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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis basically argues that the re-energised India-Philippine relations represent 
the third phase of India’s ‘Look East’ policy (LEP). The policy was implemented by 
the Indian government in 1992 as a rapprochement with Southeast Asian countries 
that were benignly neglected during the Cold War years. Specifically, the LEP was 
utilised to assuage the countries that were alienated by India’s closeness to former 
Soviet Union and navy’s expansion in Southeast Asian waters in the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, the increasing pressure of regionalisation, and the need of fresh sources 
of foreign direct investments to salvage its ailing economy also triggered the 
reorientation of its foreign and economic policies. 
 
Thus after 18 years of existence since 1992, the LEP has evolved into a multi-pronged 
mechanism that is definable in terms of motivations, global developments and 
geographical focuses. On a closer look, India’s LEP is recently in its third phase. 
From a mere navy’s diplomatic tool, the LEP became a more pronounced economic 
instrument and lately evolved as a strategic mechanism. The LEP also gained its 
prominence after several global developments acted as its watersheds such as the 
Asian Financial Crisis, 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, 9/11 World Trade Center’s 
attack and the subsequent war against terrorism among others. This thesis also shares 
similar views with prominent experts that in terms of space, the LEP also managed to 
expand its coverage from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as its 
pillar to northeast Asian countries and some member states of Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF). It, however, advances an argument that India’s relations with all ten member 
states of ASEAN did not constitute only one phase of the policy. On the contrary, the 
relations along with the policy were conducted in three instalments. The first stage 
happened with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, as well as Brunei and 
followed by Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. The case of the Philippines 
falls within the third phase of the LEP simultaneous with the revitalisation of India’s 
ties with Northeast Asian and Pacific countries. 
 
Drawn primarily from the information gathered through interviews as well as archival 
and library researches, this thesis also examines the factors why the Philippines 
responded only to India’s LEP in the beginning of the 21st Century. Aside from the 
natural and social disasters that prevented the Philippines to respond to India’s LEP in 
its early years of implementation, shadows of Cold War still haunt the Philippines and 
India relations. Both countries became ‘prisoners of history’ wherein relations had 
been cordial but distant even a decade after the Cold War’s conclusion.  
 
It was only in the year 2000 onwards that the relations registered favourable economic 
and to some extent strategic offshoots. Improvements are noticeable in terms of total 
trade in bilateral merchandise and services, as well as in flows on tourism, investment 
and manpower. The most recent developments in the relations include the expansion 
of Indian based/owned business process outsourcing companies in the archipelago as 
well as the increasing importation of Indian pharmaceutical products in the 
Philippines.
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Regionalism as a concept, along with regionalisation1, continues to be one of the 
significant themes in numerous works on globalisation and international political 
economy used over the last decades. 
 
Before 1990, Karl Deutsch, David Mitrany, and Ernest Haas2 presented a classic 
model of regionalism that operated on inter-state cooperation and transnational 
community building3 with a security emphasis. The change of the world order in 
1990, however, ushered the evolution of ‘new regionalism’.4  James Mittleman, for 
instance, emphasised that the regionalism in the 1990s is not to be considered as a 
movement towards territorially based autarkies as it was during the 1930s. The 1990 
version represents the concentrations of political and economic power competing in 
                                                
1 Regionalisation describes an increase in regional ties measured by the share of intra-regional 
trade in total trade or by the direction of investment flows. The distinction between 
regionalism and regionalisation is often made only in the literature but not always carefully 
used. Detlef Lorenz. “Regionalisation versus Regionalism: Problems of Change in the World 
Economy.” Intereconomics. 26. (1991): 3-10. Cited in Richard Pomfret. Regionalism in East 
Asia: Why has it flourished since 2000 and how far will it go? Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 2011. xvii.   
2 Karl Deutsch et. al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1957; David Mitrany. A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1961, and Ernest Haas. “The Challenge of Regionalism.” International Organization. 
12.4. (Autumn 1958): 440-458. 
3 Jorn Dosch. “The Post-Cold War Development of Regionalism in East Asia.” Regionalism in 
East Asia: Paradigm Shifting? Eds. Fu-Kuo Liu and Philippe Regnier. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 30. 
4 Hettne felt awkward of continuously using the term ‘new’ to something that is now more 
than two decades old. This research, however, still maintains that the start and development of 
India’s revitalized relations with countries in Southeast Asian region was done at times when 
conditions were still perfectly fit in the definition of the second wave of regionalism. 
    2 
the global economy, with multiple interregional and intraregional flows.5 Bjorn Hettne 
and colleagues at the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the 
United Nations University in Helsinki even considered ‘new regionalism’ as a 
multidimensional phenomenon instead of an economic one.6 Being developed in a 
multipolar world order, Hettne personally argued that new regionalism is a 
comprehensive multidimensional programme including economic, security, 
environmental and many other issues. For him, it was an open regionalism wherein 
the integration project should be market-driven and outward-looking, avoiding high 
levels of protection and should be part of the ongoing globalisation and 
internationalisation process of the world political economy.7 Mary Farrell, too, shared 
similar view on regionalism’s multidimensional form of integration embracing 
economic, cultural, political and social aspects, thereby extending the understanding 
of regional activities beyond the creation of free trade agreements or security 
regimes.8 
 
                                                
5 James Mittleman. “Rethinking the ‘New Regionalism’ in the Context of Globalisation.” 
Globalism and the New Regionalism. Eds. Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel. 
United Kingdom: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1999. 27. 
6 Oliver Hensengerth. Regionalism in China-Vietnam Relations. New York: Routledge, 2010. 
16. 
7 Bjorn Hettne. “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism.” New Political Economy. 10.4. (2003): 549. 
Hettne cited the works of Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration 
and the Global Trading System. United States of America: Harvester Wheathsheaf, 1993; 
Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, eds. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1993; and Vincent Cable and David Henderson, eds. 
Trade Blocs? The Future of Regional Integration. United Kingdom: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994. 
8 Mary Farrell. “The Global Politics of Regionalism: An Introduction.” Global Politics of 
Regionalism: Theory and Practice. Eds. Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove. 
London: Pluto Press, 2005. 8. 
    3 
Furthermore, Hettne, Fredrik Soderbaum, and Ellen Frost considered the new 
regionalism as a joint initiative of both state and non-state actors.9 Louise Fawcett 
expressed similar view that the state is no longer regionalism’s only gatekeeper.10 
Non-state actors such as civil societies and private sectors are also working separately 
or in cooperation with state agencies towards regional cooperation. Frost, however, 
argued that the initiative is still essentially political since it is being driven by 
government fiat and stems from the actions of political authorities.11  
 
Since states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given 
region, regionalism according to Fawcett is conceived as a policy and a project.12 
Richard Pomfret also believed that it is a policy-driven, involving agreements among 
national governments.13  Following this line of thinking, regionalism as a project and 
an evolving policy only validates that the ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) is a tangible form 
of India’s regional initiative in Southeast Asia and the Philippines since 1992. 
 
1.2. Main Objectives of the Research 
Given the growing interests in regionalism of India in Southeast Asia, it is only 
imperative that India’s relations with other smaller partners in the region including the 
Philippines are also highlighted. Hence, this research aims to address the following 
objectives: 
                                                
9 Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum. “Theorising the Rise of Regionness.” New 
Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy. Eds. Shaun Breslin, et. al. United Kingdom: 
Routledge, 2002. 33. Also, Ellen Frost. Asia’s New Regionalism. United States of America: 
Lynne Reinner, 2008. 157. 
10 Louise Fawcett. “Regionalism From an Historical Perspective.” Global Politics of 
Regionalism: Theory and Practice. Eds. Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove. 
London: Pluto Press, 2005. 25. 
11 Frost. 157. 
12 Fawcett. 25. 
13 Pomfret. xvii. 
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• To explain the existence of a ‘cordial but distant behaviour’ between India and 
the Philippines in the context of their Cold War history of relations; 
• To investigate whether the change in the foreign and economic policies of post 
Cold War Philippines and India resulted to compatible or contradictory 
policies towards regional cooperation; 
• To define India’s ‘Look East’ policy in Southeast Asia and the Philippines in 
particular as a regional strategy; and 
• To identify the concrete manifestations of regionalism in the recent India-
Philippine relations. 
 
1.3. Main Hypothesis of the Research  
Since 1992, India has successfully engaged with Southeast Asian countries through 
the LEP. In its 18 years of implementation, a volume of literature has been written on 
its evolution and current standing. Most of these materials suggest that the policy has 
reached the second phase of its development, remained to be economically focused, 
and been implemented in Southeast Asia as one collective initiative. This research, 
however, contests that India’s regionalism in Southeast Asia has now evolved into a 
multidimensional mechanism fit to either engage bilaterally or multilaterally with all 
ASEAN countries including smaller economic players in the region such as the 
Philippines. The points below, as expounded further in Chapter 3, therefore argue that 
the India-Philippine recent relations represent the third phase of India’s LEP.  
 
Foremost, the LEP’s motivation has evolved over time and assumed as a multi-
pronged instrument by giving strategic emphasis to include defence and politico-
economic related interests. From a mere naval diplomatic tool to assuage 
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misunderstandings of Indian navy’s presence in Southeast Asian waters in the late 
1980s14, the LEP became an instrument of economic diplomacy to complement 
India’s economic reforms in 1990s.15 By 2000, the LEP evolved into a 
multidimensional project to cover strategic concerns ranging from defence/maritime, 
economic and security dimensions of regionalism.16 At this point, the relations of 
India and the Philippines improved further by seizing the opportunity to collaborate 
not only on economic but also on other strategic aspects.  
 
Secondly, events of international and regional importance from 1990 to 2010 also 
shaped the advancement of India’s relations and the implementation of LEP in 
Southeast and East Asia particularly with the Philippines. Three important periods in 
the history of India and the Philippine ties were defined. The first period began from 
the end of Cold War in 1990 towards the occurrence of the financial crisis in Asia in 
1997. The second one started right after the crisis and the conduct of nuclear tests in 
South Asia in May 1998 until the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001. The third 
period began from 2002, when George W. Bush’ administration declared war on 
terrorism and against Iraq, to 2010. There are speculations that the global recession in 
2009 marks the end of the third period but the absence of substantial data, however, 
impedes verification. 
 
Lastly, LEP is now on the third phase based on its geographical focuses especially in 
the context of the Philippine relations with India. It is argued that the LEP was never 
                                                
14 GVC Naidu. Interview. 28 February 2009. 
15 Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo. “Introduction.” Beyond the Rhetoric: The Economics 
of India’s Look East Policy. Eds. Grare, Frederic and Amitabh Mattoo. New Delhi: Manohar, 
Centre de Science Humaines and Core Group for the Study of National Security. 2003. 11. 
16 GVC Naidu. “The Political and Security Dimensions of the Look East Policy.” Power, 
Commerce and Influence: India’s Look East Experience. Eds. Rabindra Sen, et. al. New Delhi: 
Lancers Books, 2009. 76. 
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implemented as a collective initiative of India in Southeast Asia. Similarly, the 
responses beneficial to India from these countries did not come simultaneously at the 
same time. In a closer examination, the information and literature available in 
circulation suggest that the LEP has undergone three phases. It started with ASEAN 
or rather the six countries of ASEAN. Prior to July 1995, there were only six members 
in this regional body namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and 
the Philippines.17 The first four including the Philippines are the original members of 
ASEAN but only the four countries achieved the Highly Performing Asian 
Economies’ (HPAE) status in late 1980s. The Philippines was not politically and 
economically prepared to actively respond to India’s initiative. Brunei, on the other 
hand, although small in size, was significantly valued by India for its petroleum 
potential. Although the Philippines was never dropped from the LEP’s radar, it 
remained to be in periphery18 at this time.19 
 
After 1995, India also engaged with the newest members of the ASEAN like 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Although they are small economic players, 
all of them are geographically important to India since a significant number of Indian 
migrants are settling in these countries. The said states are also a security concern for 
                                                
17 ASEAN Secretariat. “Overview.” Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 28 
February 2011. <http//:www.aseansec.org>.  Also, Vivian Louis Forbes. “Geopolitical 
Change: Direction and Continuing Issues.” Southeast Asia Transformed: A Geography of 
Change. Ed. Chia Lin Sien. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. 50. 
18 The term simply refers to the status of the Philippines as secondary priority in India’s 
political and economic activities. A far cry from the term expounded by world systems 
analyst, Immanuel Wallerstein, in 1970s regarding the relations of the ‘periphery’ of 
undeveloped countries and ‘core’ of developed states. Immanuel Wallerstein. “Dependence in 
an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist 
World Economy.” African Studies Review. 17.1 (April 1974): 2.  
19 The Philippines, according to then Ambassador Navrekha Sharma, has been traditionally 
outside India’s trade radar for a long time. Even after India’s LEP was launched in the early 
1990s, bilateral trade with the Philippines did not pick up whereas India’s trade with countries 
like Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam grew rapidly. Navrekha Sharma. 
Prithviraj Hegde. The Rediff. 31 October 2005. 13 November 2010. <http://www.rediff.com>.   
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India. Aside from sharing border with India’s northeast regions, Myanmar together 
with Cambodia and Laos, are also challenged by several transnational problems and 
are feared to spill over in India. The same is true with Vietnam, which shares border 
with India’s rival, China. Again, the Philippines is still on the side-line. 
 
It was only in the early part of 2000 that regionalism began to actively work in India-
Philippine relations. This observation is validated by Pomfret’s conclusion that before 
2000, regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region was distinguished by its absence.20 Along 
with the change of motivations and defining global developments, India at the 
beginning of the 21st Century has able to solicit positive responses from the 
Philippines by capitalizing on security dimension and economic integration vision of 
regional interaction in the region. The Philippines once more earned a place in India’s 
foreign and economic priorities in Eastern Asia21 to include Northeast Asian countries 
(China, Japan and South Korea) and the Pacific Islands along with Australia and New 
Zealand. 
 
1.4. Nature and Scope of the Research 
In 1990, the world witnessed the disintegration of former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) resulting in the end of Cold War. Contemporaneously, the 
liberalisation of Indian economy occurred with the subtle implementation of the LEP. 
The said strategies were implemented as instruments by the Indian government to 
address those challenges in its domestic and external affairs. Fortunately for India, 
both strategies produced good results. 
                                                
20 Pomfret. 25. He considered the period before 2000 as the case of missing regionalism. 
21 Paul Evans. “The Concept of Eastern Asia.” Eastern Asia: An Introduction History. Ed. 
Colin Mackerras. New South Wales: Longman, 2000. 3. 
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The conclusion of Cold War brought politico-economic vacuum to India especially at 
a time when the world was also reconfiguring economically and strategically. India 
was also facing a looming fiscal bankruptcy due to the depletion of its foreign 
reserves and the decreasing remittance especially from the Gulf states. To arrest such 
crisis, the Indian government under Narasimha Rao22 as Prime Minister and Dr. 
Manmohan Singh23 as Finance Minister liberalised the economy. India, therefore, 
needed to search for new markets as well as sources of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) to resuscitate its ailing economy.  
 
The long history of protectionist policy and a strong dependence on USSR’s economy 
made it difficult for India to gain sympathy and economic support from its immediate 
neighbourhood. It should be noted that most of the countries sharing borders with 
India had their respective problems with it.24 Thus, India was forced to go beyond its 
regional grouping looking for areas that were not hostile and willing to outpour more 
FDI in the country. The Indian government made series of attempts to reach out to 
various countries particularly in its east. Some of these were quite receptive while 
                                                
22 Pamulaparthi Venkata Narasimha Rao was the 10th Prime Minister of the Republic of India 
from 21 June 1991 to 16 May 1996. “Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao - A Profile.” Prime Minister of 
India. n.d. 31 May 2010. <http://pmindia.nic.in/former.htm>. 
23 Dr. Manmohan Singh served as finance minister from 1991 to 1996 and is the current prime 
minister. He is the 14th Prime Minister of the Republic of India from 22 May 2004 to present. 
“Dr. Manmohan Singh- Personal Profile.” Prime Minister of India. n.d. 31 May 2010. 
<http://pmindia.nic.in/former.htm>. 
24 The neighbouring countries of India in South Asian region have some issues with it. 
Pakistan has a long border issue with India since the 1947 partition and the case of Kashmir. 
Similarly, Bangladesh has issues on border and migrant mobility as well as Sri Lanka with 
Tamil fundamentalism to name a few. In the words of Ambassador Rajiv Sikri, these 
sovereign and independent countries have acquired new political and juridical personalities, 
taken separate paths of development and seek to project a distinct cultural tradition as an 
expression of their nationalism and separate identity. Rajiv Sikri. Challenge and Strategy: 
Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2009. 20.   
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others had lukewarm accommodation.25 One of those successful stories was the 
positive disposition of Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia to India.26 India then nurtured this kind of relation through the 
implementation of an aggressive economic diplomacy that gave birth to the LEP. 
 
From the onset of the LEP’s implementation in 1991 to early 2000, the Philippines as 
one of the founding members of the ASEAN either did not respond much to the 
Indian initiative or that its presence did not register at all in New Delhi’s diplomatic 
radar. Either one or both of these reasons are true, the fact remains that the Philippines 
is considered in the ‘periphery’ when it comes to India’s recent engagements in 
Southeast Asia. Similarly, India too felt that it traditionally has not figured on the 
radar screen of the Philippines, which has generally been more focused on its relations 
with the ASEAN members, other countries in East Asia and the United States of 
America (US).27 
 
One major explanation is the ideological baggage that was continuously imbibed by 
policymakers and leaders of India and the Philippines despite the end of Cold War. 
India was more identified with Soviet Union while the Philippines was pro-US. There 
were numerous instances in international conclaves that representatives of both 
countries found themselves at the opposing end.28  Overstretched by the Cold War 
years, such mutual suspicion has naturally become part of their consciousness. 
                                                
25 The case of the Philippines is a good example. Despite some efforts to respond at the initial 
engagement, the Philippines was overwhelmed by its domestic problems. 
26 These countries including the Philippines were the five founding member countries that 
formed ASEAN in 1967. 
27 Sikri. 123. 
28 These ideological differences had assumed personalities during the conferences held in 
Bandung, Indonesia and Baguio, Philippines among others. 
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Shadows of such behaviour could still be seen in some notable forums and 
international assemblies.29  
 
Moreover, the Philippines cannot be wholly blamed for not responding well to India’s 
economic advancement in the 1990s. Except for the Philippines, all ASEAN30 
founding members were enjoying more than five percent gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth in the first half of 1990s31 while the Philippine economy remained 
sluggish despite the change of regime from Ferdinand Marcos’32 dictatorship to the 
revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino33 in 1986. In its domestic front, the 
Philippines was inundated by economic and political threats. Several coups d’ etat34 
were staged against the Aquino government until 1992 that contributed negatively to 
an ailing economy. Thus, despite some advances made by the Aquino administration 
in late 1980s to the Philippine foreign policy on South Asia35, with India in particular, 
the response was still too slow. 
 
                                                
29 In 1998, the government officials of the Philippines were too critical on India’s ‘Pokran II’ 
test which they expressed in the ASEAN Regional Forum Summit in Manila, G8 Meetings in 
London and in the United Nations’ General Assembly in US. Isabelle Saint-Mezard. Eastward 
Bound: India’s New Positioning in Asia. New Delhi: Manohar and Centre de Sciences 
Humaines, 2006. 402. 
30 Brunei became a member of ASEAN only in 1987. Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam 
(CMLV) were accepted as members in the late 1990s. 
31 Ramesh Behl and L.D. Mago. India-ASEAN Trade Cooperation and Investment 
Opportunities. New Delhi: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade. 1996. 5. Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia were High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs). 
32 Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralin Marcos was the 10th president of the Republic of the 
Philippines from 1965 to 1986. He declared the Martial Law from 1972 to 1981. Ricardo Jose. 
“Marcos, Ferdinand (1917-1989).” Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor 
Wat to East Timor. Ed. Ooi Keat Gin. California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2004. 855. 
33 Maria Corazon Cojuangco Aquino was the 11th president of the Republic of the Philippines 
from 1986 to 1992. Cory, as she was fondly called, was the icon of the 1986 EDSA 
Revolution that catapulted the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos.  
34 7 coups d’ etat were staged by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) against 
Corazon Aquino’s administration. “Corazon Aquino.” Corazon Aquino.ph. n.d. 7 June 2010.  
< http://www.coryaquino.ph>.  
35 Artemio Palongpalong. Forgotten Neighbors: The Philippines’ Relations with South Asia. 
Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, 1992. 68-69. 
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In fact, the first state visit of a Philippine president to India in 1997 did not bring 
much vigour to the acceleration of India and Philippine relations. However, it was a 
good start to ‘break the ice,’ a watershed of re-engagement.36 It was only in 2000 
onwards that the effects of India’s LEP were slowly felt in the Philippines. In fact, an 
Indian diplomat observed that it was only after India’s Summit-Level Dialogue with 
the ASEAN, India’s membership of the East Asian Summit (EAS) and the exchange 
of presidential visits in 2006 to 2007 that there have been some movements in the 
bilateral relations between India and the Philippines, including cooperation in the field 
of defence and counter-terrorism.37 
 
1.5. Methodology and Research Sites 
This research took a shape after a year of fieldwork and library research in India, the 
Philippines and Singapore. For more than two months, I conducted field research in 
India particularly in New Delhi (January to March 2009) and several months in the 
Philippines and Singapore. During this period, several institutions were visited and 
numerous key informants were interviewed.  
 
In India, I visited the Philippine Embassy in New Delhi, Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs (MEA) and its Patiala House’ library, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
(MCI) particularly the Secretariat of Industrial Assistance (SIA), Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting (MIB), National Archives of India (NAI), Jawaharlal 
Nehru University (JNU) library, University of Delhi (UD), Indira Gandhi Centre of 
Arts (IGCA) library, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Foreign 
Policy Centre (FPC), Indian Council for Research on International Economic 
                                                
36 Amar Ram. Interview. 16 February 2009. 
37 Sikri. 123. 
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Relations (ICRIER), Research Information System for Developing Countries Library 
(RIS), Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Indian Council of World Affairs 
(ICWA), National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), Indian 
International Centre (IIC), Observer’s Research Foundation (ORF), Nehru Memorial 
Library and Museum (NMLM), Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI), Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), 
and Astral Travel Inc. in New Delhi as well as the Centre for Rural and Industrial 
Development (CRRID) and Punjab University (PU) in Chandigarh.  
 
In the Philippines, I visited the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Foreign Service 
Institute (FSI) Library, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) particularly the 
Bureau of Export Trade Promotion (BETP), Department of Tourism (DOT), 
Department of National Defense (DND), National Statistics Office (NSO), National 
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), Bureau of Immigration (BI), Bureau of 
Investments (BOI), Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC), Indian 
Embassy in Manila, India-Philippine Business Council (IPBC), Federation of India-
Philippines Chamber of Commerce (FIPCC), BPO Association of the Philippines 
(BPAP), BPO Association Services Unlimited (BSA/U), Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) Library, Philippine National Archives (PNA), Philippine National Library 
(PNL), University of the Philippines (UP) Library in Diliman, Pamantasan ng 
Lungsod ng Pasig (PLP), Municipality of Cainta in Rizal Province, Khalsa Diwan in 
Manila, and other Indian private companies.  
 
In Singapore, I visited the National Archives of Singapore (NAS), National Library of 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), and Institute of Policy 
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Studies (IPS). Eventually, a number of written sources available from these 
institutions were subjected to content analyses and used in some case studies and 
conference papers. 
 
1.5.1. Research Method 
In gathering the data, several research methods were utilised such as interviews, 
content analyses, case studies as well as focus group discussions. 
 
1.5.1.1. Interviews 
60 respondents were interviewed within the period from December 2008 to May 
2011. The interview was done either face to face or by electronic mail (email). In case 
of validation/verification, most of informants consented to be contacted again through 
email. During interviews, an interview guide (one version was designed for diplomats 
and bureaucrats, and another for businessmen) duly approved by the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) of the National University of Singapore was used (refer to 
Appendices A and B).   
 
Key informants include scholars, Indian and Filipino diplomats, political and military 
attaches, bureaucrats, policy makers and researchers from various think tanks, as well 
as leaders of Indian business organisations. Specifically, former Indian foreign affairs 
secretaries, Indian ambassadors as well as previous and present Indian consuls posted 
in Manila, high-level officials from the Philippine DOT, DTI, DND, DFA, PITC as 
well as Indian’s MCI were consulted. It is also important to mention that two of the 
former secretaries-general of the ASEAN also agreed as key informants.  Moreover, 
public relation personnel of Indian business process outsourcing (BPO) companies 
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based in Makati, officials of BPAP AND BSA\U, officers of IPBC in the Philippines 
and of FICCI in India were also interviewed. 
 
1.5.1.2. Content Analyses 
The research relied on information generated through content analyses of various 
sources. Texts, either in written forms (newspaper articles, official and personal 
documents, books, pamphlets, tracts and the likes) or the accounts people proffered in 
interview and later transcribed in written form38, were analysed. It also included a 
systematic examination of documents such as relevant literary works, speeches, 
government publications and others.39 Earl Babbie in 2010 also cited materials from 
magazines, web pages, letters, email messages, bulletin board posting on the internet, 
laws, and constitutions, as well as components or collections thereof as excellent 
sources for content analyses.40 In this research, content analyses of historical 
documents, bilateral agreements from the embassies of India in Manila and of the 
Philippines in New Delhi, speeches of former Indian and Philippine presidents, 
foreign affairs secretaries and other officials were consulted as well as analysed. 
Notably, selected speeches of Narasimha Rao compiled in four volumes from 1991 to 
1995 were also analysed and utilised in this research. Editorials and opinions that 
appeared in the major dailies of India and the Philippines were also examined.  
 
The research also employed online sources such as e-books, e-journals and other 
online publications of various think tanks in both countries. Since this study also 
                                                
38 Robert Miller and John Brewer, Eds. The A-Z of Social Research: A Dictionary of Key 
Social Science Research Concepts. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003. 43. 
39 Earl Babbie. The Practice of Social Research. London: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 
2001. 29. 
40 Ibid. 2010. 333. 
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covers contemporary events, articles from various print and online publications and 
magazines were employed. Moreover, annual reports and white papers from the 
outsourcing service sector, private companies, government and inter-governmental 
publications were also utilised. 
 
1.5.1.3. Case Studies 
Being a comprehensive description and explanation of many components of a given 
social situation41, case study either published or otherwise is very significant in this 
research.  Case studies done for module requirements in the National University of 
Singapore (NUS) and those presented in international conferences were fully 
employed. Foremost are the studies on Indian contact centres, Indian pharmaceutical 
trade, Indian migration in the Philippines, and state visit of the Philippine president to 
India.  
 
1.5.1.4. Focus Group Discussions 
The research also employed focus group discussions (FGD) especially among 
Filipinos who are working in India. The discussion was usually done during the 
Sunday gatherings of Filipinos to celebrate birthdays, farewell parties, basketball 
games, and other celebrations. In India, the participants included chefs in five star 
hotels, managers of foreign multinational corporations, senior officials of Indian BPO 
companies, staffs of non-governmental organisations, embassy personnel, engineers 
working in metro rail projects, assistants of foreign dignitaries posted in New Delhi, 
and wives of Indian citizens. These were usually held in Safdarjung Enclave or Siri 
Fort, New Delhi. In the Philippines, the participants were bigwigs of their own 
                                                
41 Ibid. 2001. 32. 
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companies based in Manila and at the same time members of the Philippine-Indian 
Business Council. The FGD was conducted in a plush restaurant in Makati after their 
regular Friday rendezvous. 
 
1.5.1.5. Discontinuation of FGD. Given the efficiency of conducting personal 
interviews, FGD was finally discontinued in the process. It appeared that in-depth 
discussions on business commentaries were limited due to trade secrets and privacy 
reasons of the respondents. It should be emphasised, however, that this activity was 
effective in the early part of the study since those involved were more relax in 
discussing initially their opinions with the rest of the group.  Nevertheless, the FGD 
served well as a ball rolling activity as it allowed the researcher to schedule for 
appointments of either face-to-face contact, email, or telephone interviews and made 
follow-ups. 
 
1.5.2. Brief Description of Countries Understudy 
India and the Philippines are both Asian countries. India belongs to South Asian 
regional construct while the Philippines is a Southeast Asian nation state. The former 
has a total area of 3,287,263 square kilometres of which 90 percent is land42 while the 
latter is an archipelago that sits on 300,000 square kilometres of which 99 percent 
constitute the total land area.43 Moreover, India is composed of 28 states and 7 union 
territories with New Delhi as capital44 while the Philippines has 80 provinces and 120 
                                                
42 India 2009: A Reference Annual. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Government of India, 2009. 1. 
43 The Philippines in Figures, 2009. Manila: National Statistics Office, Republic of the 
Philippines, 2009. 1. 
44 India 2009. 8-9. 
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chartered cities having Manila as administrative and economic centre45 (refer to 
Illustrations 1.1 and 1.2). 
 
 




                                                
45 The Philippines in Figures, 2009. 
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 Illustration 1.2. Political Map of the Philippines. Nations Online 
 
India and the Philippines started officially their relations in 1949. In their 60 years of 
bilateral ties, the said countries found many things in common. In politics, both 
countries were established as nation-states after World War II (WWII) with the 
Philippines in 1945 and India in 1947. Both countries were formerly colonised, India 
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was under the British control for about 190 years46 and the Philippines by the 
Spaniards for 350 years, British for almost two years47, Americans for 46 years and 
the Japanese for about four years.48 After gaining independence, both countries 
followed democratic forms of government. 
 
The economies of the Philippines and India, although in size can be likened to David 
and Goliath49, have commonalities in terms of their reform experiences. Both 
countries suffered looming bankruptcies in late 1980s and early 1990s. Both opted to 
liberalise their economies almost simultaneously in 1991 with the implementation of 
various fiscal and legislative mechanisms to arrest potential and real economic threats. 
The only difference is that India mainly liberalised the economy after losing a reliable 
market due to the disintegration of Soviet Union while the Philippines did it primarily 
as a reversal of the economic policies of former President Ferdinand Marcos. Also, 
the two countries are both agricultural-based economies and yet are now currently 
concentrated in developing further the information and communication technology 
(ICT) industry. 
 
It is indeed worthy to note that as a result of the economic reforms initiated in 1991, 
India’s long-term growth rate trend increased from 6.1 percent in the 1990s to more 
than nine percent from 2005 to 2007. In 2008, India’s economy shrank to seven 
                                                
46 J.N. Dixit. India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2003. New Delhi: Picus Books, 2003. 339. 
47 Nicholas Tracy. Manila Ransomed: The British Assault on Manila in the Seven Years War. 
United Kingdom: University of Exeter Press, 1995. 57. 
48 Teodoro Agoncillo. History of the Filipino People. Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 
1990. 371. 
49 New International Version of the The Holy Bible.  Philippines:  International Bible Society, 
1985. 211-212. In 1 Samuel 17:1-58, David and Goliath were described as examples of the 
small and big people of early times. 
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percent 50 but improved almost by one percent in 2009.51 In 2010, India’s economy 
grew at 8.6 percent and is expected to increase by nine percent in 2011 to 2012.52 This 
is considered to be a great leap from what used to be the ‘Hindu rate of growth’ in 
1960s to 1980s of not more than four percent.53  
 
By 1991, the Indian government had implemented several monetary and fiscal 
measures to enhance demands, boost credit flows, and lower interest rates in 
countering possible slowdown of the economy. These initiatives brought positive 
effects to Indian economy in succeeding years. The economy had developed strong 
fundamentals (high savings and investment rates) especially when it was already 
powered by the growth of domestic consumption and investment—unlike other 
economies that depended heavily on exports.54  The services sector also had become a 
major part of the economy with gross domestic product (GDP) share of over 60 
percent and the country becoming an important hub for exporting information 
technology (IT) services.55 India’s foreign exchange reserves crossed the US $100 
billion mark and the prevailing account deficit has turned into a surplus since 2002. 
The said improvement was achieved through non-debt creating capital flows so that 
                                                
50 Indian economy has greatly transformed due to these reforms. From a mere 3.6 percent 
growth rate during the 1950s–1970s and 5.2 percent in the 1980s, the economy in recent years 
is registering more than two percent improvement. Hiranya Mukhophadyay. “India.” Asian 
Development Outlook 2009 Update. Broadening Openness for a Resilient Asia. Manila: Asian 
Development Bank, September 2009. 129.  
51  In the second quarter of 2009, India has a growth rate of 7.9 percent. “India at a Glance.” 
India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF). January 2010. 17 March 2010. 
<http://ibef.org/artdispview.aspx?in=35&art_id=25131&cat_id=584&page=2>.  
52 Economic Advisory Council to Prime Minister. “Review of Economy 2010-2011 
Highlights.” Office of the Prime Minister of India. February 2011. 11 March 2011. 
<http:\\pmindia.nic.in>.  
53 Hindu rate is a term coined by Professor Raj Krishna of Delhi School of Economics to 
describe a disappointing but not disastrous outcome. It has a connotation based on Hindu’s 
greater emphasis on the ‘life after.’ Nihal Amerasinghe and Pradeep Kharola. Foreign Direct 
Investment in Asia: Lessons of Experience. Working Paper Series. Philippines: Gov. Jose B. 
Fernandez Jr. Center for Banking and Finance, 2006. 8.  
54 Mukhophadyay. 
55 IBEF.  
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India’s external debt remained virtually static in nominal terms. The debt servicing and 
debt ratios accordingly had fallen sharply.56 
 
Quite similar to the Indian experience, the Philippines faced a difficult task of 
rebuilding its economy after democracy was restored in 1986. The problems created 
by ‘crony capitalism’ of President Marcos’ regime was followed by six more years of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed structural adjustment57 under President 
Corazon Aquino’s administration. These collectively contributed to the sluggish 
performance of the Philippine economy. Its spill over effects were still felt in 1993, 
despite the implementation of reforms in 1991, wherein a zero average growth was 
registered since 1983.58 This economic catastrophe, resulting from the natural and 
political upheavals like the Pinatubo eruption, coup d’etat side by side with global 
recession of the mid-1980s, forced the government to take decisive action.  
 
The Philippine government revoked the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
strategy and replaced it with an export-oriented manufacturing (EOM) policy. This led 
to the introduction of an Omnibus Incentives Code in 1987 followed by the Foreign 
Investment Act (FIA) in 1991. 59 A New Central Bank Act was also enacted in 1991.60 
                                                
56 Nihal and Kharola.  
57 IMF imposed to the Philippine government to prioritize the payment of its foreign debt that 
consequently deprived the economy of much-needed investment. 
58 Nihal and Kharola. 14. 
59 Foreign Investment Act of 1991 is the enacted Republic Act No. 7042 that opens most areas 
of economic activities to foreigners, allowing foreign equity of up to 100 percent except in 
areas covered in negative list. Anthony Bende-Nabende. FDI, Regionalism, Government 
Policy and Endogenous Growth. England and Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999. 
24-25. 
60 The New Central Bank Act or Republic Act No. 7653 created an independent central 
monetary authority called Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to manage the fiscal system.  It also 
gave permission for foreign banks to open in the country after 46 years. Claro Parlade. Foreign 
Direct Investments in the Philippines.  Hongkong and Singapore: Sweet and Maxwell Asia. 
1997. 3. 
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At the same time, the government transformed two former US military bases in Subic 
and Clark into Special Economic and Freeport Zones (SEFZs). Because of state 
interventions, the largely market-driven economy of the Philippines has attained rapid 
growth in succeeding years despite the 1997 inflation.61 In fact, the average GDP 
growth improved to 5.6 percent from 2003 to 2008, compared to three percent from 
1990 to 2000. The stable growth rate was accompanied by benign inflation, declining 
national government debt as a proportion of GDP, markedly reduced fiscal deficit, and 
a robust balance of payments (BOP) position. The GDP growth in 2008 decelerated to 
4.6 percent while the fiscal deficit was at 0.9 percent of GDP to support growth during 
the global economic downturn.62 The GDP growth further slowed to 4.2 percent in 
200963 and regained in 2010 with 7.2 percent.64  
 
By and large, the economic reforms and policies implemented by these countries in the 
early 1990s produced considerable improvements in their own economies recently. 
The World Bank’ key macroeconomic indicators as of 2009 will show the 
improvement of these economies in the past years. The economic growth of the 
Philippines, however, when compared to India is indeed miniscule as demonstrated in 
Table 1.1.  
 
 
                                                
61 Ibid.  
62 Teresa Mendoza and Purnima Rajapakse. Asian Development Outlook 2009 Update. 
Broadening Openness for a Resilient Asia. Manila: Asian Development Bank, September 
2009. 151. 
63 “Gross National Product and Gross Domestic Product. Fourth Quarter 2009.” National 
Statistical Coordination Board. 28 January 2010. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.nscb.gov.ph/sna/2009/4thQ2009/2009per4.asp>.  
64 “Philippines Records Highest GDP Growth in 34 Years.” Philippine Embassy in Singapore. 
10 February 2011. 14 April 2011. <http://www.philippine-
embassy.org.sg/news/2011/02/philippines-records-highest-gdp-growth-in-34-years/>.  
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Table 1.1. Selected Indicators* of India and Philippines 
 
Indicators India Philippines 
Population (Million) (2009) 1,155.34 91.98 
GNI (2009) US $ Billion Current Value 1,405.7 164.6 
GNI Per Capita (2009) US $ Billion 
Current Value 
3,280 3,540 
US $ Billion 237.69 62.91 External Debt (2009) 
Percent of GNI 18.9 41.9 
GDP 2009 US $ Billion 1,377.3 161.2 
GDP Growth Rate (Percent) 2007-2008 9.1 1.1 
Total Reserves (2009) US $ Billion 284.7 44.2 
Net ODA (2009) US $ Million  2,453 310 
FDI net flows (2009) US $ Billion 34.58 1.95 
Exports (2009)  
US $ Billion 
185.29 38.44  
Merchandise 
Imports (2009)  
US $ Billion 
303.69 43.09 
 
Source: All data, except merchandise and net ODA, are generated from World 
Bank Open Data 2011. Merchandise data are taken from the export-import 
databanks of both India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Philippines’ 
Department of Trade and Industry. Net ODA figures are taken from 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
* Gross National Income (GNI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Official 




The Philippines, according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) study in 2006, has 
lagged behind among Asian countries for two to three decades due to poor investment 
climate. This was brought about by macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructures, 
excessive regulation and corruption. Investors were also discouraged by poor 
governance and inadequate infrastructure facilities like power outages, inefficient 
telecommunication systems, inefficient water supply, tax rates, economic uncertainty, 
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crime concerns and red tape in obtaining government licences or permits, active 
labour unions, high labour cost65 and even obtaining a visa.66  
 
As of 2010, these hindrances have gradually been removed and favourable business 
climate has been put in place through various mechanisms67 employed both by 
government agencies and private sectors. These improvements are vividly expressed 
in the speeches of multinational corporations’ top executives especially among Indian 
businessmen during the launching of their new offices and facilities in the country. A 
phenomenon, greatly credited to the favourable conditions in the country and the 
successful facilitation of LEP, which triggered the rise of Indian BPO enterprises, 
flooding of Indian pharmaceutical products in the archipelago, and an increase of 
merchandise trade to more than a billion US dollar among others. 
 
Socio-culturally, India and the Philippines shared some cultural connectivity. Many if 
not all of Indian officials when visiting countries in Southeast Asia invoked in their 
speeches the civilisation links of India with the region over a millennium. 68 As 
                                                
65 Nihal and Kharola. 14. 
66 Usual complaints of most informants interviewed such as former Ambassador Navrekha 
Sharma, Mr. Johnny Chotrani, and Mr. Geedee Singh among others. In 2004, the Philippine 
DFA issued a memo revising the policy towards Indian nationals. It allows any Philippine 
embassy worldwide to issue visa for Indians as well as the Philippine consulates in Mumbai, 
Kolkata and Madras to issue tourist visa without referring to the Philippine Embassy in New 
Delhi. At the same time, it allows for multiple entry visas. Vishnu Hathiramani, ed. 2009 
Philippines Immigration Update Book.  Manila: Popular Publishing House, 2009. 122. 
67 In August 2007, the Philippine government through its Bureau of Immigration offers pro-
investment visa to all foreigners interested to put up business in the Philippines. Types of this 
visa are pointed out in the FDI section of this chapter. The government also offered fiscal and 
non-fiscal incentives and developed the information infrastructure system as manifested by the 
existence of cyber corridor. Details of these are also mentioned in Chapter 7.  
68 Selected speeches of former Prime Ministers Narasimha Rao, and Atal Vajpayee, former 
President Abdul Kalam and current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh mentioned partly these 
civilizational links. Narasimha Rao. “India and the Asia-Pacific: A New Relationship.” P. V. 
Narasimha Rao Selected Speeches- Volume IV, July 1994-June 1995. New Delhi: Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, 1995. 390; also Atal Bihari Vajpayee. India’s Perspectives on 
ASEAN and the Asia Pacific Region. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. 6; 
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Amartya Sen rightly pointed out, the influence of interaction between Indians and the 
Southeast Asians is well reflected in languages and vocabularies throughout Asia 
through Thailand and Malaya, to Indo-China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea and 
Japan.69 In fact, the implementation of India’s LEP had been justified through India’s 
centuries old links with Southeast Asia. This was reinforced by the speech of Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh in the 3rd India-ASEAN Business Summit in New Delhi 
in October 2004. He said that India wished to look east because of centuries of 
interaction between India and Southeast Asia.70  
 
A case to point, the Indian diplomatic circles prior to this pronouncement have readily 
orchestrated their spiritual ties with the region. In East Asia, for instance, the 
connection has been capitalised through the presence of Buddhism. Indian officials 
are hoping that the utilisation of any of the ancient ties between India and East Asia 
may generate additional weight to India’s contemporary position and hence nurture a 
feeling of cultural proximity.71 In the case of the Philippines, the existence of Indian 
diasporic communities72 in the country had reinforced further the influence of the LEP 
in promoting various partnerships between India and the Philippines. This ‘silent’ 
factor along with other initiatives coordinated by public and private organisations in 
                                                
also Abdul Kalam. Address at the Joint Session of the Congress of the Philippines. 06 
February 2006. External Publicity Division. Visit of Dr. A.P. J. Abdul Kalam to Singapore, 
Philippines and Republic of Korea, February 1-8, 2006. New Delhi: Ministry of External 
Affairs, 2006.127; also Manmohan Singh. “PM Statement at the 7th India-ASEAN Summit in 
Thailand.” n.d. 24 October 2009. http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=833.  
69 Amartya Sen. The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity. 
New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005. 85. 
70 Sudhir Devare. India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006. 28. 
71 Saint-Mezard. 251. 
72 The 50,000 people of Indian origins (PIO) as well as descendants of sepoys (Indian soldiers 
serving the British colonizers) in the country are one of the ‘umbilical connections’ of India 
and the Philippines. Joefe Santarita. “Beyond Bombay: Indians in the Philippines.” 
Conference in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of Philippines and India Ties. 
University of the Philippines. September 2009. Unpublished conference paper. 
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both countries have holistically contributed in the realisation of India’s regionalism in 
the region. 
 
1.6. Limitations of the Research 
The aim of this research is not to deliver an economic analysis of the relations. The 
discussion of economic cooperation is solely taken into consideration where it appears 
as part of foreign and security policies. Thus economic policy is perceived as a 
foreign policy/regionalism tool and is used for foreign policy analysis only.73  
 
In addition, the detailed discussions on security and socio-cultural aspects particularly 
the Indian migration in the Philippines are not covered in this study. This could be 
done as a separate future research along this line. At the same time, this research is 
also restricted to discussion on Indian manpower flows in the Philippines due to 
dearth of information in India, the Philippines and even from the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). 
 
In spite of several attempts in updating the information especially on pharmaceutical 
section, the accessible trade data from the coordinating agencies both in India and the 
Philippines are those figures prior to 2009. The same is true with data on economic 
indicators of both countries. Sources such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
ASEAN, United Nations and others could only provide the latest data gathered from 
2008 to 2009. These institutions also relied most of their information from the 
consolidated figures of the ministry’s in charge in home country. 
 
                                                
73 Hensengerth. 5. 
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The information used in this research particularly in the BPO sector is taken online 
specifically from the websites of the various BPO companies. With the intention of 
providing the latest information, the most practical sources are white papers, press 
releases and newspaper featured articles available online. 
 
1.7. Organisation of the Dissertation 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters including this introduction. Chapter 2 
examines the concepts of ‘region’, ‘new regionalism’, and ‘regionalisation’ to explain 
the existence of India’s LEP in Southeast Asia. Drawn from numerous available 
literature, the concept of the LEP is examined in the context of India’s participation in 
the regionalisation process of post Cold War Southeast Asia as a ‘region.’  
 
Chapter 3 answers the third objective of this research. It defines the nature and current 
state of the LEP as India’s regionalist instrument in Southeast Asia using the recent 
India-Philippine relations as a case study. Specifically, the policy is examined against 
the definable terms of motivations, global developments and geographical focuses.   
 
Chapter 4 addresses the first objective. It traces the reasons of the sluggish 
development of India and Philippine relations despite the implementation of the LEP. 
This part discusses the existence of a ‘cordial yet distant relations’ between these 
countries as far as the Cold War period. 
 
Chapter 5, as a response to the second objective, discusses the dilemma and 
developments of the 1990s to India and the way it used these to seize the opportunity 
of reforming its economy and foreign policy. It discusses the implementation of 
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India’s LEP as a mechanism in negotiating India’s role in Southeast Asia and how it 
was being used to expand its global aspirations among those countries that were less 
responsive to its previous initiatives such as the Philippines. 
 
The last objective of the research is discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6, for 
instance, assesses the extent of the LEP’s influences in the archipelago using selected 
variables of economic relations such as merchandise trade relations, investment 
relations, tourism flows and manpower flows as points of reference. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the India-Philippine collaboration on the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector particularly on BPO companies in the 
Philippines. In particular, the presence of the 24 Indian-based/owned BPO companies 
in the archipelago is categorised into four types of inter-firm linkages and clustering.  
Chapter 8 talks about the parallel importation arrangement of Indian pharmaceutical 
products in the Philippines, the establishment of Indian pharmaceutical representative 
offices in the country and the overall benefits it brought to the Philippine health sector 
and economy. 
 
As a concluding section, Chapter 9 summarises the points that address those questions 
emanated from the objectives and main hypotheses of the research offered in the first 
chapter.   
 
1.8. Conclusion 
This chapter basically argues that the current India-Philippine relations represent the 
third phase of India’s LEP. With this in mind, a survey of related literature is 
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necessary to help in setting up the direction of the study as well as identify important 
points in enhancing the argument of this research. What follows then is a chapter that 
examines the bodies of literature in guiding this research to identify concepts that will 
elucidate further the recent advancement of India’s relations with East Asian countries 





















    30 
CHAPTER 2 
 
REGIONALISM IN INDIA-SOUTHEAST ASIAN RELATIONS:  
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As a prelude, the first chapter succinctly laid down the intention of examining the 
development of the ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) as India’s integration mechanism to 
East Asia particularly Southeast Asia. In situating further India’s reoriented foreign 
policy in the post Cold War Southeast Asia, concepts such as region, regionalism and 
regionalisation were consulted and examined. Also, to have a survey of the extent of 
the LEP’s influence in the region, numerous literature were consulted and elaborately 
discussed in this chapter especially those works related on Indian relations with other 
Southeast Asian countries. 
 
As a response to the third research objective, this chapter defines the LEP in Southeast 
Asia and in the Philippines as a vivid manifestation of India’s regionalism in the area. 
Organised into five parts, the first section of this chapter reviews the available 
literature regarding India’s relations with countries in Southeast Asia as well as 
identifies useful materials for India-Philippine early ties. The second section, on the 
other hand, situates India and Southeast Asia in the context of the region as a concept 
while the third section consults various definitions of scholars working on regionalism 
and subsequently explains the concept in the context of India’s post Cold War 
relations with Southeast Asian countries. The fourth section rationalises the role of 
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regionalisation in India’s interaction with Southeast Asian countries. The last section 
concludes this chapter. 
 
2.2. India’s Relations with Southeast Asia: Literature Review  
Various academic works have been written about the relations of India and Southeast 
Asian countries prior to the end of Cold War. The topics were also varied ranging 
from social to cultural, economic and political, all written against the backdrop of 
superpowers’ rivalry. Several comprehensive publications have appeared over the last 
six decades along with journal articles that touched on the ‘benign neglect’ treatments 
of India and the countries of Southeast Asia with each other.  
 
From 1991 onwards, however, the theme of the discussions between India and 
Southeast Asia fall under the changing world order. Books and journal articles among 
others are no longer concentrated solely within the political realm but ventured as well 
into economic and strategic aspects. In particular, the growing curiosity on the 
reforms implemented by Indian government in its economy as well as foreign policy 
in 1990s triggered the production of numerous publications meant for this purpose. 
Aside from Southeast Asia- the region in focus, some scholars also gave attention to 
India’s bilateral connection with individual member countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Examples of most recent comprehensive works 
include Lipi Ghosh’s “Connectivity and Beyond: Indo-Thai Relations through Ages” 
(2009), Marie Lall’s “India-Myanmar Relations: Geopolitics and Energy in light of 
the New Balance of Power in Asia” (2009), See Chak Mun’s “India's Strategic 
Interests in Southeast Asia and Singapore” (2009)1, BIMSTEC Network of Think 
                                                
1 Published in New Delhi by MacMillan Publishers India Ltd.  
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Tanks,  Indian Chamber of Commerce and  Centre for Studies in International 
Relations and Development’s joint publication “BIMSTEC Cooperation Report 2008” 
(2009)2, Vasant Bira Jugale’s edited volume “Economic Growth and Foreign Trade 
Relations among India, China and ASEAN” (2009)3 and Faizal Yahya’s “Economic 
Cooperation between Singapore and India: An Alliance in the Making” (2008).  
 
Moreover, a study on Indian relations with Malaysia conducted a decade ago by B.N. 
Ghosh’s “A Tale of New Economies: Development Dynamics of India and Malaysia” 
(1998) is still significant to the pool of authoritative materials on such relations. There 
are no studies yet available in Singapore and in the Philippines, written in English and 
for general circulation, that extensively discuss about Indian ties with Indonesia and 
the region’s small economies such as Laos, Cambodia, Brunei, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines with the exception of Myanmar. It is understandable that scholars 
particularly Indians will give more attention to Myanmar because of its border and 
non-traditional security concerns. 
 
In search of related publications, a survey on the collections of various academic and 
policy-linked organisations in India is imperative. The most effective and cost 
efficient way of doing this is browsing the online catalogue of India-based DELNET4. 
This exercise, as a standard operating procedure, is conducted to refine the ongoing 
                                                
2 Published by Bookwell in New Delhi. 
3 It was published by Serials Publication in New Delhi. 
4 DELNET began at the India International Centre Library in January 1988 and was registered 
as a society in 1992. It was supported by various agencies of the government of India such as 
the National Information System for Science and Technology (NISSAT), Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), National Informatics Centre (NIC), Department of 
Information Technology (DIT), Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
(MCIT), and the Ministry of Culture (MOC). It offers a web platform that allowed online 
accession of the union catalogue of literature available in various libraries and historico-
cultural centres all over India. 
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dissertation project in case similar works have been done in India. Hitherto, the result 
shows that there are few books and dissertations done that focused solely on India and 
its recent bilateral relations with each ASEAN member countries. These include the 
books of Hariyadi Wirawan’s “Indonesia and India: A Study of Political Strategic and 
Cultural Partnership, 1991-2002” (2004)5; Susan Bayle’s “Asian Voice in a 
Postcolonial Age: Vietnam, India and Beyond” (2007)6, “Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao 
PDR: A Study of India's Trade and Investment Potential” (1997)7, Export Import 
Bank of India’s commissioned study “Union of Myanmar: Study of India's Trade and 
Investment Potential” (1999)8, “Study on Promotion of Border Trade between India 
and Myanmar” (1995)9, Dipankar Banerjee’s “Myanmar and Northeast India” 
(1997)10, N.N. Vohra edited book “Emerging Asia: Challenges for India and 
Singapore” (2003)11, Kishan Rana’s “Asian Diplomacy: The Foreign Ministries of 
China, India, Japan, Singapore and Thailand” (2007)12, Anil Kumar Singh Jha’s 
“India and Thailand: A study of Socio-economic and Cultural Partnership (1988-
2000)” (2004)13, and Tang Nath Dubey’s “India and Thailand” (1990)14. 
 
In the case of the Philippines, not a single book or dissertation has been written yet by 
Indian or any scholars that highlights its recent relations with India. On a recent 
surfing of DELNET catalogue, only two studies conducted in the 1970s about India-
                                                
5 An opportunity was given to the researcher to browse the said material while looking for 
Philippine related materials in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) library. Browsing an online 
union catalogue on books powered by DELNET will only show two relevant materials on 
Indo-Indonesia relations. One was published in 1976 and the most recent was in 2004. 
6 Published by Cambridge University Press. 
7 Published by Quest Publication in India. 
8 Published as an occasional paper by the Export Import Bank of India based in Mumbai.  
9 This 105-page manuscript was published in New Delhi. 
10 Published by Delhi Policy Group in New Delhi. 
11 Published by the India International Centre (IIC) in New Delhi. 
12 Published in Malta by Diplo Foundation.  
13 This 213-page manuscript is accessible in the JNU Library. 
14 Published by H. K. Publishers and Distributors in New Delhi. 
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Philippine connections are found and these touched more on socio-economic and 
agricultural aspects.15 Another literature that is worth citing, although not directly 
related to India-Philippine foreign relations, is the book written in 1978 by JNU 
Professor Man Mohini Kaul.16  She highlighted in her manuscript the development of 
the Philippines in the last three decades since its inception as a nation state in 1945, 
and the conduct of its diplomatic linkages to other Southeast Asian countries. Despite 
the Cold War emphasis, the above-mentioned materials are still significant in this 
study as these all served as points of reference in assessing the past and present 
conditions of India-Philippine relations.  
 
It is also worthy to mention the classic manuscript on early connections of India and 
the Philippines published in 1930 by Dhirenda Nath Roy entitled “The Philippines 
and India”. The book traces the civilisation links of Indian and Filipino societies 
centuries ago. It also laments the long isolation of the Philippines from the East and 
the strong persuasion by the West as its self-appointed teacher to regard the East with 
western attitude. This literature is a good material to know the early perceptions of 
Indians about the Philippines. 
 
In general, the number of publications in the Philippines that extensively talks about 
current collaborations between India and this archipelagic nation-state is almost close 
to nil. In absence, manuscripts on Philippine linkages with South Asian countries, 
                                                
15 Only the works of Rabindra Nath Ray (1971) a dissertation “Study of socio-economics 
conditions of Indian in Philippines” in the University of Delhi: Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Department of Social Work; and Nirmal Sengupta (1990) a book entitled “Managing Common 
Property: Irrigation in India and the Philippines” published by Sage Publications are among 
the very few literature that talked about India-Philippine connections. DELNET online union 
catalogue of books and dissertations. 
16 Man Mohini Kaul. The Philippines and Southeast Asia. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 
1978. 
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post graduate papers on Cold War India-Philippine ties as well as culturally focused 
articles deposited in some libraries in the archipelago partially addressed this dearth. 
The works of Rodelio de la Cruz and Amelita Ordonez on “A Study of Philippine 
Bilateral Trade Relations with South Asia: India and Pakistan (1964-1981)”, Lourdes 
Rajini Rye on “Philippines-India Bilateral Relations (1950-1980)” and Artemio 
Palongpalong “Forgotten Neighbors: The Philippines’ Relations with South Asia” are 
among the few of its kind.  
 
In their master’s thesis submitted in 1982, De la Cruz and Ordonez traced the 
evolution of the Philippine trading relations with India and Pakistan for almost two 
decades. They concluded that the Philippine economic relations with those South 
Asian countries at that time were both difficult and promising. It was quite 
challenging due to the protective markets of both countries and promising as well 
because of the opportunities for Philippine exports to gain ground in these markets.17 
Rye, on the other hand, extensively discussed in her master’s thesis the Indian 
relations with the Philippines during the Cold War years. She found that the intensity 
of the relations was affected by the fundamental difference in countries’ foreign 
policy orientation. In her observation, the relations from 1952 to 1957 were ‘inhibited 
at best and estranged at worst’.18  
 
Palongpalong examined the Philippine general attitude towards the three countries in 
                                                
17 Rodelio de la Cruz and Amelita Ordonez. “A Study of Philippine Bilateral Trade Relations 
with South Asia: India and Pakistan (1964-1981).” MA Thesis. University of the Philippines, 
1982. 13. 
18 Lourdes Rajini Rye. “Philippines-India Bilateral Relations (1950-1980).” MA Thesis. 
University of the Philippines, 1990. 241. Rye observed that the Philippine policy of alignment 
and pro-military approach to the problems of regional security alienated neutralist countries 
like India. Similarly, India’s staunch rejection of military alliances and its non-aligned posture 
in the superpower rivalry isolated the Philippines from its thinking and completely excluded it 
from India’s ‘zone of peace’. Thus, a cordial but distant relations existed between the two. 
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South Asia namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, particularly on issues of 
alignment and neutralism as well as issues discussed in the United Nations General 
Assembly. In particular, he mentioned that the country’s policies towards India and its 
reactions resulted to ‘unenthusiastic cordiality’ and ‘correct but distant relations’.19 
The author also pointed out that the Philippines, prior to the implementation of the 
LEP, started to reorient its relations with India and its two other neighbours in South 
Asian sub-continent. The government of President Corazon Aquino initiated the 
‘development diplomacy’20 to South Asia from 1986 to 1992 in order to secure 
additional inputs for economic and social development. India along with Pakistan and 
Bangladesh were seen to have complementarities with the Philippines that have not 
been fully explored and tapped. Various promotional activities for this purpose were 
facilitated by the Philippine embassy in New Delhi. Some were successful but the 
whole process in the late 1980s stagnated after the Philippines experienced a series of 
natural and social disasters.21  
 
The earlier studies have helped in identifying the direction of this research project 
especially in determining areas requiring further study. If there are literature that dealt 
with recent developments on India and Philippines, these are white papers intended 
for bureaucratic consumption and executive summary for state visits. The dearth, 
                                                
19 Artemio Palongpalong. Forgotten Neighbors: The Philippines’ Relations with South Asia. 
Quezon City: Asian Center, 1992. 96. 
20 Development Diplomacy is defined as the harnessing and managing of all available 
resources of the nation, internal and external, public and private, official and non-official, in 
the active pursuit and the acquiring of opportunities abroad in the vital areas of trade, 
investment, finance, technology and aid. Its primary objective is to enhance the economic 
performance and the generation of bounding growth of the nation's political economy. 
Benjamin Domingo. The Making of Filipino Foreign Policy. Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 
1983. 82. 
21 The Philippines was a multi-disaster prone country in mid 1980s because of Pinatubo 
volcanic eruption, numerous typhoons and deluges, withdrawal of US military bases, IMF 
controlled economic policy, and series of coup d’ etat among others. 
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therefore, of full-blown narratives is both bane and boon to the project. It is quite 
troublesome as it implies more work but at the same time is a windfall as it strongly 
justifies the pursuance of a pioneering work on the current India-Philippine ties. 
 
On the other hand, in examining the recent relations between India and Southeast 
Asian countries, most books written recently mention or inevitably discuss the role of 
the LEP. Several writers credited the renewal of Indian relations with the ten countries 
of Southeast Asia and its expansion in whole East Asia to India’s reoriented foreign 
policy’ strategy. Notable scholarly works primarily devoted on the LEP are of 
Frédéric Grare and Amitabh Mattoo’s “India and ASEAN: The Politics of India's 
‘Look East’ policy” (2001), and “Beyond the Rhetoric: The Economics of India’s 
Look East Policy” (2003); Isabelle Saint-Mezard’s “Eastward Bound: India’s New 
Positioning in Asia” (2006); Prakash Nanda’s “Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of 
India's Look-East Policy” (2007); Debamitra Mitra and Madhuchanda Ghosh’s 
“India's Look East Policy: The Emerging Trends” (2008); Charles Reuben Lyngdoh 
and Merostar Rani “Look East Policy: Impact on Northeast India” (2008); Sunanda 
Datta-Ray’s “Looking East To Look West: Lee Kuan Yew's Mission India” (2009); 
Thingnam Kishan’s “Look East Policy and India's North East: Polemics and 
Perspectives“ (2009) and the book entitled “Power, Commerce and Influence: India’s 
Look East Experience” (2009) by Rabindra Sen, Tridib Chakraborti, Anindyoj 
Majumdar and Shibashis Chatterjee as editors. These books contained revealing 
information on the nature, motivations, and strategies of the recent incarnation22 of 
India’s engagement with Southeast Asia.  
                                                
22 Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo, eds. Beyond the Rhetoric: The Economics of India’s 
Look East Policy. New Delhi: Manohar, Centre de Science Humaines and Core Group for the 
Study of National Security, 2003. 11. 
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Given the fact that the LEP is an evolving concept, keeping tract of it is challenging 
and requires conscientious effort to be current on scholarly undertakings. Thus, 
employing the aid of numerous journal articles, policy reports, and commentaries on 
the LEP available in print and online circulations is indeed helpful. Offering more up-
to-date information than most books, their availability is much appreciated when 
documenting the current affairs of India and the Philippines particularly the LEP’s 
influence on India-Philippine recent collaborations on business process outsourcing 
(BPO) industry.   
 
Furthermore, a good number of these authors concluded that the LEP has already 
reached a certain phase of development in the context of several global events. 
Powered by the swift dynamics of regionalism and regionalisation, a thorough 
examination of the LEP using the former as frameworks to define India’s recent 
foreign policy in Southeast Asia is indispensable. 
 
2.3. Understanding the ‘Region’ in the Context of India and Southeast Asia 
Qualifying the LEP as India’s regional instrument in Southeast Asia is an arduous 
task. In the first place, the inclusion of India in the region of Southeast Asia is as 
complicated as the term ‘region’ itself. To understand such complex reality, several 
definitions of a ‘region’ were consulted. Surprisingly, each of the definition has varied 
meaning depending on the background, perspective and milieu of the author.  
 
Foremost of these is the definition provided by Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen. From 
historical and geographical perspectives, they defined ‘regions’ as sprawling and 
complex, shaded by borderlands and etched by multiple corridors and crossing points. 
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They reflected historical processes, interaction with others, and assemblages of ideas, 
practises and social institutions. In addition, they also contained not only dominant 
populations and postcolonial nation-states as known but also the vast diasporas, 
cultural archipelagos, and populations whose region, language and material culture 
endowed them with various mixed or ‘matrix’ identities.23  
 
 




                                                
23 Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen. The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Cited by Ellen Frost in her book “Asia’s New 
Regionalism.” London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008.  30-31. 
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By virtue of this definition, India has the inclusive privilege to be part of Southeast 
Asia and participate in its own regionalism. India, for instance is just 45 kilometres 
away from the Coco Island of Myanmar, 450 kilometres away from Thailand and 700 
kilometres from Malaysia.24 At its extremity represented by the Andaman and Nicobar 
islands, India is only 145 kilometres from Indonesia and 175 kilometres from 
Malaysia25 (see Illustration 2.1). It also shares a land border with Myanmar. 
Furthermore, India too has a vast diaspora with the total size of 4.6 million migrants 
spread all over the region. The biggest number of these migrants thrives in Myanmar.26  
 
Moreover, it also shares a cultural archipelago with Southeast Asia. As cited by 
Nagesh Kumar, a Thai journalist once commented that ‘India feels much more East 
Asian because of its cultural influence and aspirations in the ASEAN region than with 
Mongolia, for instance’.27 Similarly, India too capitalised this ancient link with most of 
the countries in the region ranging from Buddhism to arts, artefacts, architecture and 
even language. This is usually present in most speeches of Indian officials when 
visiting Southeast Asia. Former President Abdul Kalam28, in one of his speeches in the 
Philippines during his state visit in 2006, said that ‘the countries of Southeast Asia, 
                                                
24 K.K. Nayyar. Maritime India. New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2005. 49. 
25 Yong Mun Cheong. “Concluding Remarks: An Agenda for Research.” Singapore-India 
Relations: A Primer. Eds. Yong Mun Cheong and V.V. Bhanoji Rao. Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1995. 298. 
26 Sanjay Chaturvedi. “Diaspora in India’s Geopolitical Visions: Linkages, Categories and 
Contestations.” Asian Affairs: An American Review. 32.3 (2005): 141-68. Cited by A. Mani. 
“Community Formations Among Indians in East Asia.” Rising India and Indian Communities 
in East Asia. Eds. K. Kesavapany, A. Mani and P. Ramasamy. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. 68. Indian migrants in Myanmar approximately reached to 
2,502,000 individuals as of 2005. 
27 Nagesh Kumar. “India and Broader Economic Integration in Asia.” Indian Foreign Policy: 
Challenges and Opportunities. Eds. Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta New Delhi: India Foreign 
Service Institute, 2007. 398. 
28 Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam is the 11th president of the Republic of India from 
2002 to 2007.  “Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam.” Abdul Kalam.nic.in. n.d. 7 June 2010. 
<http://www.abdulkalam.nic.in/profile.html>.  
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including the Philippines, constitute an extended neighbourhood with whom India’s 
links go back many centuries. He further emphasised that there is a distinctive Indian 
impress in this part of Asia, a religious, cultural, and linguistic stamp which Indian 
seafarers brought via Indonesia and the Malaya peninsula before the era of European 
colonisation. 29 He earlier called this link during his Singapore visit as ‘umbilical 
connectivity.’30 
 
Peter Katzenstein, on the other hand, defined ‘region’ as a group of countries markedly 
independent over a wide range of different dimensions. This pattern of 
interdependence is often indicated by patterns of economic and political transactions 
and social communications that differentiate groups of countries. He further said that 
regions are also social and cognitive constructs that are rooted in political practise.31  
 
As rightly pointed out by Bjorn Hettne, the definition of a ‘region’ varies according to 
the particular problem or question under investigation. He further commented that the 
definition depends on how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region 
and notions of ‘regionness’. Hence, all regions are socially constructed and thereby 
politically contested.32 To argue, therefore, that India is part of Southeast Asia in the 
context of this definition is no longer an issue. Historically, the Southeast Asian 
leaders as early as 1940s already acknowledged the importance of India as part of the 
area now called as Southeast Asia. Manuel Luis Quezon, the first president of the 
                                                
29 External Publicity Division. Visit of Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam to Singapore, Philippines and 
Republic of Korea, 1 to 8 February 2006. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 2006. 120. 
Umbilical connectivity means the generational ties of migrants in the host country and their 
relatives in the country of origin which is India. 
30 Ibid. 113. 
31 Peter Katzenstein. “Regionalism and Asia.” New Regionalism in the Global Political 
Economy. Eds. Shaun Breslin, et. al. United Kingdom: Routledge, 2002. 105. 
32 Bjorn Hettne. “Beyond the ‘New Regionalism.” New Political Economy. 10.4. (2005): 544. 
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Philippine Commonwealth government, even declared with emphasis that no nation in 
Southeast Asia be freed without a free India.33  
 
Moreover, India during World War II was also categorised geographically under the 
South-East Asian Command of the Allied Forces. In fact, such classification is still 
carried over recently by the World Health Organisation (WHO) placing its New Delhi 
office as the Southeast Asian headquarters.34 Thus India, to borrow the words of 
Salvador Lopez in his observation about the Philippines as an Asian country, is a case 
of geography versus history.35  
 
2.4. Revisiting Regionalism 
Similar predicament is also encountered when defining the term ‘regionalism’. As 
Bilveer Singh similarly observed, ‘various scholars have put forward varied definitions 
and not surprisingly, there are as many definitions as there are scholars.’36   
 
                                                
33 K.M. Panikkar. The Future of South-East Asia. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1943. 30. 
34 Noticed by the researcher in the main gate of WHO headquarters in Indraprastha Estate on 
his way to the National Council of Applied Economics Research (NCAER) to interview Dr. 
Rajesh Chadha in February 2009. “Southeast Asia Regional Office.” World Health 
Organization. n.d. 20 March 2010. 
<http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section898/Section1443.htm>. The term "South-East Asia" is 
credited to Indian historian K.M. Pannikar who used it in the title of his book "Future of 
Southeast Asia" published in 1943. By the end of Second World War, the term was well 
established and was used as a collective for the peninsula between India and China. The 
countries include Brunei, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Indonesia. Panikkar at this time observed that even the Philippines in some instances was 
not recognized as part of Southeast Asia.   
35 Salvador Lopez. “The Foreign Policy of the Republic of the Philippines.” Governance and 
Policies of the Philippines. Eds. Raul de Guzman and Mila Reforma. Singapore: Oxford 
University Press/University of the Philippines, 1988. 246. Salvador Lopez served as secretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, ambassador to the United Nations and president of the 
University of the Philippines from 1969 to 1975. 
36 Bilveer Singh. Soviet Relation with ASEAN: 1967-88. Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1989. xv. 
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As mentioned earlier, regionalism before 1989 in the works of Karl Deutsch, David 
Mitrany, and Ernest Haas37 is presented as the classic regionalism that operated on 
inter-state cooperation and transnational community-building.38  K.M. Panikkar in 
1948 also observed that regionalism was manifested in the maintenance of peace, 
prosperity and security in a defined geographical region with the establishment of 
paramountcy of a Great Power39 most likely from the western world. 
 
The change of world order in 1990, however, ushered the evolution of a new school of 
regionalism or ‘new regionalism’.40 James Mittleman, for instance, emphasised that 
the regionalism in the 1990s is not to be considered as a movement towards 
territorially based autarkies as it was during the 1930s. The 1990 version represents 
the concentrations of political and economic power competing in the global economy, 
with multiple interregional and intraregional flows.41 With the end of Cold War, the 
term has elicited numerous definitions from different academic quarters all over the 
world and is reflected in Bjorn Hettne’s discourse. It is worth quoting at length how 
                                                
37 Karl Deutsch et. al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1957; David Mitrany. A Working Peace System. Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1961; and Ernest Haas. “The Challenge of Regionalism.” International 
Organization. 12.4. (Autumn 1958): 440-458. 
38 Jorn Dosch. “The Post-Cold War Development of Regionalism in East Asia.” Regionalism 
in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting? Eds. Fu-Kuo Liu and Philippe Regnier. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 30. 
39 K.M. Panikkar. “Regionalism and World Security.” Regionalism and Security. K.M. 
Panikkar, et. al. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1948. 1-2. 
40 Recent global developments, however, started to question the continuous use of the term 
‘new regionalism’ when it has two decades now behind it. Hettne felt awkward in 
continuously using the term ‘new’ to something that is now more than 20 years old. New 
regionalism started in the latter half of 1980s. This research, however, still maintains that the 
start and development of India’s revitalized relations with countries in Southeast Asian region 
was done at times when conditions were still perfectly fit in the definition of the second wave 
of regionalism. 
41 James Mittleman. “Rethinking the ‘New Regionalism’ in the Context of Globalization.” 
Globalism and the New Regionalism. Eds. Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel. 
United Kingdom: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1999. 27. 
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he examines these definitions:42 
 
Regionalism refers to a tendency and a political commitment to organise the 
world in terms of regions; more narrowly, the concept refers to a specific 
regional project. In some definitions, the actors behind this political 
commitment are states; in other definitions the actors are not confined to 
states. According to Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble, ‘regionalism is a 
state-led or states-led project designed to reorganise a particular regional 
space along defined economic and political lines’.43 They go on in their 
pioneering book to say that ‘regionalism is seen as something that is being 
constructed, and constantly reconstructed, by collective human action’,44 
which sounds like a more comprehensive view as far as agency is 
concerned.45 Other authors find it difficult to confine the regionalism project 
to states. Helge Hveem also makes a firm distinction between regionalism and 
regionalisation, but talks about ‘an identifiable group of actors’ trying to 
realise the project.46 Andrew Hurrell lets the concept of regionalism contain 
five varieties: regionalisation (informal integration), identity, interstate 
cooperation, state-led integration and cohesion.47  
 
Reflecting this position, Bjorn Hettne and colleagues at the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research of the United Nations University in Helsinki 
considered ‘new regionalism’ as a multidimensional phenomenon instead of an 
economic one.48 Being developed in a multipolar world order, Hettne personally 
argued that new regionalism is a comprehensive multidimensional programme 
including economic, security, environmental and many other issues. For him, it is an 
                                                
42 Bjorn Hettne. “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism.” New Political Economy. 10.4. (December 
2005): 545. 
43 Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble. “Introduction: The Political Economy of Regionalism 
and World Order.” Regionalism and World Order. Eds. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne. 
United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1996. 2. 
44 Ibid. 17. 
45 Anthony Payne. “Rethinking Development Inside International Political Economy.” The 
New Regional Politics of Development. Ed. Anthony Payne. United Kingdom: Palgrave, 
2004. 16. 
46 Helge Hveem. “The Regional Project in Global Governance.” Theories of New 
Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader. Eds. Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy Shaw. United 
Kingdom: Palgrave, 2003. 83. 
47 Andrew Hurrell. “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective.” Regionalism in World Politics: 
Regional Organization and International Order. Eds. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell. 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1995. 39. 
48 Oliver Hensengerth. Regionalism in China-Vietnam Relations. New York: Routledge, 2010. 
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open regionalism which emphasised that the integration project should be market-
driven and outward-looking, should avoid high levels of protection and should be part 
of the ongoing globalisation and internationalisation process of the world political 
economy.49 Farrell too shared similar view on regionalism’s multidimensional form of 
integration embracing economic, cultural, political and social aspects, thereby 
extending the understanding of regional activities beyond the creation of free trade 
agreements or security regimes. She, however, stressed that this new school must have 
a strategic goal of region-building, of establishing regional coherence and identity.50 
 
For George Schultz, regionalism is simply ‘a web of cooperative realities’.51 This web 
is by no means exclusively organisational in nature as it is formed by a growing 
network of bilateral ties between governments of the region, and by the growing 
contacts among private businesses, professional groups, and individuals in various 
countries.52 Most of regionalism in Asia and the Pacific that is developing today may 
be characterised as examples of new regionalism that emerged since late 1960s. It has 
developed wider interregional and even global connections and linkages.53 In 
                                                
49 Bjorn Hettne. “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism.” New Political Economy. 10.4. (2003): 549. 
Hettne cited the works of Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration 
and the Global Trading System. United States of America: Harvester Wheathsheaf, 1993; 
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particular, the regionalism of the 1990s was promoted by the decentralisation of the 
international system and the removal of superpower overlay.54 
 
Ellen Frost, on her part, believed that the recent regionalism, now a joint initiative of 
both state and non state actors, is still essentially political since it is being driven by 
government fiat and stems from the actions of political authorities. Although it derives 
legitimacy from a collective vision of a more integrated community, it is planned and 
executed for reasons of state. The most visible expression of Asian regionalism is the 
upsurge of free-trade agreements (FTAs) and most of these are done bilaterally. It is 
argued that the trade agreements are obviously economic in nature but their existences 
are used as effective political instruments.55 A good example is the initiative of China, 
South Korea, and Japan to negotiate wide-ranging agreements with the ASEAN as a 
whole. The same process is true with India, Australia, and New Zealand.56 
 
Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, on the other hand, defined regionalism as a 
complex process of change simultaneously involving state as well as non-state actors, 
and occurring as a result of global, regional, national and local level forces.57 This 
definition is suggesting of the dynamism of regionalism and regionalisation that is 
working in the region. 
 
                                                
54 Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne, and Luk Van Langehove, eds. Global Politics of Regionalism: 
Theory and Practice. London: Pluto Press, 2005. 256-257. 
55 Frost. 2008. 157. 
56 Ibid. 15. 
57 Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum. “Theorising the Rise of Regionness.” New 
Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy. Eds. Shaun Breslin, et. al. United Kingdom: 
Routledge, 2002. 33. Regions are social constructions, and to observe and describe 
regionalisation is also to participate in the construction of regions.  
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Das also noted that the old regionalism was essentially confined to Regional 
Integration Agreements (RIAs) between industrial economies or developing 
economies while the new one is known for cross-alliances between developing, 
emerging-market and industrial economies. The new bonds forged by the developing 
and industrial economies offered considerable potential for gains from trade which are 
now currently enjoyed by countries such as India and the Philippines.  
 
Secondly, old regionalism was essentially limited only to RIA formations by 
contiguous economies while the new ones are not limited only within the neighbouring 
economies. In some recent or proposed cases, RIAs are intercontinental in scope. A 
condition which India seems to perfectly fit on its current engagements in Southeast 
Asia despite being not part of the geographical construct of the region. Its lucid 
participation in the regionalisation of Southeast Asia in turn enabled it to reconstruct a 
‘region’ that is beneficial for its interest in the long run.58  
 
Lastly, under the new arrangement, RIAs are not exclusive for they allow certain 
country to be simultaneously engaged to more than one RIA.59 The Philippines and 
India, for instance, are not only members of one regional grouping but are also part of 
other RIA-based organizations such as Japan, ASEAN, China, India and South Korea 
cooperation (JACIK), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and others.60 
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The decisions of the said nations to group and regroup are not really surprising. Percy 
Mistry argued that these countries are expected to embrace new regionalism especially 
after the Cold War because the old multilateralism no longer works.61 The failure of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) of advancing trading interests of the members 
and the consequent pessimism about the prospects for a new round of global trade 
liberalisation also contributed to the slow progress of multilateralism. By then 
numerous proposals for bilateral agreements, including those between Japan and 
Korea, Japan and Mexico, Japan and Singapore, Korea and Chile, and Singapore and 
New Zealand, had already been made and, in some instances, negotiations begun.62 
 
Just like the rest of countries around the world, India and the Philippines in their 
attempt to protect their national interests are also deeply engaged on ‘new 
regionalism’. Being an open regionalism, the geographical definition of a region 
chosen for cooperative engagement has become flexible and less decisive. Aside from 
the establishment of ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+1 summits, the existence also of 
geographically overlapping and converging regional grouping like Bay of Bengal 
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation63 (BIMSTEC), 
Greater Mekong Sub-region (ASEAN countries and China), and the Mekong-Ganga 
Cooperation (MGC) Initiative (India and the Mekong basin countries) best 
exemplified this flexibility.  
 
                                                
61 Hettne 551. 
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Moreover, this ‘new regionalism’ has invariably been driven by economic 
liberalisation and globalisation in terms of its agenda for economic cooperation. The 
developments in the first decade of the 21st Century, especially the 9/11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center  (WTC), redefined once more the concept of new regionalism as it 
gives greater sensitivity towards regional security concern and initiatives. In the case 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), this has been reflected in the attempts either to 
introduce a security dimension in existing regional grouping or evolve new and 
additional institutional arrangements.64 
 
After a careful examination of the Indian and Southeast Asian cases, their behaviours 
and activities are suggestive of their ‘new regionalism’ tendencies. In this study, 
however, such outlay is simply referred in the course of discussion as ‘regionalism’ 
keeping in mind of its difference from the old one. This is a response to the ongoing 
debates on the usage of the word ‘new’ since some scholars65 are questioning the 
inappropriateness of the term that has been there for almost two decades.  
 
Accordingly, the conclusion of Cold War allowed countries to embrace regionalism. 
India and the Philippines went along with globalisation by riding on regionalism 
bandwagon. The regionalism of the ASEAN for instance, since the organisation’s 
inception in 1967 was born out of old form, has been a state-led project.66 The post 
Cold War ASEAN, however, witnessed certain transformation from its statist nature. 
Inter-governmental policy coordination was already complemented by rapid 
                                                
64 Farrell, Hettne, and Langehove. 256-7. 
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proliferation of  ‘regionally based transnational social and cultural networks’ to 
address various issues.67 The same is true in the case of India despite the fact that it 
does not geographically belong to the recent Southeast Asian regional construction.68  
 
As mentioned earlier, there was a proposal in mid 1940s to create a Southeast Asian 
region that should consist of India, China, Burma (present Myanmar), Siam (present 
Thailand), Indo-China (present Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), Malaya (present 
Malaysia), Indonesia, the Philippines and Ceylon (present Sri Lanka).69 This plan, 
however, remained indefinitely in the drawing board. India instead became part of the 
South Asian regional construct. Due to the sluggish phase of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation70 (SAARC), however, India was encouraged 
instead to participate in other regional groupings including the ASEAN in 1990s that 
was primarily facilitated both by state and non-state actors. This inclination towards 
regionalism in early 1990s was even complemented by the economic liberalisation 
policy of both countries. India, for instance, inevitably has to adjust immediately to 
these new trends because of its economic and geopolitical stakes in the Asian regional 
integration. It should be noted that its trade and investment ties with East Asia have 
grown dramatically since 2000 and has been its big market. The other motivation was 
geopolitical since it tried to play ‘balancing’ role in Asia and by virtue of its sheer size, 
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India is the only country that could stop a regional community from falling under 
Chinese domination.71  
 
In the case of the Philippines, it needed to diversify its economy and looked for 
sources of foreign direct investments (FDI) that could boost its local industries. As a 
result, India and the Philippines joined other countries in the bandwagon of 
regionalism after the world witnessed the shift from bipolar to multi-polar order. In 
fact, the international politics after 1990 witnessed the creation of ‘a world of regions’ 
that was greatly shaped by the economic and social processes of regionalisation and by 
structures of regionalism.72  
 
Indeed, the politico-economic developments in the last decade of the 20th Century will 
attest that regionalism as a policy is the country’s way of survival in this globalised 
world. It has become an inevitable post Cold War development since all countries are 
trying to be part of one or more regional groupings to ensure their economic security 
in case multilateral arrangements failed to take off such as the case of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to some extent APEC.  
 
It is also noteworthy to mention that the new regionalism arrangement accented by 
cooperation is never without problems. States normally shifted their loyalty and 
resources to institutions that are perceived to be mutually beneficial and can provide 
increasing opportunities to secure their international interests.73 Such state behaviour is 
called rationality. Here, the states are assumed to be more conscious in calculating the 
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costs and benefits of different courses of their action and choosing the course of action 
that will give them the highest net pay-off. 74 This therefore gives certain leeway to 
member countries of any regional groupings such as the Philippines and India to hold 
bilateral engagements once transactions at the regional level maybe difficult to realise 
due to intergovernmental policy conflict/s. Then state-to-state apparatuses and various 
private sector initiatives are subsequently utilised to advance the countries’ interests 
through bilateral negotiations.  
 
That is why in the early and mid 1990s when many countries of the world joined 
various regional economic groupings, Indian policy makers were getting concerned 
about India’s relative isolation. India was conscious that countries that failed to 
participate in any of the new RTAs will be adversely affected due to the diversion of 
trade and investments that will affect their balance of trade’.75  India was aware that 
the membership in one or more regional economic arrangements is very important to 
every economy of the world. India’s membership at that time was confined solely with 
the SAARC. Since its establishment in 1985, the SAARC was not registering faster 
movements in core areas of economic cooperation like trade and investment.76 Such 
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frustration was reflected in the speech of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi77 at the 4th 
SAARC Summit in Islamabad in December 1988.78  
 
Out of economic anxiety, India began to search for new bodies. Southeast Asia, a 
region which was not only emotionally attached to India but which waited decade 
after decade for some signals to gain closer to India79, has finally got its attention. To 
reach out to the region, the LEP came into existence.  
 
Through the years, Indian regionalism in Southeast Asia has covered and interacted 
with all players and partners in the region. This research, however, focuses only in 
defining the LEP as India’s regionalism in Southeast Asia using India’s current 
relations with the Philippines as a case study. Similarly concurring with Saint-
Mezard’s argument, the LEP should be interpreted in the perspective of new 
regionalism. As a matter of fact, the evolution of this policy should be seen in 
congruence with the new regionalism trend since New Delhi in the first place forged 
the LEP at a time when India feared being left on the periphery of a worldwide trend 
towards a new wave of regionalism.80 As the years progressed, the LEP evolved from 
a discrete instrument of navy’s diplomacy to economic tool and lately as strategic 
mechanism. The implementation of the policy was also a product of series of 
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experimentations on bilateral and multilateral channels of engagements and vice-
versa.  
 
With these developments, the role of India as a global player requires appropriate 
attention. After 1991, India is no longer the country that was desperately looking and 
aggressively longing for sources of FDI and other financial assistances. The India of 
today, although still open to more foreign investments, is already capable of extending 
its own FDI to other countries especially in sectors of information and communication 
technology. India is now rising as the 4th81 largest economy of the world. Such global 
stature was possibly done through careful planning and effective implementation of 
various mechanisms such as economic diplomacy in maximizing the fullest potentials 
of new regionalism and regionalisation. 
 
2.5. Role of Regionalisation 
For a country to successfully integrate within the region, it needs both regionalism and 
regionalisation to work simultaneously. These concepts in theory and in reality are 
inseparable. Regionalism as discussed earlier is a policy and regionalisation on one 
hand is a process.82 Mario Telo and Joseph Camilleri, for instance, defined 
regionalisation as diverse flows and processes (be they economic, technological, or 
socio-cultural) that bind together the constituent entities of any given region.83 On her 
part, Frost considered regionalisation as a process because of its concern on the 
                                                
81 As of 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranked India as the 4th largest 
economies of the world based on PPP “Economies of the World.” International Monetary 
Fund. n.d. 31 May 2010. <http://www.imf.org>. 
82 Farrell, Hettne, and Langehove. 24-25. 
83 Mario Telo. “Between Trade Regionalisation and Deep Integration.” European Union and 
New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era. Ed. 
Mario Telo. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2001. 71. Also, Joseph Camilleri. Regionalism in 
the New Asia Pacific Order: The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific Region, Volume II. 
United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2003. 12. 
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creation or realignment of transactions and attitudes along regional lines. A process 
that is driven, brokered, and carried out primarily by private individuals acting on their 
own. In this manner, real-life integration took place between people and employees, 
multinational corporations, small-scale traders, representatives of civil society 
organisations, and many others.84  
 
The role of civil society85 in regionalisation has been emphasised by Soderbaum in one 
of his recent studies. He believed that the states are not the only regionalising actors 
but also the market, civil society and external actors in the global South’ context.  In 
the case of South Africa, Soderbaum observed that regional cooperation and 
networking among civil society actors arise in a wide range of fields particularly in the 
aspects of social and economic justice, debt and structural adjustment, trade and 
globalisation, human rights and law, health and HIV/Aids, food security, student 
associations, trade unions, as well as regional research and education networks.86  
Some of these aspects, to some extent, are also present in India-Philippine relations.  
 
It is also interesting to note that aside from civil society, the role of popular culture has 
been highlighted in the continuous discussion of regionalisation. As observed by 
Otmazgin, the dense traffic of popular culture throughout urban centres in Asia serves 
as a powerful regionalising engine. It allows the formation of a transnational market 
                                                
84 Frost. 15. 
85 Fredrik Soderbaum. “Regionalisation and Civil Society: The Case of Southern Africa” New 
Political Economy (September 2007): 322. Soderbaum built his theory on Scholte’s definition 
of civil society as a political space where voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape the 
rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life. This includes a rich variety of actors 
and voluntary associations such as the non-governmental organisations, community-based 
organisations, interest groups, trade unions, social movements, faith-based organisations, 
academic institutions, clan and kinship circles, lobbies, youth associations, development 
cooperation initiatives and more. Jan Aart Scholte. “Civil Society and Governance”. Towards 
a Global Polity. Eds. Morten Ougaard and Richard Higgott. London: Routledge, 2002. 145. 
86 Ibid. 325. 
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for culture and thereby pulling Asian cities and their inhabitants closer together.87 
India’s Bollywood movies and music, for instance, are widely offered in Southeast 
Asia where they diversify and enrich the local cultural scenes with another alternative. 
Such development is best exemplified by the recent regional collaborations between 
companies and promoters that created alliances and subsequently brought a strong 
impact on the Asian cultural market.88 This development, however, also facilitated the 
existence of media piracy markets in Asia.  Media piracy plays a conspicuously 
important part in fuelling the regional confluences of popular culture by facilitating 
and accelerating the diffusion of related products through restrictive conditions.89 As a 
response, governments and organisations in the region are forced to cooperate.  
 
Regardless of the actors involved, the breathtaking pace of regionalisation in Asia is 
accredited primarily to recent and ongoing revolution in information, 
telecommunication, and transportation technology. These breakthroughs are the core 
“propellers” of globalisation. Together with the lowering of tariffs and other border-
based barriers, they have enabled companies to adapt, customise, and rapidly deliver 
goods and services around the world. These similar developments have sped up travel 
and personal communication made them much more affordable. To some extent, they 
unfortunately and unintentionally have also nourished criminal networks and other 
cross-border threats that subsequently stimulate region-wide countermeasures.90 
This is the reason why the LEP in the latter days is used in enabling India to 
participate in various collaborative activities with the United States of America (US) 
                                                
87 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin. “Cultural Commodities and Regionalization in East Asia.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia. (2005): 510. 
88 Ibid. 507. 
89 Ibid. 514. 
90 Ibid. 
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and its Southeast Asian allies such as naval exercises as well as disaster and 
transnational crime prevention and management. In effect, the LEP becomes a useful 
regional policy framework of India in Southeast Asia since 1990s. 
 
The extent, however, of its utility will only be fully appreciated if the LEP is defined 
in proper context. As Saint-Mezard has aptly pointed out, the LEP is a tangential and 
multidimensional process that has to be considered over the long-term and in the larger 
framework of the world trend towards regionalisation.91 
 
2.6. Regionalism and Regionalisation in India-Philippine Relations 
Based on the literature as well as in the context of the post Cold War India and 
Philippine experience, regionalism is now defined as a multidimensional policy of 
integration covering political, economic, cultural, social, security and even 
environmental aspects; and is promoted actively both by state and non-state actors 
such as private organisations and other social groupings either through bilateral or 
multilateral levels.  
 
The developments that occurred between 1980s and 1990s suggest that the launching 
of the LEP by the Indian government as a response to various global developments 
either directly or indirectly effects of Cold War’s conclusion. These include economic 
crisis, formation of trading blocs, interregional cooperation, and the weakness of 
existing regional arrangements.  
 
                                                
91 Ibid. 436. 
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Looking closely at the nature of the LEP, the said policy was born in congruence with 
the proliferation of new regionalism. Aside from domestic financial woes, the 
existence of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an increasing influence of 
south-south cooperation, the surging presence of China in Southeast Asia, the 
weakness of World Trade Organization (WTO) and the sluggish performance of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) triggered India to join 
the bandwagon of global trend of new regionalism in the 1990s. These factors forced 
the administration of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to implement reforms on 
economy and foreign policy. Thus, the LEP came into existence and has become a 
regionalist strategy of India in Southeast Asia and a mechanism to reach out those 
countries in the region including the Philippines.   
 
Nevertheless, the LEP has evolved into a multi-pronged strategy of India in advancing 
its interests not only in Southeast Asia but also the entire Eastern Asia. To some 
extent, the member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum92 (PIF) are now 
categorically included in an expanded coverage of the policy particularly Australia 
and New Zealand.  
 
The success of the LEP for almost two decades was greatly attributed to the dynamic 
interactions of key drivers of regionalism and regionalisation. The government sectors 
as well as private organisations and other members of civil societies worked together 
to implement this new regionalism strategy in enhancing the relations of India and 
                                                
92 Pacific Islands Forum is composed of member countries such as Australia, the Cook Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Soloman Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. It 
was established in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum and later changed to its current name in 
2000. Since 2006, the associate members are New Caledonia and French Polynesia. “About 
Us.” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.org. n.d. 31 May 2010. <http://www.forumsec.org>.  
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countries of Southeast Asia including the Philippines. In reviewing the initiatives 
associated to the LEP since 1992, it was revealed that the governments of India and 
Southeast Asia and their related agencies closely collaborated with each other on 
various fields particularly on the economy. The respective governments also seriously 
involved the private sectors in their numerous partnerships. These were manifested by 
the existence of joint working groups, formation and participation of business councils 
and other media of cooperation.  
 
The participation of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI), Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) 
and Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) greatly facilitated the role of the LEP in 
revitalizing the relations of India and the Southeast Asian countries.  Conversely, the 
LEP also made it possible for India’s private organisations to have active role in the 
building of political, economic and social cooperation with members of the ASEAN. 
CII, for instance, is helping the Indian government in connecting and cooperating with 
the ASEAN countries through governments and through their respective chamber of 
commerce and industries.93 In the case of the Philippines, the role of the Federation of 
Indian Chamber of Commerce Philippines (FICC) and the India-Philippine Business 
Council (IPBC) among others is also important in re-energizing the relations between 
India and the Philippines. This initiative complemented the various efforts of the 
Philippine government ranging from official visits to forging of agreements and 
memoranda of understanding (MoU). The presence of Indian settlements in the 
archipelago also matters to this development. 
 
                                                
93 Olive Tiu. “18 Indian companies eye BP Outsourcing with RP- PIA Press Release.” 
Philippine Information Agency. 27 November 2006. 3 July 2010. <http://www.pia.gov.ph>. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
Indeed, the examination of related literature really helped in enhancing the research 
project. Most importantly, these materials show the necessity to do a revisit of the 
LEP after 18 years of its implementation. Though there were attempts in the past to 
understand the nature of India’s initiative in Southeast Asia, there is still a need to 
define the LEP since it is an evolving concept and its developments moved swiftly as 
the years progressed. The next chapter examines the nature and motivations of the 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DEFINING INDIA’S ‘LOOK EAST’ POLICY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
After consulting various literature in the previous chapter, one thing is indeed now 
clear. There is a need to define the ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) as India’s tool to promote 
its interests in Southeast Asia since 1992. In the succeeding discussion, the LEP is 
being defined in terms of India’s motivations, global developments, and geographical 
focuses. Specifically, this policy is being assayed using the revitalised India-Philippine 
relations as a point of reference.  
 
This chapter is organised into six parts. The first section briefly explains the various 
factors that prompted the change in the post Cold War India and Southeast Asian 
foreign policies. The second section traces the evolution of the LEP while the third 
part identifies the institutions and individuals that served as drivers of regionalism and 
regionalisation between India and the ASEAN countries. The fourth section, on the 
other hand, analyses the nature and expansion of the LEP especially with the 
Philippines using motivations, global developments and geographical focuses as 
references. The last section provides the conclusion. 
 
Looking at the East during the Cold War era in policy terms made India uncomfortable 
with its existing commitments and in effect compromised its economic survival at that 
time. The end of Cold War and the pressures of economic liberalisation, however, 
brought India into a realisation. The fear of being isolated from all major regional 
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groupings that were being formed in the world forced India to embark on an active 
race for regional integration. This is where the LEP came into the picture. India then 
reoriented its foreign policy on a constructive dimension and became a vehicle for 
different regional projects in East Asia.1 To situate better the LEP, it is best to revisit 
the defining moments in the last decade of the 20th Century that enabled India to seize 
the opportunity in implementing a regionalist policy framework in Southeast Asia. 
 
3.2. Watersheds of India’s Regionalism in Southeast Asia  
India’s engagement in regionalism can be traced primarily to three major global 
changes, namely: the growing interdependence, the technological revolutions that have 
brought the entire world into closer and more immediate and continuous touch than in 
any previous era,2 and the end of Cold War. This is aside from the fact that India too 
was domestically and economically unstable at that time (see Chapter 5 for details). 
Among the three global developments in the 1990s, the last factor was seen to have 
greatly transformed the geo-economic set-up of the world along with globalisation that 
prompted greater economic cooperation. Thus, it is not surprising that the states 
formerly isolated in one camp especially those identified with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) began looking for possible allies and focused on regional 
integration. As Kumaraswamy has pointed out, the end of Cold War significantly 
challenged the relevance and influence of once important Third World bodies such as 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). As a result, the countries concerned were either 
knocking at the doors of the multilateral forums or participating in the formation of 
                                                
1 Isabelle Saint-Mezard. Eastward Bound: India’s New Positioning in Asia. New Delhi: 
Manohar Publishers, 2006. 56. 
2 Norman Palmer. The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific. United States of America: 
Lexington Books, 1991. 27. 
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new bodies.3 With the fear of being isolated from all major regional groupings that 
were being formed in the world, India then began to look the east as a new diplomatic 
and market focus4 and gladly was not disappointed. 
 
Prior to 1960s, India and the countries in Southeast Asia were enjoying vibrant and 
dynamic relations. India’s policy towards the region in the early years of independence 
from 1947 to mid-1958 was not only dynamic and forward-looking, it was also in 
complete empathy and solidarity with the hopes and aspiration of Southeast Asian 
people. By the end of 1950s, however, India’s policy in Southeast Asia lost its 
momentum. The United States of America (US) scuttled the Geneva Agreements and 
subsequently the politics of Cold War spread in Asia. India’s relations with South 
Vietnam, Laos, China and Indonesia gradually deteriorated. All these had their adverse 
fallout on Indian standing in Southeast Asia.5  
 
By 1960s and 1970s, India’s foreign policy was conditioned by the attitude towards 
Pakistan and China. Obsessed with the Pakistan factor, New Delhi was more interested 
in winning friends and influencing people in the West to indulge in one-up-manship 
over Pakistan specifically with respect to Kashmir dispute. After 1962, when relations 
with China had collapsed, the obsession with Pakistan only intensified and New Delhi 
had little time of cultivating good relations with lesser powers in the East. Southeast 
                                                
3 P.R. Kumaraswamy. “South Asia After the Cold War: Adjusting to New Realities.” The 
Third World Beyond the Cold War: Continuality and Change. Eds. Louise Fawcett and Yezid 
Sayigh. United Kingdom: Oxford University 1999. 171. 
4 Rodney Tasker. “Rao’s Look-East Policy.” Far Eastern Economic Review. (22 April 1993): 
16.  
5 V. Suryanarayan. “Looking Ahead: India and Southeast Asia in the 1990s: New Perspective, 
New Challenges.” India And Southeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities. Ed. Baladas 
Ghoshal. Konark Published Pvt. Ltd. 1996, 19. 
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Asia consequently has been benignly neglected by the Indian foreign office.6 In 
addition, India also viewed that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
was in the sphere of Japanese and Chinese influence leaving India no more roles to 
play7 and contributed further to this neglect. In fact, S. Viswam concluded that New 
Delhi did not make an effort to befriend the countries in Southeast Asia, especially the 
Philippines, beyond the conventional requirements of diplomatic interaction. This was 
reflected by the fact that President Ferdinand Marcos never paid a visit to India on 
official capacity in the 1980s.8  
 
The Indian politico-military standing in the region suffered more with the defeat of the 
Indian military in the India-China border war in 1962.9 This situation was further 
aggravated with the signing of Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between 
India and the Soviet Union in August 1971. The treaty was perceived by the 
governments of Southeast Asia as a serious compromise on India’s non-alignment 
stance.10 India’s ‘ambivalence’ also on the issue of Soviets in Afghanistan and finally 
the recognition of Heng Samrin11 government in July 1981 also contributed to India 
and ASEAN further estrangement.12 
 
                                                
6 Ibid. 24. 
7 S. Viswam. “South-East and East Asia.” World Focus. 12.11-12. (Nov. 1991): 52. 
8 Ibid. 52. 
9 Suryanarayan. 20. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Heng Samrin was the titular head of the Viet Nam-installed regime, the National United 
Front for National Salvation, that over after Viet Nam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 
1978. Andrew Tan. A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia.  United 
Kingdom: Europa Publications, 2004. 117. By the mid-1980s, however, he was overshadowed 
by Cambodia’s dynamic prime minister, Hun Sen. Ooi Keat Gin, ed. Southeast Asia: A 
Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor War to East Timor. California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2004. 
569. 
12 Suryanarayan. 24. 
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India too had serious issues with the ASEAN at that time due to the western 
orientation of the regional body and the role of the Philippines as one of the main 
springboards in Indo-China war. These triggered New Delhi to distance from the 
regional grouping.13 
 
These diplomatic estrangements, however, were changed with the sudden collapse of 
the former Soviet Union leading to the resolution of Cambodian conflict and the 1991 
economic liberalisation policy of India under the government of P.V. Narasimha Rao. 
India, in the initial phase of the post cold war years, under the banner of New 
Economic Policy (NEP), identified the ASEAN as the major focus of interest in its 
foreign, economic and defence policies, which is otherwise known as the ‘LEP’. This 
new economic outlook of New Delhi complemented with the ASEAN’s ‘Look West’ 
and the regionalisation thrust subsequently inaugurated a new phase of rediscovery 
and revival in the relationship between India and the ASEAN.14 
 
3.3. The Birth of LEP  
Although the LEP was not based on a definitive policy paper15, this is being 
implemented to reintegrate India with Southeast Asia. G.V.C. Naidu argues that the 
LEP is a policy since it started as an attempt to assuage negative reaction to the 
expansion of the Indian Navy in the 1980s. It was not just a mere reaction to the 
development of the day as it offered an opportunity to convert that development into a 
policy framework by expanding the scope considerably to include political as well as 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Tridib Chakraborti. “Indochina States in the Canvas of India’s Southeast Asia Policy.” 
World Focus. 27.4. (April 2006): 24. 
15 A statement of intent from the government does not make a policy. The latter is more 
concerned on the process rather than the outcome to qualify as a policy. Sanjay Chaturvedi. 
Interview. 25 February 2009. 
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economic aspects. It soon became a multi-faceted and multi-pronged approach to 
establish strategic links with as many individual countries as possible, evolve closer 
political links with the ASEAN and other nations, and develop strong economic bonds 
with the region. The policy was an attempt, apart from carving a place in the larger 
Asia-Pacific, to showcase India’s economic potential for investments and trade.16    
 
Bureaucrats and diplomats contemporary to the policy’s implementation including 
those who are close to former Prime Minister (PM) Rao, could not remember the 
existence of ‘LEP document’.17 In fact, Naidu is confident that the policy was never 
articulated by way of any official document or pronouncement except in then PM 
Rao’s Singapore lecture in 1991.18 The possible explanation is connected with the 
‘stealth’ style of reform where Rao’s government had notoriously employed. The 
Indian government at that time as much as possible wanted to avoid actions that might 
antagonise the countries of Southeast Asia which were being wooed by India to 
forward its interest in the ASEAN and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
                                                
16 GVC Naidu. “Looking East: India and the Asia-Pacific.” Emerging India Security and 
Foreign Policy Perspectives. Eds. N. Sisodia and Uday Bhaskar. New Delhi: Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses and Promilla and Co. Publishers, 2005. 221. 
17 Amar Ram. Interview. 16 February 2009, GVC Naidu. Interview. 20 February 2009., 
Navrekha Sharma. Interview. 28 January 2009, Ganganath Jha. Interview. 13 February 2009, 
Pankaj Kumar. Interview. 18 February 2009, Mahendra Gaur. Interview. 08 February 2009. 
Amar Ram, a close associate of PM Narasimha Rao and secretary of the economic division of 
the Ministry of External Affairs from 1991 to 1996; Navrekha Sharma, former ambassador of 
India to the Philippines; and scholars such as GVC Naidu, Ganganath Jha, and Pankaj Kumar. 
All of them are saying that the LEP evolved as a ‘study in progress.’ Even the observer and 
publisher of India’s foreign affairs, Dr. Mahendra Gaur of the Foreign Policy Research Centre 
denies the existence of a document. 
18 The Singapore Lecture was sponsored by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). 
In this lecture, Rao talked about the India’s intent of getting closer to Southeast Asia in 
particular and the Asia Pacific in general. GVC Naidu. “The Political and Security Dimensions 
of the Look East Policy.” Power, Commerce and Influence: India’s Look East Experience. 
Eds. Rabindra Sen, et. al. New Delhi: Lancers’ Books, 2009. 82. 
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(APEC) forums. Thus, declaring it in public as a policy would attract suspicion and 
jeopardise instead the resuscitating relations between India and the ASEAN.19  
 
The Indian prime minister (PM), however, admitted in an interview conducted by the 
Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) in 1995 that his government was implementing 
the LEP. He said that ‘India and Indian business is now ‘looking East’ and in policy 
terms is ready for a new and productive partnership.’20 The rationale of the LEP was 
best articulated in PM Rao’s responses. He mentioned that India believed in a common 
destiny for Asia. The PM even invoked the centuries’ old historic and cultural linkages 
of East and South Asian regions. He also put forward India’s desire to integrate its 
economy with the global mainstream and the outward-looking economic policies of 
Southeast Asia. The Indian PM accordingly called for an enhanced and diversified 
cooperation by citing the complementarities of India and Southeast Asian’s 
economies. India was endowed with a vast market, abundant natural resources, good 
business infrastructure and a large reservoir of managerial and technological talent 
while several countries in East and Southeast Asia had investible surplus and 
marketing skills. Thus, he opined that it was only natural for India to forge closer and 
multidimensional linkages with countries in East and Southeast Asia.21  
 
On the issue of a well thought long term action, PM Rao admitted that the first steps of 
reform were conceptualised and some of them were implemented in early 1980s under 
                                                
19 Pankaj Kumar. Interview. 18 February 2009. 
20 P.V. Narasimha Rao. “Towards Closer Linkages with Asian Countries.” Interview for the 
FEER, 19 January 1995. P.V. Narasimha Rao Selected Speeches, 1994-1995. New Delhi: 
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 
December 1995. 467. 
21 Ibid. 
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PM Indira22 Gandhi and were intensified to some extent during PM Rajiv23 Gandhi’s 
regime. The trend was set in early 1980s and was continued later. Reform in the 
economy and foreign policy was implemented hastily only during his time because 
India encountered problems that it had not seen earlier during the regimes of either 
PMs Indira or Rajiv Gandhi. He elaborated that the reform was inevitable due to 
unexpected circumstances that required for the whole package of reforms to be rushed 
through within a very short time.24 In the case of India’s foreign policy, PMs Indira 
and Rajiv also attempted to reach out to several governments in Southeast Asia 
through official visits during their respective term as head of government. The mother 
and son respectively, most of the time, were accompanied by Rao in his capacity either 
as minister of defence, home, or external affairs.25  His experience alone gave him 
enough clues on the stake attached to Southeast Asia. He knew the potentials of this 
area though the decision was not fully in his hands at that time. The idea, however, 
was formed and subsequently became into reality when he was chosen as premier.  
 
3.4. Drivers of India’s Regionalism and Regionalisation  
Beside domestic and international developments, the LEP was advanced further by the 
concerted efforts of various individuals and institutions to be one of India’s regionalist 
instruments.  
 
                                                
22 Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi was the only child of Jawaharlal Nehru. She served as Indian 
prime minister from 1966 to 1977 and also from 1980 until her assassination on 31 October 
1984. “Smt. Indira Gandhi- A Profile.” Prime Minister of India. n.d. 8 June 2010. 
<http://pmindia.nic.in/former.htm>.  
23 Ibid. Rajiv Gandhi was elected as the youngest prime minister of India at the age of 40. He 
served his term from 1984 to 1989.  
24 P.V. Narasimha Rao. P.V. Narasimha Rao Selected Speeches, 1991-1992. New Delhi: 
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 
January 1993. 445. 
25 He served as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh (1971-1973) as well as home, defence and 
foreign ministers (1980-1984). 
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As discussed earlier, the installation of Narasimha Rao as the premier afforded India 
the capability to implement the LEP. Together with the economic transformation 
undertaken, he also reoriented the foreign policy focus towards India’s eastern 
neighbours particularly Japan. Japanese investors also responded to India’s overture 
and invested more into the country despite some reservations.26 The latter’s 
investments, however, were not sufficient to resuscitate India’s economy. Thus, PM 
Rao in his attempt to save the country from the cusp of economic turmoil turned his 
efforts to forge closer relations to East Asia particularly Southeast Asia. Such move 
was faithful to India’s motive in participating lucidly in the regional economic 
organisations such as the ASEAN in order to encourage more foreign investments. At 
that time, the premier was also interested in closely observing and subsequently 
imitating the success stories of East Asian economic developments.27 Building on the 
concept of economic liberalisation by his late political boss Rajiv Gandhi, PM Rao 
asked his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh to push the overhauling of export-import 
policy. The latter then eased the iron-clad bureaucratic controls in order to encourage a 
business friendly investment climate in the country.28 
 
Thus, the expertise of Dr. Singh as Minister of Finance from 1991 to 1996 greatly 
contributed to the advancement of the LEP. His role in ushering a comprehensive 
policy of economic reforms, without doubt, provided a positive image of India to 
                                                
26 Japanese businessmen complained about political unrest, poor quality of labour, labour-
related disputes, erratic power supply, poor telecommunication, transport networks as well as 
protectionist Indian and Pakistani markets. Satu Limaye. “Sushi and Samosas: Indo-Japanese 
Relations After the Cold War.” India Looks East: An Emerging Power and its Asia-Pacific 
Neighbours. Eds. Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham. Australia: Australian National 
University, 1995. 167. 
27 Christophe Jaffrelot. “India’s Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective.” India 
Review. 2.2 (2003): 46. 
28 B.M. Jain. Global Power: India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2006.  United Kingdom: Lexington 
Books, 2008. 51. 
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international investors and attracted more foreign direct investments (FDIs). Being the 
‘chosen one’ of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in which he was a part of 
before his appointment as finance tsar, Dr. Singh was able to advance Rao’s policy 
framework through economic diplomacy.29  He also negotiated an 18-month stand-by 
loan of US $2.3 billion from IMF which ended in March 1993. The balance of 
payments at that time was badly needed to sustain an ailing Indian economy. Through 
Dr. Singh, Rao’s government issued a new industrial policy statement in July 1991 
welcoming FDIs to sustain India's industrial development.30 The painful experience 
made the government realised the significance of effecting investor-friendly reforms to 
attract investments from all sources (indigenous industrialists, non resident Indians and 
foreign direct investors).31 
 
Aside from individuals, regional and global institutions also contributed in the 
furtherance of the LEP in East Asia. The ASEAN, for instance, granted India in 1992 
the status of ‘sectoral dialogue partner’ for tourism, commerce, investments, and 
science and technology. As a proof of its role and importance in the LEP’s 
advancement, PM Rao designated the Foreign Secretary to directly supervise the 
Southeast Asian cluster in the second half of 1992. This cluster had been previously 
                                                
29 “PM’s Biography.” Manmohan Singh.org. n.d. 23 June 2010. 
<http://www.manmohansingh.org>. Dr. Singh was guided by his experience as the Governor 
of the Reserve Bank of India from 1982 to 1985. Aside from that, he joined the Government 
of India as Economic Advisor in the Commerce Ministry in 1971.  This was soon followed by 
his appointment as Chief Economic Advisor in the Ministry of Finance in 1972.  Among the 
many Governmental positions that Dr. Singh has occupied are Secretary in the Ministry of 
Finance; Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission; Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
India; Advisor of the Prime Minister; and Chairman of the University Grants Commission. 
30 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Business Affairs.   1996 India 
Country Commercial Guide. “1996 Country Commercial Guide- India.” Electronic Research 
Collections. n.d. 17 October 2007.  
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/commercial_guides/India.html>. 
31 Charan Wadhva. “Political Economy of Post-1991 Economic Reforms in India.” South 
Asia. 23.1 (2000): 215. 
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dealt with one of the secretaries of the Ministry for External Affairs (MEA). By this 
time, the ASEAN, according to a member of the Secretariat for Economic Affairs of 
MEA in October 1995, was already at the heart of India’s reworked strategy.32 At that 
moment, Pranab Mukherjee and J. N. Dixit assumed their positions as the Minister and 
Foreign Secretary of the MEA respectively. They too also helped in pivoting their 
organisation to advance the government’s foreign policy orientation and strategies.33  
 
Besides government initiatives, private trade organisations such as the Confederation 
of Indian Industry (CII), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India 
(ASSOCHAM) also contributed in the reorientation and maintenance of the policy. 
The leadership of these organisations played a very important role in bringing about 
transformation.34 This closer interaction of government and non-government 
organisations only proved the active interface of regionalism and regionalisation in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
CII was born out of a 115 year old miniscule association. It emerged side by side with 
the abolishment of industrial licensing and a wide scale introduction of economic 
reforms.  Since then it has grown to be the most visible business association in India.35  
                                                
32 Jaffrelot. 47. 
33 Pranab Mukheerji served as the board of governors in various international financial 
institutions from 1982-1985 such as International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank and African Development Bank. He also served as the chairperson of the 
Group 24, a ministerial group attached to IMF and World Bank in 1984. “Pranab Mukheerji- 
A Bio Profile.” Ministry of External Affairs. n.d. 13 October 2007.  
<http://meaindia.nic.in/onmouse/eam.htm>.   
34 J.N. Dixit. India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2003. New Delhi: Picus Books, 2003. 311. 
35 “About Us.” Confederation of Indian Industry. n.d. 23 October 2007. <http://www.cii.in/>. 
CII has a direct membership of over 6,500 organisations from the private as well as public 
sectors, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Multinational Corporations 
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To strengthen government’s LEP initiatives, the CII established a regional 
representative office for Southeast Asia based in Singapore in September 2004. This 
office was tasked to cooperate with businessmen and governments in the ASEAN 
countries in devising a strategy to promote mutually beneficial economic cooperation 
in the field of trade, investment, technology transfer, trainings on cross border 
developments on infrastructure, manufacturing and engineering, information and 
communication technology (ICT), healthcare, tourism, environment, agriculture, 
science and technology, finance and banking, as well as logistics and retail.36 In fact, 
today this office serves not only as reference point for Indians but also for the ASEAN 
industry players as well. 
 
Since then, the organisation has worked closely with the government on policy issues, 
enhancing efficiency, competitiveness and expanding business opportunities for 
industry through a range of specialised services and global linkages. An interesting 
project that has significant bearing to the LEP was the Art-North-East Project, an 
initiative by CII and North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd.37 (NEDFi). 
This provided market linkages for handlooms and handicraft products from the North 
East region of India. Moreover, the Rural Business Hubs Pilots projects were also 
                                                
(MNCs), and an indirect membership of over 90,000 companies from around 350 national and 
regional sectoral associations. 
36 “India-Singapore-Economic Relations.” Indian Brand Equity Foundation. 14 April 2005. 1 
November 2007. <http://www.ibef.org/artdisplay.aspx?cat_id=402&art_id=5805>.  
37 NEDFi is a premier financial and development institution of northeast India. A brainchild of 
then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in 1995, it is empowered to carry on and transact the 
business of providing credit and other facilities for promotion, expansion and modernisation of 
industrial enterprises and infrastructure projects in the North Eastern Region of India, also 
carry on and transact business of providing credit and other facilities for promotion of agri-
horticulture plantation, medicinal plantation, sericulture plantation, aquaculture, poultry, dairy 
and animal husbandry development in order to initiate large involvement of rural population in 
the economic upsurge of the society and faster economic growth of different parts of the North 
Eastern region. “What We Do.” North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. n.d. 23 
October 2007. <http://www.nedfi.com/what_we_do.htm>.  
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initiated ranging from fruit production in Nainital to Jatropha38 cultivation for bio 
diesel in Haryana, and carpet weaving and 'Blue Pottery' from Rajashthan.39 The 
confederation also facilitated the participation of budding Indian entrepreneurs from 
north-eastern states of India to participate in Singapore’s trade exhibitions in August 
2007.40 
 
FICCI, on the other hand, is the largest and oldest organisation of Indian business. 
With a nationwide membership of over 500 chambers of commerce and business 
associations, this federation deals directly and indirectly with more than 250,000 
business units. It has been able to extend its area of operation to all major trade and 
investment partners of India. It has 79 joint business councils’ agreements and 
commercial alliances with over a hundred counterpart chambers worldwide.41 
 
Another outstanding Indian private organisation that emerged along with the upswings 
and upheaval of Indian economy in 1990s is the ASSOCHAM. It played a catalytic 
role in shaping the trade, commerce and industrial environment of India. The 
association was established in 1920 with members from various chambers of 
commerce of Mumbai, Cochin, Chennai and New Delhi.42  
                                                
38
Jatropha is a genus of approximately 175 succulent plants, shrubs, and trees from the family 
Euphorbiaceae. All parts of the jatropha plant have been used traditionally as medicines, for 
both human and veterinary ailments, for a long time. The jatropha species that is most widely 
studied in a nutritional context is J. curcas. The kernel has higher crude protein (22-28 percent) 
and oil contents (54-58 percent) compared to the shell (4-6 percent crude protein and 0.8-1.4 
percent oil).  Rakshit Devappa, Harinder Makkar and Klaus Becker. “Nutritional, 
Biochemical, and Pharmaceutical Potential of Proteins and Peptides from Jatropha: Review.”  
Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry. 58.3. (2010): 6544. 
39 <http://www.cii.in/>. 
40 Charlie Lalthlenmawia. Interview. 21 August 2007. 
41 India-Philippines Bilateral Trade: An Overview. New Delhi: Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry. 2009. n.p. 
42 Economic Diplomacy: India’s Strategy for the Coming New Economic World Order. New 
Delhi: The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India, 2008. n.p. 
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The role of these three major peak industry organisations as facilitators of 
development has been effectively proven by the immediate recovery of Indian 
economy and is even more appreciated in recent times. To fully participate further the 
efforts of nation building, these organisations regularly meet with government 
executives, apprise them about the needs to enhance India’s competitive position, and 
obtain promises of policy response. They also served as strong supporters of 
‘Competitiveness for India Inc.’43 
 
3.5. A Relook on the LEP 
Sharpened by experiences, the LEP acted as regionalist platform of India in East Asia 
ever since its implementation. The objectives of the LEP were obviously regionalist in 
nature insofar as they intended to bind India to East Asian region in most diverse fields 
possible.44 Under such initiatives, major efforts were made to become a member of the 
ASEAN, where the Philippines is one of the founding members in 1967, and of the 
APEC. Although the economic relationship was already strong with countries like 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, India’s fullest participation as dialogue partner of 
the ASEAN was intended to improve its relationships with all member countries. 
Further membership in the association was also expected to smooth its way into the 
APEC.45 Unfortunately, the latter was not yet ready technically to welcome India in its 
midst. As a result, the LEP was focused primarily on India’s economic engagements 
with Southeast Asia.46   
 
                                                
43 India Inc. refers to Indian corporate sector. Jalal Alamgir. India’s Open-Economy Policy: 
Globalism, Rivalry, Continuity.  United States of America and Canada: Routledge, 2009. 106. 
44 Saint-Mezard. 436. 
45  Ibid. 
46 Swaran Singh. “A Role for External Actors in an East Asian Security Community: Indian 
Perspectives.” Regional Security in East Asia: Challenges to Cooperation and Community 
Building. Ed. Aileen Baviera. Diliman: University of the Philippines, 2008. 189-190. 
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Table 3.1. Defining India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Based on 








1990-1997 (End of Cold War to Asian Financial 
Crisis) 
1998-2001 (1998 Nuclear Tests to 2001 World 
Trade Center Attack)  
 
Global Events 
2002- 2010 (War on Terrorism and Iraq to-day) 
 
ASEAN 5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Brunei) 




NORTHEAST ASIA, PACIFIC ISLANDS AND 
THE PHILIPPINES (China, South Korea and 
Japan; New Zealand, Australia and Pacific Island 






Since its implementation, the policy has undergone various phases.47 The recent 
evaluation of its status based on the following categorisations (motivations, global 
developments and geographical focuses) concludes that the policy is already in its 
third phase. It should be taken into consideration, however, that the said 
categorisations are not totally independent from each other and are employed only for 
the purpose of tracing its current status. This study still acknowledges that the 
following variables are interrelated and interconnected towards the realisation of 
India’s regional strategy in the region. Thus, the following points in Table 3.1 despite 
some overlapping are important in making a case for each category. 
                                                
47 Jashwant Singh.  Minister of External Affairs, Republic of India. Speech at Harvard 
University. C. Raja Mohan “Look East Policy: Phase Two.” The Hindu, 9 October  2003. 
These notable personalities arrived to a certain conclusion that the LEP was already in the 
second phase of its development at the time of discussion. 
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3.5.1. Motivations  
In evaluating the trajectory of India’s LEP since 1992, one should look at the evolution 
of the policy in terms of motivations. Based on available literature, the LEP began as a 
form of naval diplomacy and developed into soft economic statecraft. Eventually, it 
evolved into a comprehensive instrument which includes strategic as well as defence 
cooperation while strongly maintaining the economic interest. 
 
3.5.1.1. Navy Expansion  
GVC Naidu believed that the LEP started as an attempt to assuage negative reactions 
of Southeast Asian countries about the expansion of Indian Navy in 1980s.48 It was 
first initiated to dispel the concern over India’s naval build-up programme and the 
expansion of power projection capabilities. Such concerns had been made known to 
India from about the mid 1980s by some littoral states in the Indian Ocean, including 
Australia. They essentially elated to the Indian Navy’s purchase of a second aircraft 
carrier ‘Viraat’ in 1987, and the three-year lease of a nuclear powered submarine from 
the Soviet Union in 1988.49 Indonesia in particular was concerned by the reports that 
India was planning to build a major naval base at Great Nicobar Island.50 The rationale 
of the Indian naval expansion was questioned and linked to India’s hegemonic 
aspiration in the region. This development subsequently solicited adverse reaction 
from the ASEAN. According to a retired official of the Indian Armed Forces, such 
                                                
48 Naidu. 221. 
49 A.R. Tandon. “India and the Indian Ocean.” Maritime India. Ed. K.K. Nayyar. New Delhi: 
Rupa & Company and National Maritime Foundation, 2005. 61-62. 
50 Mak Joon Num. “ASEAN-India Defence Interactions.” India and ASEAN: The Politics of 
India’s Look East Policy. Eds. Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo. New Delhi: Centre de 
Sciences Humaines, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Centre for the Study of National 
Security Policy and Manohar, 2001. 152. 
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negative response could have been avoided if the Indian government provided precise 
explanation on what its navy was doing or what strategic objectives it was pursuing.51  
 
Thus from 1991 onwards, India has vigorously opened up for navy-to-navy interaction 
with neighbours and other extra regional powers. These were cleared to take place in 
the form of joint and bilateral exercises with selected littoral and extra-regional navies. 
This decision brought to an end the almost three decade of self-imposed isolation on 
the part of Indian navy.52 Noting the success of naval diplomacy, the Indian 
government according to G.V.C. Naidu went further by transforming this initiative 
into a ‘soft economic statecraft’ to engage again with Southeast Asia in the early 
1990s. 
 
3.5.1.2. Economic  
The post Cold War political atmosphere offered an opportunity to Indian government 
to convert this naval diplomatic initiative into a policy framework.53 It was 
transformed into an economic instrument to reach out to countries of the ASEAN as 
India’s partner for closer economic cooperation. Aside from geographical proximity 
and the presence of large Indian diaspora, India was particularly keen to be associated 
with the ASEAN because of the fast growing market of the region with half a billion 
population and about US $737 billion income, greater openness as well as larger role 
in the global market. These factors pushed the birth of the LEP.54  
 
                                                
51 Ibid. 153; also “India Allays Fears Over Military Might.” The Star. 28 February 1992.  
52 Tandon.  
53 Naidu. 221. 
54 Atul Sarma and Pradeep Kumae Mehta. “Indo-ASEAN Trade Prospects: A Study of Trade 
Complementarity.” Beyond the Rhetoric: The Economics of India’s Look East Policy. Eds. 
Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo. New Delhi: Centre de Sciences Humaines, Core Group 
for the Study of National Security and Manohar, 2003. 81. 
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In order to grow economically closer to the countries in the region, India’s strategy 
worked on two levels. India tried to improve its relations both at multilateral level with 
the ASEAN and, at bilateral level with each of the members of the association.55  
 
India also worked with the ASEAN to facilitate the FTAs in 2009. It is interesting to 
note that at this phase, India’s total trade with Southeast Asian countries dramatically 
increased from US $2.4 billion in 1990 to US $43.9 billion in 2010.56 At the same 
time, the trading relations of India with China, Japan and South Korea increased in 
2010. The combined trade figure of these East Asian countries and the ASEAN states 
reached to US $108.7 billion in 2010 from a mere US $8 billion in 1990.57 Such 
growth was supplemented also by the increase in FDI flow from India to the region 
and vice-versa.58 
 
3.5.1.3. Strategic/Defence  
From 1991 onwards, the LEP became a regional strategy of India in Southeast Asia 
primarily on economic front. The 2001 bombing of World Trade Center (WTC) in the 
US, however, drastically changed this particular orientation. The campaign against 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and former President George W. Bush’ 
campaign on war on terror reoriented even the LEP’s motivation from purely 
economic to strategic and defence related cooperation. India also participated in the 
said US alliance and deepened its strategic cooperation with the sole superpower. As a 
                                                
55 Saint-Mezard. 41. 
56 Export-Import Data Bank, 2009-2010. Ministry of Commerce, Republic of India. 5 April 
2011; also Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “External Trade Statistics, 2005-2006.” 
ASEAN Secretariat. n.d. 1 November 2007. <http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm>. The 2010 
figure, however, plummeted by nearly US $1.4 billion from the total trade data of 2009.  
57 Ibid. As of the end of 2010, India’s total bilateral trade with China was US $42.4 billion, 
Japan to nearly US $10.4 billion, and South Korea to US $11.9 billion. 
58 Jyaneswar Laishram. “ASEAN-India FTA: A New Horizon.” Diplomatist. January 2007. 23 
August 2007.  <http://www.diplomatist.com/dipo1st/story_01.htm>.  
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result, India was able to participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) 
organised by the US Navy. India eventually hosted the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium in February 2008 (IONS 2008) with 29 participating nations.59 This was 
followed in May 2010 in Abu Dhabi.60 
 
Because of these, the US viewed India as a key regional power and an emerging global 
player. Nonetheless, India assumed importance as a potential partner in maintaining 
stability in the Indian Ocean region particularly in fighting Islamic extremism, and in 
preventing the spread of WMD.61  
 
Moreover, the expanding India-US relationship that has been accompanied by a higher 
Indian profile in Southeast Asia contributed also to India’s projection as a natural 
partner and balancer of power in the region.62 It should be noted that India too 
occupied a strategic position near Southeast Asian waters. The Indian Navy’s Far 
Eastern Subcommand has its headquarters in Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, which 
is very close to the northern entrance of Malacca Strait.63 Hence, India utilised the 
LEP as a strategic arm in the region without solely focusing on naval cooperation but 
also on non-traditional security concerns especially on transnational crimes, piracy and 
even disaster management. 
 
                                                
59 “Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.” Indian Navy. n.d. 15 June 2010. 
<http://www.indiannavy.gov.in/ion.htm>. 
60 Ibid. 28 May 2011. 
61 Harinder Sekhon. “America’s Role in Asia.” Political and Security Dynamics of South and 
Southeast Asia. Ed. Daljit Singh. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007. 39. 
62 C. Raja Mohan. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New 
Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003. 162. 
63 Daljit Singh. “Asia-Pacific Political and Security Dynamics.” Political and Security 
Dynamics of South and Southeast Asia. Ed. Daljit Singh. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2007. 31. 
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In its attempt to further consolidate defence ties after 9/11, India signed a joint 
declaration with the ASEAN in October 2003 at the Bali Summit to combat 
international terrorism. India and the Philippines also agreed on an Extradition Treaty 
in March 2004. Moreover, India also signed a Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters with Thailand in 2004 and Singapore in 2005.64 
 
In sum, these motivations have transformed the LEP as a policy framework of India to 
advance its interest in Southeast and eventually the East Asian region. It should be 
noted, however, that each motivation did not fade away once a new driving force 
emerged. Instead they are all moving cumulatively to strengthen each other and 
become a comprehensive regionalism tool through the years. Aside from motivation, 
various literature also suggesting the other way of looking at the LEP’s direction using 
events of global and regional significance as points of reference. 
 
3.5.2. Global Developments.  
Since the LEP was born out of necessity to address the challenges brought about by 
the change of world order, it is only but proper that the policy should also be reviewed 
in terms of global developments. Ambassador Amar Ram65, for instance, put forward 
the various events that he deemed significant in defining India’s LEP. This distinction, 
however, should not be misunderstood as his exclusive claim as there are other 
scholars also postulating similar ideas. His familiarity, however, to the LEP as one of 
its facilitators during PM Rao’s administration makes his version more authoritative. 
 
                                                
64 Manish Dabhade. “Indian and East Asia: A Region ‘Rediscovered’.” Indian Foreign Policy 
in a Unipolar World. Ed. Harsh Pant. New Delhi: Routledge, 2009. 316-317. 
65 Amar Ram. Email Interview. 4 May 2010. 
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India’s LEP, throughout its 18 years of existence, is characterised by three tipping 
point eras in the context of global developments: 1990, the year when Cold War was 
finally concluded; 1998, when India conducted its nuclear test; and 2002, when the US 
declared global war against terror following the September 11 attack.  
 
3.5.2.1. Year 1990 to 1997 
The first phase of the LEP witnessed the global transformation with the collapse of 
Soviet Union and the subsequent conclusion of Cold War. This development 
eventually made the US as the sole global superpower. This also signalled the shift of 
power structure from a unipolar to multipolar system and subsequently questioned the 
continuity of India’s non-alignment policy. India was then forced to reorient its foreign 
policy leading to the institutionalisation of the LEP. 
 
The first phase of the LEP was also characterised by the presence of trade and 
investment linkages. This period witnessed India’s active attention to the dynamic 
ASEAN markets, and the latter’s intention in taking advantage the former’s rising 
potentials and more open Indian market. Since 1991, several high level political visits 
had occurred on both sides and dramatically increased the following year when the 
ASEAN made India its Sectoral Dialogue Partner (SDP). To begin, both parties 
focused on four areas of potential cooperation such as trade, investment, tourism and 
human resource development including science and technology. In 1995, the ASEAN 
made India its Full Dialogue Partner (FDP) together with China and Russia. India was 
also invited in July 1996 to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that acts as a 
platform for annual review of issues relating to regional peace and security.66  
                                                
66 Wadhva. 62. 
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To supplement the government-to-government interactions, both countries also 
encouraged and facilitated the conduct of business-to-business level initiatives. The 
Indian-ASEAN Economic Cooperation Committee (IAECC) and the ASEAN-India 
Business Council (AIBC) jointly identified areas of energy, technology, capital goods, 
food and agriculture, telecommunications, transportation and banking as means to 
build closer mutual economic links and synergies. To cement these initiatives, 
academic and expert level undertakings were also held by organizing annual Indian-
ASEAN lecture series in New Delhi.67  
 
The first phase of the LEP ended with the occurrence of Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 
in 1997. This development was an acid test to the relations of India and Southeast 
Asia. India did not hesitate to provide financial assistance especially to those ASEAN 
partners that were greatly affected by the crisis.  The next phase of the LEP revealed 
India’s reciprocity as a reliable partner. 
 
3.5.2.2. Year 1998 to 2001 
The second phase of the LEP started right after the AFC. New Delhi did not allow the 
Asian crisis to ruin the gains made by the LEP. In May 1998, India offered long term 
credit for the purchase of equipment, especially in engineering, machinery, 
automobile, iron and steel work sectors to countries in the region. Since India’s 
equipment cost less, India considered itself in an advantageous position to sell its 
products to these impoverished countries as alternatives to the products formerly 
bought from the developed states. Learning from its post Cold War experience, India 
                                                
67 Ibid. 63. 
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also promoted a barter system with Southeast Asia in order to allow trade to continue 
while preserving precious reserves of strong currencies.68 
 
Another defining moment in this particular stage of the LEP was the conduct of 
India’s nuclear test ‘Pokhran II’ by the Vajpayee administration on 11 May 2008. 
Most Southeast Asian nations officially criticised the tests, though less virulently than 
the Philippines.69 Indian relations with the region suffered from a fairly serious 
handicap because the chairmanship of the ASEAN and the ARF was with the 
Philippines. Manila was not contented to just officially condemn India’s nuclear tests. 
Its officials expressed their dismay during their participations in the Group of Eight 
(G8) summit meeting in London and in the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) in the US.70  
 
In spite of the tensions created by the nuclear tests, Indian diplomacy in the region did 
not die down. Instead, India’s diplomatic corps made the most of the 1998 Post-
Ministerial Conferences to redefine the LEP by exerting efforts to be ‘flexible and 
responsive’ to the diversity within the evolving unity of East and Southeast Asia. 
Rather than trying to be all things to all countries, India instead engaged in sub-
regional and supra regional arrangements to the extent that others valued its 
contribution and participation. Examples of these are Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
                                                
68 Saint-Mezard. 161. 
69 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government knew that the 1998 nuclear test would affect 
again India’s relations with ASEAN member countries. However, India needed to conduct this 
test to quash the Indian perception that India’s security environment had deteriorated sharply 
through the 1980s and 1990s. These include Pakistan’s determination to develop a nuclear 
weapon and China’s abetment of the programme; the separatist insurgencies India faced in 
Punjab and Kashmir; and India’s loss of external allies. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri. “The 
Challenges for Indian Diplomacy.” India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond. Ed. 
Amitabh Mattoo. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1999. 195-196. 
70 Saint-Mezard. 398. 
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Multi-Sectoral Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC) formed in 1997 and Mekong-
Ganga Cooperation (MGC) in 2000.71  
 
The Indian government also exercised political and economic relations with the region 
keeping in mind the particular conditions and requirements of each Southeast Asian 
state.72  At this time, India managed to strengthen its regionalism while conducting 
series of ‘new bilateralism’ activities.  
 
This second stage of the LEP concluded with the WTC bombing on 11 September 
2001. This event triggered the evolution of the LEP’s motivation from economic to 
security and defence issues.  
 
3.5.2.3. Year 2002 to 2010  
The third phase of the LEP, on the other hand, changed and enhanced again the LEP’s 
orientation with the deepening of ties between India and the US. Following the 
September 11 attacks, the threats from transnational terrorism and the possibility of the 
global war on terror gave India an opportunity to break decisively out of the isolation 
caused by its nuclear tests in 1998. Subsequently, India was able to reframe the 
Kashmir issue as one of terrorism in making a case for the international community to 
shed much of the moral ambivalence around it. Furthermore, the ‘war on terror’ helped 
India in developing its ties with the US much better than what was being projected 
before September 11.73 In fact, this development found some reasons for the US and 
                                                
71 Ibid. 400. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Arabinda Acharya. “India and Southeast Asia in the Age of Terror: Building Partnership for 
Peace.” Contemporary Southeast Asia. 28.2 (2006): 304. The Post 9/11 relations between 
India and the US manifested on many fronts such as lifting of post- Pokhran sanctions, 
increased democracy and governance assistance, joint patrolling of the strategic Straits of 
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India to activate their joint working group on counterterrorism established in January 
2000. In confronting the challenge of global terrorism, India has taken on anti-piracy 
missions in Malacca Strait and humanitarian operations in Southeast Asia. The said 
activities were expected in combating the ideological support for terrorism and radical 
extremism.74 Thus, India’s closer relations with the US enabled its participation in 
naval and defence exercises with several countries in Southeast Asia that are US allies. 
The success of this development was undeniably facilitated by the LEP.    
 
In this period, another interesting development that occurred between India and 
Southeast Asian countries was the holding of the first ASEAN-India Summit in 
November 2002 in Phnom Penh. In 2009, India and the ASEAN also signed the FTA. 
 
This phase is still ongoing. There is speculation that the global recession of 2009 will 
conclude this phase but its effects are still too premature to evaluate and may or may 
not boost the LEP. Another interesting category to look at is on the expansion of the 
LEP’s circle of influence in East Asia as well as the Pacific. 
 
3.5.3. Geographical Focuses  
In the examination of the LEP as India’s regional strategy in the region, the 
geographical focuses are the most articulated category. In this study, the spreading out 
of India’s influence in breadth is not the only consideration. Responses made by the 
countries involved to the LEP are also taken into account. The expansion of India’s 
sphere of influence in Southeast and East Asia is seen in print, broadcast and new 
                                                
Malacca and others. 
74 Timothy Hoyt. “India and the Challenge of Global Terrorism: The ‘Long War’ and 
Competing Domestic Visions.” India Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World. Ed. Harsh Pant. 
New Delhi: Routledge, 2009. 97-98. 
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media to be a one-time deal. Reality, however, says otherwise. The action of India was 
defined by the necessity of time and of its economic needs in particular. India, for 
instance, intended to re-engage with the six member countries of the ASEAN after the 
Cold War. Unfortunately, only four of these countries were economically prepared 
while Brunei responded only in the middle of 1990s. The Philippines, on the other 
hand, was pestered by various kinds of disasters at this time. From this initial stage, 
India expanded its influence to include four new members of the ASEAN in mid 
1990s such as Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. With the good responses 
coming from them and to complement as well to some extent the ARF and East Asian 
Summit partners, India eventually expanded further by including in the LEP’s breadth 
the countries of China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the other 
Pacific countries.  
 
At this juncture, India also reviewed the loop and re-energised recently those distant 
relations with the Philippines. It should be noted, that India for so long enjoyed 
continuous trading relations with all countries involved. Their formal inclusion in the 
sphere of influence particularly at a strategic level was undertaken only in early 2000 
especially after India’s acceptance as a dialogue partner of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in 1996 and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2002.  
 
Following this line of analysis, the spatial expansion by phases also coincides with 
India’s priorities. It started from the dire needs to attract foreign direct investments, to 
the management of border and transnational crime related problems as well as energy 
security, and lastly strategic concerns. 
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3.5.3.1. ASEAN 5  
India longed to re-invigorate its relations with countries in Southeast Asian region. 
Being pragmatic, Rao government engaged in diplomatic ties with the ASEAN. At 
that time, there were only six ASEAN members namely Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei. The first five are the founding members 
in 1967 and Brunei became a member in 1986. Although India was committed to the 
ASEAN as a body, the primary target of India was the high performing Asian 
economies (HPAEs) such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore.75 India 
wanted to emulate the success stories of these countries in improving their respective 
economic conditions. Anne Booth observed that from 1986 to 1990 all the founding 
member countries of the ASEAN have seen a recovery in economic growth with 
Singapore and Thailand achieving double-digit growth rate in some years.76 In fact, 
the weighted average of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate for Southeast 
Asia from 1980 to 1990 was 6.1 percent. The four founding members of the ASEAN 
registered more than six percent improvement while the Philippines grew only by 2.1 
percent.77   
 
According to Atul Sarma and Pradeep Kumar Mehta, the development of the ASEAN 
countries from 1980 to 1990 was due to the shifting of the economy to export-led 
growth strategy and the introduction of some measures on large-scale deregulation and 
privatisation. These economies also liberalised their financial sector by introducing 
flexible interest rates, giving greater freedom in functioning to domestic financial 
                                                
75 Teofilo Daquila. Transformation of Southeast Asian Economies. New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, 2007. 3. 
76 Anne Booth. “An Economic Overview of Southeast Asia.” Southeast Asian Affairs. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. 22; also Daquila. 5. 
77 Indonesia had 6.6 percent real GDP growth rate while Malaysia registered a 9.6 percent 
growth, Singapore with 7.6 and Thailand with 7.7. For details, see Table 1.1, Daquila, 2007, 5. 
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institutions in terms of credit allocation as well as expanding the lending facility in a 
competitive environment.78 
 
Moreover, the market friendly social and legal environment, high priority to physical 
infrastructure in energy, transport, telecommunications and construction sectors as 
well as investment in human capital also supported both domestic and foreign private 
initiatives.79 These conditions encouraged India to consider Southeast Asia at the core 
of Indian LEP because of its potential as a major trading partner and as a source of 
FDI flows.80 
 
Brunei, on the other hand, responded positively to the LEP almost in mid 1990s. In 
fact, this country supported India’s candidature as a full dialogue partner of the 
ASEAN. India’s economic relation with Brunei largely revolved around the import of 
petroleum goods. India, being an energy hungry country and the world’s sixth largest 
petroleum consumer, cannot afford to ignore Brunei. Thus, few important bilateral 
agreements such as Air Service Agreement in 1995, Agreement on Cooperation for the 
Establishment of Telemetry, Tracking and Telecommand Station for the Satellites and 
Launch Vehicles in 199781, and the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (BIPPA) in 2008 were signed.82 
 
                                                
78 Atul Sarma and Pradeep Kumar Mehta. Exploring Indo ASEAN Economic Partnership in 
Globalising World. New Delhi: Bookwell, 2002. 43. 
79 Ibid. 44. 
80 Isabelle Saint-Mezard. “The Look East Policy: An Economic Perspective.” Beyond the 
Rhetoric: The Economics of India’s Look East Policy. Eds. Frederic Grare and Amitabh 
Mattoo. New Delhi: Manohar, Centre de Science Humaines and Core Group for the Study of 
National Security. 2003. 28. 
81 Pranav Kumar. “Brunei in India’s Foreign Policy.” 19 May 2008. 23 June 2010. 
<http://www.ipcs.org/print_article-details.php?recNo=2585>. 
82 “India Signs BIPA with Brunei.” Press Information Bureau. 22 May 2008. 22 June 2010. 
<http://www.pib.nic/inarchieve/others/2008/may/e2008052222.pdf>. 
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3.5.3.2. CLMV  
India’s focus on the newer ASEAN states (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam or 
the CLMV) highlighted the fact that geographical proximity had a large influence in 
India’s LEP because the Southeast Asian states particularly those along the Mekong 
River are also strategically important to China.83 The LEP’s resurgence in the post 
Pokhran II test was marked by the reactivation of India’s relations with CLMV.  
 
Various reasons were identified for such reactivation such as the drastic improvement 
of India-US ties which substantially altered India’s relations with countries of 
Southeast Asia especially after President Clinton’s visit in 2000. This visit resulted in 
a marked realignment of New Delhi’s geo-strategic and foreign economic ties. 
Cumulatively, this factor also created an avenue for India and China to address issues 
that had divided them for so long. China’s entry in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), its capacity to influence FDI and its strategic and political influence in the 
region also motivated India to engage enthusiastically with these countries. 
Eventually, it triggered India to rethink its relation with Myanmar especially with its 
inclusion as a member of ASEAN in 1997. It should be noted that Myanmar is 
strategically important for India since the former serves as bridge to Southeast Asia 
through India’s eastern states which could either make or break its development if not 
properly addressed.84 
 
                                                
83 Baljit Singh. “India’s Extended Neighbourhood.” India’s Foreign Policy: Contemporary 
Trends. Eds. R.S. Yadav and Suresh Dhanda. Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2009. 113. 
84 Tridib Chakraborti. “Disparate Priorities: Explaining the Penumbra of India’s Look East 
Policy.” Ed. Reedy, K. Raja. India and ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st 
Century. New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2005. 65-68. 
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Another important success story of the LEP was the establishment of BIMSTEC. 
Although this sub-regional grouping was Thailand’s initiative, India’s involvement 
added new dimensions to the LEP and to the Asian paradigm of cooperation.85 This 
group is primarily interested in the areas of cooperation in trade, investment, industry, 
transportation, infrastructure, science and technology, human resources development, 
energy, fisheries, agriculture, natural resources and tourism.86 Now India has made this 
grouping as a vehicle to influence its surrounding countries in South Asia without 
disturbing its delicate and volatile regional order.  
 
The MGC, on the other hand, was designed to define regions in the new global 
economy while keeping the countries’ native identity and character intact. MGC is 
composed of India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. This initiative 
is also suspected as a design to counterbalance the influence of China in the region.87 
 
It must be remembered that this plan was part of the original motivations of the policy. 
It was only realised more than a decade after at Bangkok in 2003 to form the forum 
with the stakeholder states. The forum aimed to promote tourism and culture as well as 
transport particularly the communication links such as Trans-Asian Highway (TAH) 
under the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project and 
East-West Corridor (EWC) that will connect Singapore and the rest of Southeast Asia 
through India’s eastern states.88 ALTID, in turn, has been a priority project under the 
New Delhi Action Plan on Infrastructure Development in Asia and the Pacific (1997-
                                                
85 Faizal Yahya. “BIMSTEC and Emerging Patterns of Asian Regional and InterRegional 
Cooperation.” Australian Journal of Political Science. 40.3 (2007): 392. 
86 Nanda. 491. 
87 A. M. Thomas. “India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective." Critical 
Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy. Eds. Rajen Harshe and K.M. Seethi. Kottayam: 
Mahatma Gandhi University, 2005. 308. 
88 Devare. 198. 
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2006). The viability of the said link was tested and proven feasible sometime in 2004 
with the holding of the first India-ASEAN Car Rally. 
 
This partnership, in fact, allowed India to break the artificial political barriers between 
the subcontinent and Southeast Asia especially with the forging of new agreement 
between the BIMSTEC members to further develop the Asian Highway connections 
between their countries.89 India is willing to assist the Myanmar Government in 
developing its infrastructural projects including the proposed Tamanthi Hydro-Electric 
Project near the border of India and Myanmar across Nagaland, the proposed Kaladan 
River navigation, Road and Pipeline Project in the Rakhine State providing a link to 
southern Mizoram and India's northeast as a whole.90 Furthermore, India has also 
quietly begun to put in place the arrangements for regular access to ports in Southeast 
Asia. India is also interested to develop a deep seaport at Myanmar’s Dawei section to 
reduce the travel time of cargo between India and Thailand by bypassing the Malacca 




                                                
89 “Development of an Asian Highway.” Japan-ESCAP Cooperation Fund. n.d. 17 October 
2007. <http://www.unescap.org/jecf/p06highway.htm>. Originally, BIMSTEC stands for 
Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation that was organized in 
1997. Seven years later, it was renamed as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral 
Technical Cooperation. 
90 Thiyam Barat. “Indo-Myanmar Trade and the Economy of Manipur.” Manipur Online. 3 
November 2005. 17 October 2007. 
<http://www.manipuronline.com/Economy/November2005/manipurmyanmartrade03_3.htm>. 
India’s northeastern states include Assam, Sikkim, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Praddesh, 
Tripura, Menghalaya and Mizoram, currently share a 1,600 kilometres of border with 
Myanmar. 
91 Ramtanu Maitra. “The Energy Ties that Bind India, China.” Asia Times Online. 12 April 
2005. April 2005. 17 October 2007. 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD12Df03.html>.  
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3.5.3.3. Northeast Asia, Pacific Islands and the Philippines  
The LEP’s geographic scope has also widened from the initial focus on Southeast Asia 
to include East Asia and parts of Oceania.92 It expanded the definition of the ‘East’ 
extending from Australia to China and East Asia with the ASEAN as its core. India 
knew that by widening its influence to include Northeast Asia and some countries in 
the Pacific enabled it to secure a stake in the enlarged East Asian bloc through the 
LEP. Such participation will benefit its economy in the long run. Adding India, as then 
President Gloria Arroyo93 rightly pointed out, to the enlarged line-up would produce a 
trade bloc that could compete with the EU and North America.94 
 
Furthermore, it also widened its interest in these areas from purely economic into 
security cooperation that includes joint operations in protecting the sea-lanes as well as 
pooling resources in ‘war against terror’. The military contacts and joint exercises that 
India launched with the ASEAN states on a low key basis in early 1990s are now 
expanding into full-fledged defence cooperation. Countries like Japan, South Korea 
and China are also added to these contacts.95 
 
                                                
92 Oceania is composed of Australasia (Australia and its dependencies, and New Zealand), 
Melanesia (Fiji, part of Indonesia, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu), Micronesia (Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau and Wake Island) and Polynesia (American Samoa, 
Cook Islands, Easter Island, French Polynesia, Hawaii, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, 
Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis as well as Futuna). “Composition of Macro Geographical 
(Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-regions, and Selected Economic and Other 
Groupings.” United Nations Statistics Division. 21 April 2010. 5 June 2010. 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#oceania>.  
93 Maria Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the 14th president of the Republic of the Philippines. Her 
presidency began in 2001 by succeeding deposed President Joseph Estrada and ended in 2010. 
“The President.” Office of the President. 2010. 8 June 2010. <http://www.op.gov.ph>. 
94 Rabindra Sen. “Introduction, India’s Look East Policy: Some Observations.” Power, 
Commerce and Influence: India’s Look East Experience. Eds. Rabindra Sen, et. al. New Delhi: 
Lancer’s Books, 2009. 4. 
95 Devare. 72. 
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It is also important to note that the LEP that was originally driven by China’s rivalry 
and competition is now serving as a link towards more Sino-Indian cooperation. The 
progressive interaction of India through the LEP with Southeast Asia also helped in 
dealing positively with China.96 The Chinese government as much as possible does not 
want to disturb the stability of the region primarily to protect and maintain its 
economic interest in Southeast Asia.  
 
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee during his visit in Indonesia highlighted 
the fact that China remains an important priority of India's foreign policy. Frequent 
high level visits have further contributed in developing mutual trust and 
understanding. He further said that the India-China partnership is an important 
determinant for regional as well as global peace and development, and for Asia's 
emergence as the political and economic centre of the new international order. To 
realise this, the leaders of the two countries decided to establish a ‘Strategic and 
Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ during the visit of Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao to India in 2005.97 
 
There has been a similar rediscovery of India by Japan in the first decade of the 21st 
Century. For many years, the ties between India and Japan were relatively 
undeveloped in terms of trade, investments, tourism or just mutual awareness. 
Although India remained as one of the largest recipients of Japanese Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) since 1958 until today, it was only with the visit of 
                                                
96 Swaran Singh. Interview.  15 January 2009. 
97 Pranab Mukherjee. Address at a function jointly organized by the Embassy of India in 
Jakarta and the Indonesian Council on World Affairs on " India's Growing Engagement with 
East Asia." Indian High Commission-Australia. 18 June 2007. 17 October 2007. 
<http://www.hcindia-au.org/pr_104.html>.  
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Japanese premier Yoshiro Mori98 to India in 2000 that Japan started to look at India 
seriously.99 This was followed up by the holding of annual meetings of the premiers of 
both countries from 2005 to 2008. In August 2007, for instance, the visit of PM Shinzo 
Abe100 in New Delhi led to the establishment of the ‘Strategic and Global Partnership 
between Japan and India’. In 2008, both countries signed the joint statements on the 
advancement of strategic and global partnership as well as on security cooperation.101 
 
In the case of South Korea or officially the Republic of Korea (ROK), the relations 
started officially with India in 1962. However, it was only in the post Cold War years 
that the India-ROK relations gained some prominence. The ROK’s move to political 
liberalisation and democratisation of its society has boosted its ties with India through 
the creation of common ground with India’s economic liberalisation and the LEP. 
Bilaterally, India already gave ample attention to ROK and the latter responded 
positively in mid 1990s. As one of the HPAEs, ROK was a good model for India to 
replicate. In fact, PM Rao visited ROK in September 1993 and signed the tourism 
cooperation agreement, MoU on Science and Technology and the Cultural Exchange 
Programme.102 Luckily, many South Korean companies responded to Indian’s call for 
cooperation and some are now household names in India. India’s increasing interest at 
ROK, however, happened only from 2000 onwards as a key on India’s LEP. India is 
                                                
98 Mr. Yoshiro Mori was the 85th and 86th Prime Minister of Japan from April 2000 to April 
2001. “Yoshiro Mori Administration.” Prime Minister of Japan. 23 June 2010. 25 June 2010. 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/archives_e.html>.  
99 Rajiv Sikri. Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 2009. 124-125.  
100 Mr. Shinzo Abe was the 90th Prime Minister of Japan from September 2006 to September 
2007. “Shinzo Abe Administration.” Prime Minister of Japan. 23 June 2010. 25 June 2010. 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/archives_e.html>.  
101 “Japan-India Relations.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. June 2010. 24 June 2010. 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/index.html>.  
102 “India-ROK Bilateral.” Embassy of India, Seoul. 19 November 2009. 23 June 2010. 
<http://www.indembassy.or.kr/indiarokbilateral.html>.  
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interested to cooperate with ROK in realising a dynamic and vibrant Pan-Asian 
community of peace and prosperity.103  
 
As India proceeded with the LEP, making steady progress in its relations with the 
ASEAN as well as actively participated in the ARF’ deliberation, it also made forays 
into the Australian neighbourhood.104 India-Australian relations regained momentum 
in 2000 after some concerns such as India’s navy expansion in the Indian Ocean and 
the 1998 nuclear tests. Joint working group meetings, navy-to-navy interactions and 
the signing of the 2003 MoU on Counter Terrorism were the tangible manifestations of 
such renewed relations. Such progress in India-Australian relations coincided 
surprisingly with the faster rate of progress in India-US ties.105  
 
New Zealand, on the other hand, intensified its relations with India only in early 2000. 
The period from 1993 to 1998 saw a lukewarm relation between the two countries 
since New Zealand faced domestic instability due to defections and formation of new 
parties.106 The interest of India to expand its influence to the Pacific Island states 
through the LEP and its acceptance as a dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF) in 2003 signalled its seriousness to increasingly interact with New Zealand in the 
                                                
103 External Publicity Division. “Speech of the President Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam at the Banquet 
Hosted by the President of the Republic of Korea, His Excellency Mr. Roh Moo-Hyun.” Visit 
of Dr. A.P. J. Abdul Kalam to Singapore, Philippines and Republic of Korea, February 1-8, 
2006. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 2006. 228-229.  
104 Purosattam Bhattacharya, Saikat Sinha Roy and Anindyo Majumdar. “India and Australia: 
the Look East-Look West Impulsion.” Power, Commerce and Influence: India’s Look East 
Experience. Eds. Rabindra Sen, et. al. New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2009. 309.  
105 Ibid. 308.  
106 Pankaj Jha. “India-New Zealand Relations: From Estrangement to Engagement.” Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analyses. 21 January 2009. 23 June 2010. <http://www.idsa.in>. 5.  
    96 
regional context.107 A number of bilateral agreements were signed covering the areas 
of agriculture, plant quarantine, information technology, education and recently Joint 
Understanding on Science and Technology Cooperation in March 2008. Moreover, the 
total bilateral trade between India and New Zealand reached for the first time the NZ 
$1 billion mark in 2009.108 
 
India’s interest in the Pacific region in recent years is seen as a logical extension of its 
LEP. In 2002, as part of its reoriented foreign policy and dialogue partnership of the 
ASEAN, India successfully applied to become a dialogue partner of the PIF with the 
support of the Fiji government.109 Aside from Australia and New Zealand, India is also 
establishing and strengthening its ties with the Pacific countries such as the Cook 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Fiji Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. India, for instance, has an obvious strategic interest in the Fiji 
Islands since it is the home of over three hundred thousand people of Indian origin.110 
It should be noted that despite the slow performance of these states economically, they 
carried considerable weight collectively when it comes to voting power in the UNGA 
if India decided to pursue its interest in the UN Security Council. 
 
                                                
107 “India-Country Information Paper.” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
18 January 2010. 23 June 2010. <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Asia-South-and-
Southeast Asia/India.php>.  
108 Ibid. Also, Pankaj Jha. India-New Zealand total trade registered US $164.86 million in 
2004, US $221.18 million in 2005, US $358.53 million in 2006, US $768.55 million in 2007, 
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“Export-Import Data Bank.” Department of Commerce, Government of India. 2011. 02 June 
2011. <http://www.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp>.   
109 “Fiji-India Bilateral Relations.” Fiji High Commission-New Delhi. n.d. 23 June 2010. 
<http://www.fijihc.in/Bilateral_Relations.asp>.  
110 Shubha Singh. “Pacific Connection.” Frontline. November-December 2005. 23 June 2010. 
<http://www.flonnet.com>.  
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It is also important to highlight that while India was doing the re-engagement with 
other countries in Northeast Asia, the Pacific and the Philippines, the relations with the 
ASEAN 5 and CMLV were also strengthened. Thus, the developments recently 
between Southeast Asian countries and India on free trade agreements appeared to be 
an exciting part of this phase. Bilaterally, India inked a similar economic pact with 
Thailand in 2004 that drastically reduced tariff barriers between the two countries. 
Also, the signing of the Singapore-India FTA or Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA) followed in 2005. Furthermore, Japan and India also 
sealed finally their implementing agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) on 16 February 2011.111  
 
The turning point of the LEP as a grand strategy is the realisation of the India-ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (IAFTA). Considered the watershed in the history of relations 
between India and Southeast Asia, the economic pact that was signed in 2009 is 
expected to cover about 1.5 billion consumers with a combined gross national product 
(GNP) of US $1.7 trillion.112  
 
Moreover, various collaborative projects between India and Southeast Asian countries 
are ‘in the pipeline’ and some are still on the drawing boards. Then Indian Prime 
Minister Vajpayee emphasised this motive when he said that while the India-ASEAN 
Summit is in progress, India should continue to reinforce its strong relations with 
                                                
111 On 25 October 2010, Japan’s Prime Minister (PM) Naoto Kan and India’s PM Manmohan 
Singh signed the joint declaration to conclude the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA). Four months after, Mr. Seiji Maehara, Japan’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Mr. Anand Sharma, Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry signed the 
implementing agreement in pursuant to Article 13 of the CEPA. “Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of India.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan. 16 February 2011. 10 March 2011. <http://www.mofa.go.jp>.    
112 Ibid. 54. 
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Southeast Asia using various institutional support mechanisms. As a logical corollary 
of the LEP, the said summit is a good manifestation of the policy’s asymmetrical 
development. In fact, some observers considered the summit as the peak of India’s re-
looked, re-activated and re-accelerated LEP.113  
 
Despite some setbacks, the LEP has technically been making progress. The various 
engagements have made this policy an effective instrument for India to efficiently 
address its concerns in the region. Some of these collaborations are now working in 
favour of India’s expansion in Southeast Asia especially in the field of information 
technology (IT). These IT companies from India are steadily establishing ‘foothold’ in 
Southeast Asia through the presence of technology-based and business process 
outsourcing (BPO) multinational corporations in the region. Currently, IT in the region 
has been utilised largely for education114, health care, employment, small and medium 
enterprises and even for rural development.115 
 
Aside from these big-scale transactions with Southeast Asia in general, India is also 
active in its bilateral engagements with respective country members. It successfully 
utilised its soft power116 by offering technical, academic and even cultural scholarships 
through Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) and Indian Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (ITEC). India also made significant contributions in rural 
development and agriculture through researchers’ exchange and pilot testing of newly 
                                                
113 Nanda. 470.  
114 The Philippines attempted in 2009 to implement a cyber education program for secondary 
level students under the auspices of Department of Education. 
115 Nanda. 482. 
116 Soft power is an ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction 
rather than coercion or payment. The soft power of a country like India rests on its resources 
of culture, values, and policies. Joseph Nye. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 616 (2008): 94. 
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developed plant species. It was highlighted by the presentation of Asha peanut and 
sorghum seeds by then President Kalam in 2006 during his state visit to the 
Philippines. The cultivation of these plant species was already done in 2007 and on 
pilot testing in various parts of the country.117  The pharmaceutical cooperation 
between India and Southeast Asia has already picked up recently with the flooding of 
quality and yet low-cost medicines from India. Again, it is best exemplified of the 
Philippine case where the government invested greatly to expand its Botika ng Bayan 
(Bnb) project for the masses.118  
 
With all these concrete engagements where majority are on motion and some are still 
in the pipe line, India can definitely play a significant role as a major power to 
influence Eastern Asian affairs. In fact, the recent developments mentioned suggest 
that India’s LEP is now in its third phase when it comes to India’s relations with the 
Philippines. India has given more attention since 2000 to those countries in Southeast 
Asia that were less responsive in the nascent stage of Post Cold War engagement. 
Fortunately, these countries are now freed from the bondage of domestic concerns that 
enabled them to respond actively to the advancement of a ‘Rising India.’119  
 
                                                
117 International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. “Indian President Hands 
over ICRISAT Seeds to the Philippines.” Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research. 6 February 2006. 15 March 2007. 
<http://www.cgiar.org/newsroom/releases/news/asp?idnews=375>.  
118 Philippine International Trading Corporation. Botika ng Bayan means People’s Pharmacy 
under President Arroyo’s administration. It was the continuation of President Fidel Ramos 
project under Pharma50 in 1997. 
119 ‘Rising India’ means that Indians will have the edge over others for the next decade or so. 
Politically, India might only exert a mild influence. However, economically and especially in 
the development of the software industry, India is expected to have a great impact. Wang 
Gungwu. “India and Indians in East Asia: An Overview.” Rising India and Indian 
Communities in East Asia. Eds. K. Kesavapany, A. Mani and P. Ramasamy. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. 7. 
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The Philippines, for instance, has shown more interests to India’s initiative as 
manifested by the active collaborations of both governments’ agencies and private 
sectors. These were manifested by joint working groups, meet and sell activities and 
series of chambers’ meetings that were done regularly to fast track the economic 
partnerships. The Philippine government under then President Arroyo’s administration 
strongly supported the private sectors through the provision of incentives to Indians 
and other foreign investors as well as improvement of transportation facilities and 
technology especially the information and technology infrastructures. The government 
also dedicated a division for India (Indian desk) among its important agencies such as 
Departments of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Trade and Industry (DTI) and Tourism (DOT) 
to give full attention on this recent development. The long vacated position of an 
economic attaché in the Philippine embassy in New Delhi was also reinstated for this 
purpose.  
 
The Philippine government also strengthened the programmes in promoting the 
Philippines in its consulates in Mumbai, Madras and Kolkata. Due to these activities, a 
substantial leap in export and import figures was noticed in 2003 onwards. Indian 
pharmaceutical importation and distribution in the Philippines are also improving 
every year and Indian owned/based business process outsourcing (BPO) companies 
are expanding in major cities all over the country. Furthermore, the re-energised 
relations with India enabled the Philippines to participate in major naval and strategic 
exercises as well as in military expositions and trainings. 
 
Facilitated by India’s LEP, these developments re-energised the six-decade old 
relations between India and the Philippines. The seeds of friendship between these 
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countries were sown long before but the intensity of relations was only felt in the 
beginning of 2000. These points are further elaborated in the succeeding chapters.   
 
3.6. Conclusion 
As discussed, it appeared that India’s interests in the region are greatly advanced by 
the LEP as its regionalist strategy. Through the years, this instrument helps in 
nurturing a growing congruence between these countries, particularly of India and the 
Philippines. Despite the existence of India’s LEP, some lingering doubts from the 
Cold War are still haunting the current conduct of India’s foreign relations with some 
Southeast Asian countries.  
 
This is the reason why the ties that existed between India and the Philippines, for 
instance, remained distant for the rest of the Cold War era and even extended during 
the first decade of the LEP despite the existence of cordial relations between these 
countries. Such behaviour, as discussed in the next chapter, practically made these 
countries as ‘prisoners of history.’120    
                                                
120 Leon Ma. Guerrero opined that the Philippines, India and other Afro-Asians are prisoners 
of ‘our history’, a history that has placed the economy in bondage and held the emotions to 
ransom. Prisoners of History. New Delhi: Embassy of the Philippines, 1972. 23. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
‘PRISONERS OF HISTORY’: INDIAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST 
ASIA AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1949 TO 1991 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The relations between India and the Philippines started officially in November 1949. 
The ties began amiably for both countries which shared a number of commonalities. 
Both countries were newly established nation states. The Philippines gained its 
independence from the American colonisers in 1945 while India in 1947 from the 
hands of the British. Due to this colonial experience, both countries also shared similar 
anti-imperialistic sentiments and began to work internationally together on this 
ground.  
 
The Cold War dynamics, however, changed this relation. A benign neglect treatment 
was mutually felt between India and the rest of Southeast Asian countries from 1949 
to 1990. The case of the Philippines and India during this time was even tagged as 
‘cordial but distant.’1 No wonder, the relations between India and the Philippines did 
not take off well in the past 41 years despite some interventions from both 
governments.  In spite of the continuous economic bilateral exchanges between these 
countries, the results appeared to be minimal.2 Because of this, the long years of 
                                                
1 As noted by S. Viswam, the relations between India and Southeast Asia according to a 
diplomat in Kuala Lumpur was ‘cool, cordial, correct and circumspect.’ S. Viswam. “South-
east and East Asia.” World Focus. 12.11-12. November 1991. 53. Artemio Palongpalong also 
mentioned that the Philippine policies towards India and its reactions resulted to 
‘unenthusiastic cordiality’ and ‘correct but distant relations.’ Forgotten Neighbors: The 
Philippines’ Relations with South Asia. Quezon City: Asian Center, 1992. 96. 
2 Ambassador Rosalinda Tirona. Interview. 16 December 2008. 
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opportunities were missed and both countries practically become ‘prisoners of 
history.’  
 
This chapter is organised into four sections. The first section explains the globalist 
aspiration of India since independence and its effects to the conduct of India’s foreign 
policy especially with Southeast Asian countries. The second section, on one hand, 
discusses the ‘benign neglect’ treatment of India and Southeast Asian countries with 
each other during the Cold War years. The third section explains the ‘cordial but 
distant’ relations between India and the Philippines for four decades. It also argues that 
despite the minimal interaction, there were also economic partnerships that happened. 
The last section is the conclusion. 
  
4.2. India’s Globalist Aspiration and its Foreign Policy 
In the various literature, it appears that the foreign policy of India was and is still 
anchored on the great Nehruvian aspiration to major-power status. As noted by B. R. 
Nayar and T.V. Paul, India’s ambition was built on the premise of its existing geo-
political status (subcontinental size and large population), hegemonic presence in the 
Indo-centric South Asian region, the perception of India’s potential and military 
power, and a long and sustained nationalist struggle.3 Being one of the largest and 
most enduring civilisation entities, India from the point of view of Indian elite and 
informed public must have the leadership role in international arena. Such dream was 
incorporated in the vision of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1935 that India, though not a Pacific 
                                                
3 Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul. India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power 
Status. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 3. 
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state, will inevitably exercise an important influence in the Pacific as the ‘future nerve 
centre of the world.’4 
 
The desire of India to play a significant role in world affairs is an aspiration which 
categorised by Jalal Alamgir as an expression of globalism. Although such concept 
was focused outwardly, the intention was fundamentally on self-identity. Through the 
years, India has the strong awareness of where the state should be in the international 
distribution of power and status.5 Thus, Jawaharlal Nehru, his predecessors and their 
contemporary policymakers deemed it good for India to live in an interconnected 
world in which India’s objectives as an aspirant state can be disseminated easily and 
globally. 
 
From then on, Jawaharlal Nehru and his successors employed various strategies to 
make this dream into a reality. A.M. Thomas in fact identified interrelated strategies 
which India employed since its inception as an independent nation-state. Foremost was 
the rapid industrialisation and social development. To attain this objective, the 
government implemented the policy of democratic socialism wherein scarce resources 
were poured into heavy public sector industries and consequently neglected 
agriculture. This move led to serious food shortage in 1960s which triggered the 
                                                
4 Prakash Nanda. Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look East Policy. New Delhi: 
Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2003. 509. 
5 Jalal Alamgir. India’s Open Economy Policy: Globalism, Rivalry, Continuity. London and 
New York: Routledge, 2009. 9. Globalism aims to project into the world what are considered 
indigenous values, on the conviction that such projection externally of what is considered 
valuable internally should be one of the goals of the state in a world inhabited by competing 
states and competing values. 
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government to subsequently channel considerable resources into agriculture to boost 
food production. This period was known as the era of ‘green revolution’.6  
 
Despite this economic setback, the Indian government never failed to build and 
strengthen its military and naval capabilities. For Jawaharlal Nehru, this sacrifice was 
necessary because it is based on a belief that India’s domestic economic 
transformation should be complemented by the existence of a strong military force.7 
India even ‘spread its net’ far and wide across the ideological divide just to secure 
supplies for its armament. During the administration of Jawaharlal Nehru alone, India 
acquired hundreds of Toofani and Mysters aircrafts from France, Hunters and 
Canberras from the United Kingdom, AN-12s and Mi-4 helicopters from the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Fairchild Packets from the United States of 
America (US).8 These initiatives were done faithfully within the operating power 
platform which through the years has been embraced substantially by Indian actors to 
project India as a ‘blue water’ naval force in the 1980s and as a nuclear power in 1998. 
 
All these strategies were further highlighted during the implementation of the non-
alignment policy (NAP) that gave international prominence to India during the Cold 
War. R. Sidhanta mentioned that NAP was both a product of anti-imperialist 
sentiments and of the needs of Indian capitalism.9 In the outside world, it was 
idealistically presented as an antithesis of the policy of bloc division. It practically 
                                                
6  A. M. Thomas. ‘India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective.’ Critical 
Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy. Eds. Rajen Harshe and K.M. Seethi. Kottayam: 
Mahatma Gandhi University, 2005. 172. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee. India After Independence: 1947-
2000. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2002. 151. 
9 Ramjana Sidhanta. “Indian Nonalignment.” Nonalignment. Ed. J. W. Burton. London: Andre 
Deutsch Limited, 1966. 28. 
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served as a mechanism to oppose all hegemonic forces specifically between American 
and Soviet’s dominating influences.10 Domestically, the NAP was perceived to be a 
‘leeway’ for India’s business sectors which were anxious for loans and technical 
advices. The said policy served as a breathing space to access the Soviet bloc in case 
Western rates or tariff barriers discriminated against India. This was clearly observed 
during the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962 and the Sino-Soviet rift in 1969 when 
India became the recipient of aid from both the West and the East.11 
 
Through time, these strategies underwent dramatic transformation to suit the needs of 
a changing and more demanding environment. All these created leverages were 
completely utilised by India to supplement the existing state’s resources in maximizing 
its capabilities as a ‘power’. Conditions that, according to Robert Gilpin, are 
imperative for a state with major power aspiration such as India to naturally equip it 
with adequate capacities (pursuit and maintenance of power and wealth) and 
incentives in order to create and manage a stable political order.12 But for John Gerard 
Ruggie, Gilpin’s variables should not be limited only within these realms and must 
also consider other distinctive internal characteristics such as political institutions, 
culture as ‘soft power’ and historical experiences for the hegemon to effectively shape 
the ways in building political order.13   
 
                                                
10 Ranko Petkovic. Non-Alignment – An Independent Factor in the Democratization of 
International Relations. Beograd, Yugoslavia: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1979. 6.  
11 Sidhanta. 28. 
12 Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981.  Cited from John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno. International Relations Theory 
and the Asia Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 7. 
13 John Gerard Ruggie. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Regimes. Ed. Stephen Krasner. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Cited from G. John Ikenberry and Michael 
Mastanduno. International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003. 7.  
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The collapse of USSR subsequently challenged the conventional power framework. 
The late Susan Strange, a noted international political economy scholar, argued that 
the global developments structurally expanded the power definition along the domains 
of security, production, finance and knowledge. She went beyond the state-centric 
analysis of international relations by focusing more on the market-state relations that 
complemented and expanded Gilpin’s emphasis on the intersecting pursuit of power 
and wealth. Thus, India’s situation during Rao administration in 1991 aptly fell to her 
category of ‘structural power’.14 At this time, the variables identified by Strange under 
this category were all present in post Cold War India such as economic liberalisation, 
emergence of knowledge based technology, increasing foreign direct investments 
(FDI), and existence of new security dimensions. 
 
Although not over zealously done, these major power variables through time were 
critically observed and carefully maximised in the conduct of India’s domestic and 
foreign policies since independence. Unfortunately, there were times when the bid for 
major power status was partially constrained by the arming of Pakistan and the 
existence of non-proliferation regime that kept India outside the nuclear club.15 For 
sometime, this power aspiration temporarily became a mirage for India due to the 
inexorable economic turmoil and border related irritants.  In spite of the flows and 
ebbs of such power quest, the notion of India as a power to be reckoned with has 
stirred a lot of debates in the quarters of international relations both within and outside 
the country. For those who subscribed, they saw every Indian government’s actions 
                                                
14 It is the power to choose and shape the structure of global political economy within which 
other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and their professional people 
have to operate. Robert Keohane. “Foreword.” Strange Power: Shaping the Parameters of 
International Relations and International Political Economy. Ed. Thomas, Lawton, James 
Rosenau and Amy Verdun. England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000. x. 
15 Dinshaw Mistry. “A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of India as an Emerging World 
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    108 
and policies implemented through the years as part of the subliminal intention in 
realizing the half century-old hegemonic framework.  
 
Although many pundits considered the foreign policy from Jawaharlal Nehru towards 
Indira Gandhi as a pseudo-ideological framework anchored on socialist type pragmatic 
economy16, they viewed it as an attempt to advance the interest of India and in effect 
hasten its hegemonic aspiration. In fact, for the past four and a half decades, it was 
observed that there was no single major instance when India deviated from the core 
principles of its foreign policy.17 India since then conducted its foreign policy along 
the principles of establishing and maintaining friendship and amity with all nations 
regardless of their political, ideological and economic grounds. Moreover, India aimed 
to live to its true form the spirit of non-alignment in all its participation to issues of 
international concerns. In line with this, it also forged tangible international politico-
economic cooperation as well as observed a balanced and integrated perspective in 
foreign relations.  
 
By and large, India’s current foreign policy is still anchored on the same grounds 
except that its ends are intentionally modified to meet the needs of time. ‘Look East’ 
policy (LEP) specifically was then introduced by Rao’s administration to complement 
India’s open market economy to the world.   A kind of innovation that even Jawaharlal 
Nehru will not hesitate to introduce, if he happens to be alive in the 1990s, since the 
art of conducting foreign affairs is always to find out what is most advantageous to 
                                                
16 Mohammed Ayoob. India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies.  London: 
Routledge. 1990. 16. 
17 Niranjan Khilnani. New Dimensions of Indian Foreign Policy: Prime Minister Narasimha 
Rao’s Era X-rayed. New Delhi: Westville Publishing House, 1998. 44. 
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India.18 The said condition is inevitable since the pattern of international economic 
relations will surely affect domestic politics and in turn will shape the orientation of 
the foreign policy.19  
 
The attempts of India, however, to pursue and maintain power and wealth through 
connections from both east and west alienated it from the less powerful states in 
Southeast Asia. This will explain why the governments of the day of India and 
Southeast Asian countries during the late 1980s to 1990s conducted simply 
perfunctory interaction with each other.  
 
4.3. ‘Benign Neglect’: India-Southeast Asian Relations During the Cold War Era 
It is said that the relations between India and Southeast Asian countries from 1947 to 
mid 1958 were really pro-active and with complete empathy and solidarity. In fact, 
India initiated the convention of Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 even 
under an interim government capacity. In 1949, India made a follow up by holding in 
New Delhi a ‘Conference on Indonesia’.  All these initiatives were done on Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s belief that India could play a role in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, in the 
context of decolonisation and opposition to Cold War.20 Furthermore, India from 1953 
to 1958 through its non-aligned policy (NAP) forged new links with socialist states 
especially with China. The Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai slogan was even articulated during 
                                                
18 Thomas. 172. 
19 Jonathan Kirshner. “States, Markets and Great Power Relations in the Pacific.” International 
Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific. Eds. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno.  New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 277. 
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the Bandung Conference in 1955 with the acceptance of Communist China as a 
member by many non-communist states in the movement.21 
 
The benign interaction with Southeast Asia was dramatically felt only when India was 
closely pre-occupied by its domestic and border problems with Pakistan and later with 
China in the 1960s. In fact, experts such as S. Viswam, Kripa Sridharan, and Sudhir 
Devare on Indian foreign policy bemoaned that New Delhi for three decades 
continuously neglected Southeast Asia. The region that was not only emotionally 
attached to India but also waited decade after decade for some signals to bring it closer 
to India. The said neglect was brought about by the following factors. Foremost was 
India’s eagerness of winning friends and influencing people in the west, largely in 
order to indulge in one-up-manship over Pakistan specifically with respect to Kashmir 
dispute. After 1962, the obsession with Pakistan only intensified when the relations 
with China had collapsed. Subsequently, New Delhi had little time in cultivating good 
relations with lesser powers in the East.22 
 
Since the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries were identified 
as friends of the West, India did not expect that they would change sides in the Cold 
War and gave any sympathy with India along its known links with the USSR.23 In 
turn, India regarded the ASEAN as the ‘trojan horse’ of the US and cultivated closer 
ties instead with Socialist Vietnam.24 
 
                                                
21 Sidhanta. 32. The slogan means Indians and Chinese are brothers. 
22 Viswam. 52. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Isabelle Saint Mezard. “The Look East Policy: An Economic Perspective.” Beyond the 
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Another factor was the Indian belief that Southeast Asia in economic terms was 
already in the sphere of the Japanese and Chinese influences and India had ‘little left 
to play’ to form links with Southeast Asia. The region particularly on the economic 
realm was already saturated by the presence of Japanese, Chinese, Americans, British 
and the Germans.25 
 
The relationships with its Southeast Asian neighbours deteriorated further due to 
India’s declining appeal as a military might when its border security forces were 
defeated by China during the October-November 1962 war. Although left humiliated, 
the event also humbled India to check its real position in Southeast Asia vis a vis 
China. It turned out that all Southeast Asian countries except Malaysia were not 
supporting India in this war.26 Thus, it was not surprising for India to reciprocate 
Malaysia’s gesture during Indonesia’s offensive campaign known as Konfrontasi 
against the former from 1962 to 1966.27  
 
But even before the trouble over the border, the Indian foreign policy was believed to 
have veered away from the general Afro-Asian line. Diplomatic estrangement began to 
develop earlier when India surprisingly increased its contingent while other 
nonaligned countries like Indonesia withdrew their troops in 1960 from Congo in 
protest of the United Nations’ (UN) failure to defend the Lumumba Government. Such 
move, from the point of view of the Bengali paper Ananda Bazar Patrika, made India 
friendless in Asia. For India, however, it was a right decision to stay put in Congo to 
                                                
25 Viswam. 53. 
26 Christophe Jaffrelot. “India’s Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective.” India 
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    112 
support the USSR’s commitment in helping PM Patrice Lumumba.28 On the part of its 
non-aligned allies, India’s gesture was simply a betrayal to the principle of non-
alignment. Moreover, India’s discomfort in the region was further emphasised when it 
inked with USSR a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in 1971.29 Such move 
tagged India as ‘the surrogate of the Soviet Union’30 in the area. 
 
In the UN General Assembly (UNGA), India moved a resolution calling for a 
conference between the five ASEAN nations and the Indo-Chinese states to discuss all 
issues that had given rise to tension in Southeast Asia. The discussions on the situation 
in Kampuchea began on 12 November 1979. The Indian resolution asked all other 
states (meaning the big powers) not to take any step that would hinder the convening 
of the conference or vitiate the atmosphere for its successful conclusion. The ASEAN 
sources, however, feared that the Indian text would dilute support to their own 
resolution jointly sponsored by the nations that called for cessation of hostilities 
forthwith in Kampuchea and halting interference in the internal affairs of the troubled 
country.31 
 
The ASEAN leaders were also unhappy when Indian officials abstained from voting 
on the ASEAN sponsored call in the UNGA for the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
from Kampuchea and for an international conference on that embattled land. The 
ASEAN countries moved to condemn the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea that 
                                                
28 Patrice Lumumba was the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
“Lumumba, Patrice (1925-1961).” Encyclopedia of Marxism. n.d. 24 July 2010. 
<http://www.marxists.org>. 
29 Ibid. 36. 
30 V. Suryanarayan. “Looking Ahead: India and Southeast Asia: New Perspectives, New 
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overthrew Pol Pot’s administration and the subsequent setting up of the Heng Samrin 
government in Phnom Penh. India, on the contrary, had been lobbying with the 
ASEAN countries to take all factors into consideration before arriving at a final 
decision. The ASEAN nations then accused India of being interested only in seeing 
that the ASEAN withdrew its strong opposition to the Vietnam’s military invasion of 
Kampuchea. They also felt that the Indian position was coloured by its close ties with 
the USSR and the desire to counter the growing influence of China in Southeast 
Asia.32 
 
Since then, India’s relations with the ASEAN had been rather cool because the 
ASEAN members’ stances on various issues such as the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan, the Vietnamese stake in Kampuchea and the militarisation of the Indian 
Ocean – were opposed to those of New Delhi. India’s recognition of the Heng Samrin 
regime in Kampuchea caused unhappiness in some quarters. In their view, it was 
tantamount to condoning the Vietnamese military intervention. India, on the other 
hand, had been equally unhappy too with ASEAN’s totally untenable policy of 
continuing to deal with the Chinese supported Pol Pot regime that had brought about 
suffering on the hapless people of Kampuchea. The Indian policy was to make an 
earnest attempt to isolate both the Chinese and Soviet factors from its relationship with 
other Asian countries by ensuring that differences on issues like Kampuchea and 
Afghanistan did not mar their bilateral relations.33 
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Thus, a parallel effort was made by India to establish contacts with the ASEAN with 
regard to their differing views on the Kampuchean problem. Narasimha Rao visited 
Malaysia and Thailand in September 1980 for this purpose. Mrs. Gandhi also visited 
the Philippines on her way back from Australia to establish contact with President 
Marcos in 1981.34 These visits to the three ASEAN capitals by the two leaders were a 
new diplomatic initiative by India to develop a better working relationship.35 In 1982, 
India also deputed External Affairs secretary K.S Bajpai to Singapore and Jakarta to 
ascertain what position the countries in Southeast Asia would take on the Kampuchean 
issue before the 1983 Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi.36 
 
The Indian officials found out that India’s recognition of the Heng Samrin 
Government in Kampuchea was made a big issue in some anti-India circles in the 
ASEAN capitals in the 1980s. From there, Indians at once got the message that while 
all ASEAN nations wanted to see Vietnamese forces left Kampuchea, they by no 
means subscribed to Beijing’s anti-Vietnam stance. They did not want the atrocious 
Khmer Rouge to return to power in Phnom Penh, nor they did want to see Vietnam so 
ostracised that it became a Chinese satellite state.37 The Vietnamese intervention in 
Kampuchea revived the earlier apprehension of the ASEAN countries that sooner or 
later Hanoi would try to dominate the entire Southeast Asian region. It was because of 
this fear that they tended to equate the Vietnamese demand for the withdrawal of the 
Chinese forces from its territory with the Chinese plea for the pull out of Vietnamese 
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troops from Kampuchea to pave the way for peaceful settlement of all Indo-Chinese 
disputes without any outside intervention.38 
 
As such, Indian stance on Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea weakened its 
position in the region. This was further aggravated when in 1980, then Indian Foreign 
Minister Narasimha Rao at the last minute declined Malaysia’s invitation to participate 
in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting for fear of offending the USSR.39 It should 
be noted that this regional grouping at this time was perceived by the USSR and India 
to be an American watchdog in the region. Cumulatively, the advancement of this 
Western-anchored grouping, the growing ties between Pakistan and China, and the 
Indo-Soviet alliance substantially contributed to the ‘benign neglect’ interaction40 
between India and Southeast Asian countries that extended until 1990. Unfortunately, 
all these factors contributed to the missed opportunities between India and the 
countries in Southeast Asia including the Philippines. 
 
4.4. ‘Cordial but Distant Relations’: The Case of India and the Philippines 
Historically, relations between India and the Philippines were believed to have started 
as early as the beginning of Christian era. Such contact was supported by some 
archaeological evidences that were found in the Philippines such as coinage of Indian 
origin made 1,800 years ago. Sanskrit words are also found in abundance in local 
languages and Ramayana is still a popular play in some parts of the country that 
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indicated the Philippine deep cultural and linguistic links with India.41 These 
connections were further reinforced by the presence of some Filipinos whose lineage 
can be traced back to sepoys (Indian soldiers as part of the British colonial forces) that 
stayed back in the mid 18th Century Philippines.42  
 
The trickling of Indian migrants in the country particularly from Punjab and Sind 
during the American suzerainty from 1898 onwards maintained also these umbilical 
connections with India. The majority of these Indian migrants were confined only in 
Manila and there were very few who ventured into the provincial towns and cities in 
other islands of the archipelago such as Iloilo and Bacolod.43  
 
The formal relations between India and the Philippines, however, started officially on 
16 November 1949 after both countries agreed to establish diplomatic missions in their 
respective capitals. Representations were then established in Manila and Delhi with 
effect on 1 December 1951.44 Since then, the level of politico-diplomatic relations 
between the two countries was observed to be modest. In particular, the Philippine 
continuing Washington-centred foreign policy orientation in the 1970s and its special 
military associations with the US inhibited closer relations with India. Similarly, 
India’s sub-continental problems and pressures as well as its firm commitment to non-
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alignment decades ago invariably affected the scope of its bilateral response to 
developing economies like the Philippines. 45 
 
India stereotypically viewed the Philippines as an American sphere of influence where 
it had less chance to develop more active and mutually beneficial relations.46 This 
perception was similarly echoed by an Indian diplomat posted in the Philippines in his 
legation report submitted to the Ministry of External Affairs in 1952. He observed that 
the foreign policy of the Philippine government continued to be closely related to that 
of the US government except for some minor deviations. He further mentioned that 
despite the occasional ruptures between Myron Cowen, US Ambassador in the 
Philippines, and Philippine President Elpidio Quirino47 in early 1950s, the Philippine 
government always bowed down ultimately to the embassy’s wishes. Such decision, 
according to the diplomat, was greatly swayed by the considerable American influence 
in the country through the American investment that was largely tied up with local 
vested interests and huge US economic aid.48 Moreover, the Japanese presence and the 
growing influence of China in the region also weighed heavily in Philippine 
calculations.  
 
New Delhi felt that the Philippines did not respond appropriately to some of India’s 
overtures in the past. Even in terms of cultural relations, India felt that the effort to 
develop such ties was one sided. The Philippines was quite lacklustre to such 
initiatives. From the Philippine perspective, India at that time has become a prisoner of 
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its sub-continental politics in South Asia particularly with Pakistan.49 This perception 
to some extent generated diplomatic irritants among officials of both countries through 
the years. 
 
A prominent example to cite here was the decision of Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru in distancing India from countries like Thailand and the Philippines that joined 
American-sponsored military pacts and excluded them from his projected peace area. 
While Nehru could appreciate the challenge posed by communist insurgency (to which 
India itself was a victim), he was unable to sympathise with the Philippine fear of 
external communist aggression. India’s indifference held true with Thailand as well. It 
was expected therefore, according to Kripa Sridharan, that such kind of perception 
further prevented these states from having close contact with India even on a common 
Asian plane.50 
 
Another concrete example of this was the Baguio Conference in 1950. India belittled 
the effort made by then Philippine President Elpidio Quirino to summon a conference 
in Baguio City, north of Manila, to deal with the communist threat to Asia. In 
recognition of India’s importance, Filipino leaders invited their Indian counterparts to 
attend the conference. During the conference, India resolutely refused to discuss 
political issues that made the final draft of the conference so insignificant that the 
Philippines felt it was not even worth the drafting effort. The Baguio conference thus 
turned out to be an ineffectual affair mainly because of India’s intransigence and this 
upset the Philippines a great deal. Consequently, the Philippines along with Thailand 
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during the Bandung Conference showed scepticism towards India’s Panchasheel51 and 
provided a spirited defence of their Southeast Asian Treaty Organization52 (SEATO) 
membership.53 
 
Furthermore, India vehemently disagreed on the establishment of SEATO where the 
Philippines was a member. The inclusion of Pakistan in the organisation also 
aggravated India’s belief that Pakistan will be a hindrance to the former in creating 
favourable atmosphere in the Southeast Asian region.54 
 
At the onset, India had some reservations on the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. 
This attitude, however, was much tamed compared to the early Indian reactions to 
organisations formerly established in the region. India looked with suspicion at 
suggestions emanating from these countries even with respect to multilateral efforts to 
solve common Asian problems. A good case in point was the 1966 suggestions of 
Thailand and the Philippines that non-communist Asian states should take the 
initiative to bring peace in Vietnam. This appeal was made under the auspices of the 
Association of South East Asia55 (ASA). India, however, turned down an invitation to 
participate in the joint appeal. The Indian government felt that while regional 
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cooperation among nations was indeed important in the gathering of a group of 
specific nations, such as the one proposed by Thailand and Philippines through the 
Thai Foreign Minister, their presence would increase rather than lower tensions.56 
 
The Philippines was also disappointed when India recognised Sabah as a legitimate 
part of Malaysia in 1968. Both the Philippines and Malaysia conveyed to the 
government of India their respective stands on Sabah and India hoped that their 
differences be resolved amicably through mutual discussion. Mrs. Gandhi, however, 
sent her message to Tunku Abdul Rahman recognizing Sabah as an integral part of 
Malaysia following the elections held in the contested area supervised by the UN. 
Incidentally, India was one of those observers drawn from several countries in Asia.57 
 
The Philippines along with some allies did not immediately recognise Bangladesh as a 
new independent nation due to the presence of Indian military forces in the area. The 
Philippines along with Malaysia and Indonesia urged the Indian troops to leave 
Bangladesh as soon as possible. But notwithstanding their reservations, these 
Southeast Asian countries recognised Bangladesh by the end of February 1972. Based 
on this gesture, Sridharan concluded that such recognition on conditional basis only 
confirmed the diplomatic distance between India and the aforementioned states 
including the Philippines.58 
 
In terms of diplomatic engagements, there had been very few exchanges at the highest 
levels. For instance, then Vice President S. Radhakrishnan made an official visit to the 
                                                
56 Sridharan. 1996. 29-30. Cited from Asia Almanac, 1966. 1711. 
57 Ibid. 49. Also cited in The Statesman, 28 October 1968. 
58 Ibid. 92. Also Manila Times, 1 March 1972. 
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Philippines from 06 to 07 July 1959. Such diplomatic gesture was reciprocated by an 
official visit in India by then Vice President Diosdado Macapagal from 20 April to 08 
May 1960.59  President Ferdinand Marcos also stopped over in New Delhi on his way 
back from Kenya in 1976.60 A state visit of Indian President Fakruddin Ali Ahmed to 
the Philippines was aborted at the last minute as he fell ill on his way to Manila from 
Malaysia in 1977.61 PM Indira Gandhi also paid a two-day visit in the Philippines in 
1981 on her way back from Australia.62  In April 1991, President Venkataraman paid a 
state visit to the Philippines.63 
 
Aside from official visit of presidents and PMs, high level visits of top diplomats and 
bureaucrats were made reciprocally in each other’s capital. In 1979 for instance, 
Dinesh Singh, Minister of Parliament (MP) and former Minister of External Affairs 
visited Manila in May as a special envoy of the PM. His primary mission was to feel 
the pulse of the region and establish closer rapport with some of these nations.64 
Nonetheless, together with these official trips, agreements were signed indicating 
growing rapport between India and the Philippines.  
 
In the inventory of official bilateral documents, the first agreement that was signed by 
India and the Philippines was on Air Services in 1949. It was followed with the 
signing of the Treaty of Friendship on 11 July 1952. The pact was aimed to perpetuate 
friendly relations between the two countries as well as secure the rights of both 
                                                
59 Diosdado Macapagal. The Philippines Turns East. Quezon City: Mac Publishing House, 
1966. 162. 
60 Shahani.122. 
61 Ram Sharma. 1977. 174-175. On 10 February, President Fakruddin returned to New Delhi 
cutting short his foreign tour due to indisposition. On the 11th of February 1977, he passed 
away following a heart attack. 
62 Indian embassy in Manila. 
63 “President Visits Vietnam and Philippines.” Asian Recorder. 10-16 June 1991. 21762. 
64 Sharma. 1979. 93. 
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citizens to acquire and dispose properties, engage in trade, industry and other peaceful 
and lawful pursuits. Mr. Joaquin Elizalde on behalf of the Philippine government and 
Ambassador Mirza Rashid Ali Baig of India signed the treaty.65  
 
On 11 June 1964, the two governments also forged an agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for a joint training and research 
programme using a neutron spectrometer. The agreement was inked in Vienna, 
Austria. The programme was envisioned to train scientists and technicians from the 
region in the construction, installation and use of a crystal spectrometer as well as 
conduct research using this equipment. The joint programme was based at the 
Philippine Atomic Research Center (PARC) in Quezon City.66 Interestingly, the India-
Philippine-IAEA (IPA) Agreement was the first regional collaborative tripartite 
agreement involving in the making and use of neutron spectrometer. This IPA 
continued and led to the establishment of Regional Cooperative Agreement (RCA) in 
1972 by 10 governments in Asia and the Pacific and the IAEA.67 
 
The said agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy of 1964 was followed up 
with the signing of a similar pact in Manila in 1969. General Carlos Romulo for the 
Philippine government and Ambassador Anand Sarup Dhawan for India inked the 
document on 14 March 1969.68  
 
                                                
65 For details, see Appendix C. India: Bilateral Treaties and Agreements. Volume 1. New 
Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1994. 494-496.  
66 For details, see Appendix D. India: Bilateral Treaties and Agreements. Volume 5. 78-84.  
67 “RCA-Evolution.” Department of Atomic Energy. n.d. 16 June 2010. 
<http://www.barc.ernet.in/rcaindia/1_4.html>.  
68 This pact aimed for the mutual cooperation in the application of radioisotopes in agriculture, 
medicine and general scientific research, use of crystal of spectrometer and the development 
of nuclear electronics and instrumentations for basic research among others. For details, see 
Appendix E.  
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On 24 March 1968, Philippine Secretary Marcelo Balatbat and Indian Ambassador 
Dinesh Singh sealed another agreement and this time a trade pact. Both parties hailed 
it as a landmark, for it incorporated some of the fundamental aspects of the discussions 
at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for bringing 
closer and more meaningful cooperation among developing countries.69 In addition, 
the pact also identified the commodities available for export from the Philippines to 
India and vice versa.70  
 
India and the Philippines also signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for 
Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Agriculture between the Indian Council of 
Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and 
Natural Research and Development (PCCARD) to promote greater cooperation in 
agricultural research71 on 1 November 1976 at the conclusion of President Marcos’ 
trip in India. Simultaneously, the Cultural Agreement was also forged during this 
official visit.  
 
On 29 May 1979, another trade agreement was inked.72 Unfortunately, these 
agreements and accords had not been enforced and implemented enthusiastically and 
the results had been unremarkable to say the least.73 
                                                
69 V.P. Dutt. India’s Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, Pvt. Ltd., 1984. 286.  
70 Some of the commodities identified for export from the Philippines to India were Manila 
Hemp, copra, wood pulps, rock phosphate, metallic mercury while tradable products from 
India to the Philippines were rolled steel, railway track fittings, organic chemicals among 
others. Details of the lists are shown in Appendix F. India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements. 
Volume 6. 213-218.  
71 Ram Sharma. Indian Foreign Policy: Annual Survey 1976. New Delhi: Foreign Policy 
Research Centre, 2001-2002. 126. 
72 J. Naik, ed. India in Asia and Africa Documents: 1979.  Maharasthra: Avinash Reference 
Publications, 1979, 43. The accord was signed by Indian Minister of Commerce, Civil 
Supplies and Cooperation, Shri Mohan Dharia, and by Philippine Secretary Mr. Troadio T. 
Quiazon Jr. The agreement accords the most favoured nation treatment to each other in 
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After 1979, eight years of drought on bilateral agreements followed. The conduct of 
both countries’ foreign policies was disturbed by domestic predicaments. The 
Philippines at this time witnessed political transformations such as the end of Martial 
Law in January 1981, the conduct of national election in June 1981 and the disputed 
‘overwhelming victory’ for the third presidential term of the sickly Ferdinand Marcos, 
the assassination of political opposition Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1983 and the staging of 
the People’s Revolution in 1986. India, on the other hand, was shocked by the 
assassination of PM Indira Gandhi in 1984.  With all these domestic problems, the 
next accord that was sealed by the governments of India and the Philippines happened 
in 1987 after the Epifanio De los Santos Avenue 1 (EDSA1) Revolution.74 Signed on 8 
April 1987, the basic agreement on scientific and technological cooperation was aimed 
to provide services and exchange of professionals, experts and research workers, grant 
fellowships, undertake joint special researches in the scientific and technological fields 
and others.75  
 
Then it was followed by the agreement on economic and technical cooperation that 
was signed on 3 August 1990. It was designed to encourage and expand the sound 
development of industrial cooperation, promote capital investments, as well as 
                                                
accordance with the provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
covers customs duties and charges of any kind including the method of levying such duties 
and charges imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
transfer or payments for imports and exports. It also provides to merchant cargo bearing 
vessels of either country the most favoured nation treatment in respect of entry into, stay in 
and departure from the ports. For details, see Appendix G. 
73 Shahani. 122. The figures alone from 1979 to 1987 in Table 4.1 substantiate this point. 
74 The documents are courtesy of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of the Philippines. Also known as the ‘Bloodless’ or EDSA 1 Revolution that 
happened in February 1986 that ended the authoritarian rule of President Ferdinand Marcos. 
75 In the implementation of this agreement, the executive agencies designated were the 
Philippines’ National Science Technology Authority and the Indian Ministry of Science of and 
Technology. For details, see Appendix H. 
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cooperate in the field of transport, communications, construction and energy among 
others.76  
 
Despite the existence of these agreements, the development in the political and 
diplomatic linkages in general was comparatively limited and in fact of slower pace. 
More interestingly, these trade and economic cooperation agreements signed by both 
countries in the span of four decades still did not greatly help in improving the 
sluggish economic interactions of these nation-states. This condition should not be 
misunderstood, however, as if nothing had happened in the bilateral relations. Some 
things of significance and consequence had also taken place.77 
 
Few Indian industrial capitals, for instance, were also invested in the Philippines in the 
1970s. In 1974, the Philippines awarded a contract to the Tatas for a US $9 million 
transmission tower in Mindanao and US $3.4 million order for 30 rail coaches to 
Projects and Equipment Corporation of India. In March 1975, the Integrated Coach 
Factory of Madras delivered the first batch of coaches.78 Moreover, it was also in 1975 
that the first India-Filipino joint venture spinning plant in the Philippines commenced 
its operation. The Indo Phil Textile Mills was established by the Aditya Birla Group in 
Marilao, Bulacan with an initial capacity of 15,500 spindles.79  In 1977, Indian 
investors made another three joint ventures in operation in the Philippines namely 
Kirloskar Oil Engines, Eastern Spinning Mills Ltd., and Tangaghadra Industries Ltd.80  
 
                                                
76 This pact remained in force for five years and automatically renewed for another five years 
unless terminated by one of the contracting parties. For details, see Appendix I. 
77 Shahani. 122. 
78 Dutt. 288. 
79 “Indo Phil Textile Mills.” Aditya Birla.com. 2010. 19 June 2010. 
<http://www.adityabirla.com/our_companies/international_companies/indo_phil_textile.htm>. 
80 Dutt. 288 
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Trade and economic relations also developed between India and the Philippines even 
though they were not that significant. From the virtual absence of trade in the 1950s,81 
the trade between these countries registered more than US $2 million in 1964. Based 
on the trade statistics from the year 1964 to 1990, the total bilateral trade per year from 
1964 to 1974 was below US $10 million. It was only in 1975 towards 1987 that the 
trade figures were in the upward trend registering between US $10 to 50 million.  
 
 
Table 4.1. Philippine Export to Import from India, 1964-1990 
In US $ Million 
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT TOTAL 
1964 832,406 1,551,125 2,383,531 
1965 260,718 1,099,782 1,360,500 
1966 303,682 514,761 818,443 
1969 873,786 3,063,015 3,936,801 
1970 860,535 2,048,276 2,908,811 
1971 216,358 1,776,794 1,993,152 
1972 370,406 1,867,820 2,238,226 
1973 506,928 2,827,472 3,334,400 
1974 917,203 5,894,956 6,812,159 
1975 4,836,583 10,106,882 14,943,465 
1976 8,575,247 22,444,319 31,019,566 
1977 1,365,188 23,120,531 24,485,719 
1978 1,071,971 9,776,747 10,848,718 
1979 4,118,891 12,624,747 16,743,638 
1980 16,204,536 11,064,297 27,268,833 
1981 31,990,071 9,436,549 41,426,620 
1982 10,503,412 7,459,084 17,962,496 
1983 3,975,441 8,364,645 12,340,086 
1984 11,799,031 5,460,218 17,259,249 
1985 15,832,620 4,563,512 20,396,132 
1986 4,823,024 7,703,903 12,526,927 
1987 4,553,671 9,110,993 13,664,664 
1988 71,279,576 24,539,873 95,819,449 
1989 30,282,295 30,277,615 60,559,910 
1990 2,327,466 75,805,111 78,132,577 
 
Source: Generated from the annual reports of the National Statistics 
Office, Philippines 1964-1990. There are no available data from year 
1949 to 1963 and 1967 to 1968.  
                                                
81 Ibid. 287. 
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The trade, as seen in Table 4.1, progressed more than double in the succeeding three 
years after both countries registered a US $13.6 million total bilateral trade in 1987. 
Despite significant increase in the total bilateral trade between India and the 
Philippines in the late 1980s, the balance of trade was still in India’s favour. Compared 
with other ASEAN founding members, the Philippines appeared as India’s weakest 
trading partner. The Philippine exports picked up only in the Indian market from 1980 
to 1982 because of the undervaluation of its currency. Otherwise, Filipino exports to 
India remained static for a long period of time.82 
 
Among the principal Indian export items to the Philippines were meat and meat 
preparations, manufactures of metals, drugs, pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, 
cotton yarn fabrics, made-ups and oil meals. Similarly, the Philippines imported 
considerable quantity of meat and meat preparation from the European countries. 
Given the fact that foot and mouth disease (FMD) was spreading widely among 
European livestock at that time, Indian exporters in this line took advantage of the 
situation and proliferated their sale to the Philippines. Furthermore, Indian exporters in 
the agricultural and food products such as groundnuts, spices, marine products, poultry 
and dairy products, oil meals, processed fruits and juices also took advantage of the 
Philippine growing market in these product segments.83 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Indeed, India’s interactions with the Philippines have been invariably circumscribed 
by the latter’s different foreign policy orientations. While India strived to maintain an 
                                                
82 Sanjay Ambatkar. India and ASEAN in the 21st Century. New Delhi: Anmol Publications 
Pvt. Ltd., 2002. 53. 
83 Ibid. 
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independent, non-aligned stance in world affairs, the Philippines continued to be 
identified with the US. The indifference persisted despite the fact that the Philippines 
was also accepted as one of the members of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM).84 
Even the reorientation of the Philippine foreign policy in the 1970s towards a policy of 
non-alliance espoused by Marcos did not change entirely the Indian perception that the 
Philippine foreign policy remained as American-centric. Leticia Ramos-Shahani, 
former Philippine ambassador and senator, echoed the same sentiment of other 
countries’ perceptions that the conduct of the Philippine foreign policy was always 
connected to the American sphere of influence. It was not surprising therefore that the 
Indian policy regarding the Philippines appeared merely as one of perfunctory 
interactions.85 
 
Although India was aware that the Philippines had ‘western orientation’, it still made 
some initiatives to enhance prospects for greater technical, economic and cultural 
exchanges with the Philippines. Indian efforts were meagre but at least there were 
some movements seen over the last 40 years. Indian policy towards the Philippines has 
evolved from isolation to one off creating rapport. From merely maintaining ‘correct 
relations’, it also attempted to diversify relations with the Philippines. This was 
concretised by the qualitative change in economic contacts in the 1970s to include 
joint ventures and investment portfolios in the Philippines besides traditional bilateral 
                                                
84 The foundation conference of the nonaligned movement in Belgrade laid down certain 
criteria and these served the community reasonably well until there was a demand in recent 
years from certain countries, principally Yugoslavia, for liberalisation to admit observers and 
guests. The result was the presence in conclaves of the nonaligned of such countries such as 
Romania, Portugal and the Philippines which on a strict application of rules would have been 
turned away. Ram Sharma. Indian Foreign Policy: Annual Survey 1978. New Delhi: Foreign 
Policy Research Centre, 2001-2002, 222. 
85 Shahani. 122. 
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trade.  The Indian leadership has been vocal about increasing relations with ASEAN 
countries, especially in the commercial and economic spheres.86 
 
The low incidence of official contacts, the geographical remoteness from India and the 
minimal presence of Indians in the Philippines led to a very indifferent Indian attitude 
towards the Philippines.87 Such attitude began to have a gradual change with the end 
of Cold War and the emergence of a new world order. This development is discussed 
in the next chapter.
                                                
86 Ibid. 
87 Sridharan. 1996. 29. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EXPANDING THE CIRCLES: INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES,  
1991 TO 2010 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Due to ideological difference for almost five decades, a benign neglect relation existed 
between India and the Southeast Asian countries. These countries including the 
Philippines gave India the ‘cold shoulder’ treatment. The situation, however, changed 
when some of the world’s momentous political, social and economic events occurred 
in the 1990s. Considered as a blessing and a bane for India, these developments 
provided the Indian government certain space to seize the moment by reorienting its 
economic and foreign policies with Southeast Asian neighbours.  
 
After India finally opened its economy to the world, Southeast Asia became a potential 
market and source of foreign direct investments (FDI). The good economic 
performance of most countries in Southeast Asian region encouraged India to give 
attention once more to the area that for decades was highly neglected by its foreign 
affairs department in New Delhi.  To maximise the interaction, the Indian government 
implemented the ‘Look East’ policy (LEP). Through the years, this framework became 
India’s tool in negotiating its role in the region. Gradually the same role was 
capitalised by India in expanding its diplomatic and economic breadth to include those 
less responsive countries such as the Philippines. To understand better this initiative, it 
is only but proper to situate this development along with global and domestic events 
that occurred in the last decade of the 20th Century. 
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5.2. Developments and Dilemma of 1990s: Turning Points of India’s Foreign Policy 
The end of the Cold War provided India with a new strategic situation in which its 
main ally the Soviet Union was no longer available as a political, economic and 
security anchor. Such development practically made nonalignment appear 
meaningless. As a consequence, India stood out, as Samuel Huntington was to 
describe it, as a ‘lonely’ and ‘friendless’ power.1 India was marginalised in global 
transformative process when countries of the world were consolidating in regional 
trade blocs as a result of ‘new wave of protectionism.’ Trading blocs were established 
with the transformation of the European Community into European Union (EU) and 
that United States of America (US) and Canada laid down the foundations of North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).2 Countries in the Asia Pacific, on the 
other hand, established similar organisations due to the rising need of protecting their 
interest from EU and NAFTA.  
 
The dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) also had mixed 
repercussions for India. During the Cold War, especially from the 1970s onwards, 
India had become heavily dependent on the USSR for supplies of arms, petroleum and 
to some extent economic assistance on liberal terms.3 The USSR had been a leading 
partner of India and was a big market of Indian consumer goods. The disintegration of 
                                                
1 Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul. India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power 
Status. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 205. The said description was 
cited from the work of J. Mohan Malik, “India Goes Nuclear: Rationales, Benefits, Costs and 
Implications.” Contemporary Southeast Asia. 20 (1998): 103. 
2 Sandy Gordon. “India and Southeast Asia: A Renaissance in Relations?”  India Looks East: 
An Emerging Power and its Asia-Pacific Neighbours. Eds. Gordon, Sandy and Stephen 
Henningham. Australia: Australia National University, 1995. 1.  In East Asia, the ASEAN 
gained more momentum by acting as the core of other regional groupings such as Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the latter’s non-official 
counterpart, the Council on Security Cooperation for the Asia Pacific. 
3 Prakash Nanda. Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look East Policy. New Delhi: 
Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2003.268-9.  
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the USSR in 1990 forced India to look for alternative sources of raw materials as well 
as explore possible alternative markets. India immediately saw Southeast Asia as an 
alternative dynamic region with a large population that could serve as potential market 
for its products. 
 
The collapse of Iraqi economy and the severe dislocation of oil economies in the Gulf 
region following the Kuwait crisis heightened pressures to an ailing economy of India. 
The worst, India lost remittances of US $205 million from Indian expatriates who 
were employed in Iraq and Kuwait. India also lost US $500 million owing to it from 
Iraq at the start of the crisis and about US $112 million in trade with Iraq and Kuwait. 
The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe also adversely affected India’s 
trade with the Eastern Bloc.4 By 1992 to 1993, trade with these countries had fallen to 
a mere 2.6 percent of India’s total trade.5  Such event further worsened India’s 
unsustainable fiscal deficit at that time. Without any option, India then was forced to 
knock at the door of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).6 
 
Although considered a painful process, the events in the Gulf region led to India’s 
realisation of the need to diversify its sources of energy supply and reduce its 
dependence on traditional suppliers in the Gulf and the erstwhile USSR. As a 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Gordon. 217. The Central government’s deficit was as high as 8.5 percent of GDP. India had 
an unsustainable balance-of-payments deficit in which the current account deficit was close to 
3.5 percent of GDP. The cumulative impact of these developments can be observed in the mid-
1991 steep fall in India’s foreign exchange reserves and whatever was left was only enough to 
cover two weeks’ imports. 
6 V. S. Mahaian. Manmohan’s Dream India. New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications Pvt. 
Ltd., 2005. 24. 
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consequence, India steadily turned its head to the rich energy resource countries like 
Brunei, Indonesia and Australia in Asia-Pacific as alternative sources.7 
 
India also reoriented its policy as a form of reaching out to those countries that were 
alienated during its navy’s expansion in the Bay of Bengal in the mid 1980s. It is 
understandable, from the construction of power theory, that India should also display 
its might in times when the US and the USSR emerged to be the world’s superpowers. 
The opening of the Fortress Andaman and Nicobar (FORTRAN) joint-services base at 
Port Blair in Andaman and Nicobar islands in 19858 was both a plus factor for India’s 
projection as a military might in the region and an irritant in its relationships with the 
neighbouring states particularly Indonesia. As a result, India needed to employ the 
LEP as a tool of reclaiming back those affected allies without disturbing much its 
hegemonic stance. Moreover, the need to curtail the expanding influence of China in 
Southeast Asia particularly with the establishment of a Chinese naval base in the 
southern most tip of then Burma compelled India to reorient its foreign policy.9 This 
policy was an aspect of soft power of winning more allies at its doorsteps such as 
Burma. The latter can check and balance on its behalf China’s looming advances in 
sea-lanes of communication out of and into the Indian Ocean.10 
 
                                                
7 Nanda. 272. 
8 Kripa Sridharan. “India-ASEAN Relations: Evolution, Growth, and Prospects.” China, India, 
Japan and Security of Southeast Asia. Ed. Chandran Jeshurun. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1995. 136. In fact, Major General Harsudiyono Hartas of the 
Diponegoro Command observed that the Soviet submarines roaming Indonesian waters in the 
northern tip of Sumatra were originated from the Nicobar base on the eve of Rajiv Gandhi’s 
visit to Jakarta in October 1986. This claim was vehemently denied immediately by India. 
9 P. Kamath. “India-China Relations since the End of the Cold War: India’s Security Concern 
and Policy Options.” Ghoble. Indian, China and South-East Asia. Eds. David, and T Ghole. 
New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications Pvt Ltd, 2000. 134. 
10 Gordon.  218. 
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Such move, as confirmed by Anindya Batabyal, only stressed India’s strategic 
competition with China on a larger scale as the undeclared element of the LEP.11 
Indians felt that they were not comfortable leaving the field entirely to the Chinese.12  
This claim was based on the alarming trade value between China and Southeast Asia 
from US $454.43 million in 1972 to US $1,903.86 million in 1980. This unexpected 
development was brought about by China’s steadily improving image in Southeast 
Asia upon its acceptance in 1971 as a regular member of the United Nations (UN) and 
the subsequent visit in 1972 of US President Richard Nixon in Beijing. The said value 
even soared high when China resumed its diplomatic relations with Indonesia and 
Singapore respectively in 1990. By 1991, China completely established or resumed 
foreign relations with all Southeast Asian countries. At this time, the trade value 
between China and the region reached almost US $9 billion.13 Alarmed by the growing 
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, the Indian government prompted to launch the 
LEP as a way of neutralizing the expanding Chinese clout and conversely secured its 
own sphere of influence while there was still opportunity to do so. 
 
India also needed to win friends that will support its bid as a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council which since then cannot be fully provided by its own regional 
grouping, the SAARC.14 Thus, Indian policy makers expanded the focus of their 
attention and aspirations beyond the narrow confines of South Asia and started to bank 
on its allies in the East.  
                                                
11 Anindya Batabyal. “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India's Look East 
Strategy.” China Report. 42.2 (2006): 179. 
12 Dilip Lahiri. Interview. 10 February 2009. 
13 Wen Chen. “ASEAN-China Trade Relations: Origins, Progress and Prospect.” ASEAN-
China Economic Relations. Ed. Saw Swee-Hock. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2007. 69 and 73. 
14 Nanda. 273. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka had some border and strategic issues with 
India. 
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Although the LEP is now claimed to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region, its 
primary focus is undoubtedly on Southeast Asia.15 It is the region, as Devare aptly 
said, that gave India the opportunity to combine as well as forge both politico-security 
and economic initiatives into a concrete form.16 
 
5.3. Southeast Asia: India’s New Market and Diplomatic Focus 
As early as the 1980s, Southeast Asia emerged as one of the most dynamic and 
economically vibrant regions in the world. Economists observed that within a short 
period of time the economies of these countries have not only expanded but also 
achieved rapid rates of economic integration. This development allowed for the 
creation of a large middle class, a new group of successful capitalists, and a growing 
self-confidence among states and leaders.17 
 
But it is also worthy to note that not all countries in Southeast Asia were 
simultaneously experiencing high growth rate. Only four economies out of six 
members of the ASEAN in the late 1980s were registering rapid growth rate namely 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand which were referred in this chapter as 
ASEAN-4.18 The Philippines as one of the original members and Brunei as the newest 
member of the organisation in the 1980s were unable to develop their respective 
                                                
15 G. V. C. Naidu. “Wither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia.” Strategic 
Analysis. 28.2 (2004): 332.  
16 Sudhir Devare. India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006. 2. 
17 A.M. Thomas. “India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective.” Engaging 
with the World: Critical Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy. Eds. Rajen Harshe and K. M. 
Seethi. Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2005. 300.  
18 The governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand established 
ASEAN in 1967. Brunei Darussalam then joined in 1984, Viet Nam in 1995, Lao PDR and 
Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. “Overview.” ASEAN Secretariat. n.d. 13 
December 2009. <http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html>.  
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economies substantially to that of a ‘tiger’ standing.19 Nevertheless, the economic 
performance of ASEAN-4 alone was already enough to put the region into the 
limelight. India for instance was interested in the ASEAN-4 and trade share between 
them rose from 2.3 percent in 1980 to 3.6 percent in 1993. In contrast, India’s share in 
the ASEAN total output at that time registered only from 0.4 percent to just 0.6 
percent.  It is also noticeable that the trade to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio for 
India at 16 percent in 1992 was way below 50 to 150 percent range of ASEAN-4. 20 
 
Southeast Asian economies received massive inflows of export-oriented FDI from 
Japan following a strong appreciation of yen in 1985. The Japanese investments in the 
region rose from US $55 million in 1986 to US $4,484 million in 1989.21 Aside from 
Japan, US and EU were also the leading investors in the region. The FDI reached a 
cumulative total of US $140 billion at the end of 1993, with about 24 percent coming 
from Japan, 17 percent from EU and 13 percent from the US. These aforementioned 
countries alone contributed a significant 54 percent to the total FDI in the ASEAN. 
The bulk of investments have been in the manufacturing sector due to their export-
orientation. The services sector also received a large amount of FDI particularly the 
financial and business sectors as well as transport and communications sectors.22 
 
                                                
19 Tiger economy is a nickname given to the high performing economies of Southeast 
Asia. Other “tigers” of Asia include South Korea and China. With the injection of large 
amounts of FDI, these economies grew substantially between the late 1980s and from early to 
the mid-1990s. “Tiger Economy.” Investopedia.com. n.d. 13 December 2009. 
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tigereconomy.asp>.  
20 V.V. Bhanoji Rao. “India and Southeast Asia: New Partnership.” India and ASEAN: 
Economic Partnership in the 1990s and Future Prospects.  Eds. Shri Prakash, Vanita Ray and 
Sanjay Ambatkar. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1996. 24. 
21 Teofilo Daquila. The Transformation of Southeast Asian Economies. New York: Nova 
Science Publishers, Inc., 2007. 6. 
22 Ibid. 28. 
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Apart from the size of its market, Southeast Asia as a region has also served as an 
important supplier of natural resources such as tin, rubber, edible oil, crude oil and 
gas. The second supply base was primarily constituted of human resources in the form 
of cheap labour that was gaining importance at that time. Apart from these, technology 
was an emerging area of strength.23 
 
Due to these advancements in the region, the government of Narasimha Rao decided 
to renew India’s relations initially with some countries particularly to those highly 
developed economies in Southeast Asia such as Thailand and Singapore. To maximise 
the potentials of the revitalised relations and the related stakes, India implemented the 
LEP. A succinct discussion of this regionalist instrument has already been discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
With the Indian economic liberalisation in the 1990s, capital was needed to ‘pump up’ 
the economy. Bureaucrats in New Delhi had to attract foreign investments. Thus, the 
government needed to position itself in capital surplus economies by projecting the 
image of an attractive investment/business destination. Indian diplomacy had to 
convince the developed world of the durability of India’s reforms, prevent foreign 
investors from becoming sceptical about India’s political stability as well as highlight 
the abundant opportunities it offered for economic cooperation.24 These gargantuan 
tasks were even acknowledged in the early days of Prime Minister (PM) Rao’s 
administration. Along with the economic reforms and foreign policy reorientation, the 
external affairs’ office in New Delhi was internally doing some revamp. Furthermore, 
                                                
23 Thomas. 300.  
24 Isabelle Saint-Mezard. Eastward Bound: India’s New Positioning in Asia. New Delhi: 
Manohar, 2006. 38. 
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the foreign secretary was already assigned to take charge of the Southeast Asian affairs 
that was formerly delegated to a junior official. PM Rao also instituted a separate 
economic wing in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to take care of the economic 
interaction with international community. This task was previously under the sole 
supervision of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
 
Initially, the Indian initiative was seen with reservations due to some historical 
baggage. Such downside condition did not last long since countries eventually showed 
positive responses to it. Active economic interactions then followed. Since 1992, these 
collaborations were transformed several times by various global developments and 
some programmes were born from this single initiative. Despite such activeness, 
Indian relations with other countries in the region were left underdeveloped 
particularly with the Philippines. Despite the implementation of the LEP in 1992, the 
Philippine-India relations specifically its economic component did not register an 
upward scale. This does not mean, however, that there was no movement at all. In fact, 
the trade was continuous but on a meagre turnout. At the time, an increase in the 
Philippine foreign capitals directly invested in India in mid 1990s was observable.25 
Moreover, the diplomatic relations were normalised but the scale of economic 
interactions seemed to be dismal even in the late 1990s despite the first state visit of a 




                                                
25 It was only in 1996 that the Philippine FDI in India registered the highest in the history of 
India-Philippine relations of about US $82.49 million. Refer to Chapter 6 FDI section for more 
details. 
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5.4. Expanding the Circles: India and the Philippines 
Prior to the end of the Cold War and the liberalisation of the Philippine economy, 
there was an initiative from the Indian private sector to revitalise even the economic 
aspect of the relation. The Philippine government on its part, started to give attention 
to its ‘forgotten neighbours’26 even before the disintegration of the USSR. The 
administration of President Corazon Aquino began to look at India and South Asia 
with an accent of its foreign policy on cultural and political components. Due to a 
series of domestic political crises from 1986 to 1989, however, the Philippines was not 
able to fully explore and tap India’s complementarities in securing additional inputs 
for economic and social development. It was a good start but the outcome became too 
minimal as it did not bring much dynamism to the relations of the two countries.  
 
It was only after the Cold War period that the Philippines also started to reach out 
actively to India and South Asia after Indian President Ramaswamy Venkataraman27 
officially visited Manila in April 1991. It was diplomatically reciprocated in 1992 
when President Fidel Ramos visited India. The relations were even strengthened when 
the Philippines supported India’s entry to the ASEAN as dialogue partner in 1996 and 
even in its attempt to join the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) body. As a 
result, the reconnected ties complemented by state visits produced various policy 
instruments beneficial in the advancement and exploration of more fields of 
cooperation in the long run.28  
 
                                                
26 Artemio Palongpalong. Forgotten Neighbors: The Philippines’ Relations with South Asia. 
Quezon City: Asian Center, 1992. 1. 
27 Ramaswamy Venkataraman was the 8th president of the Republic of India from 1987 to 
1992. Ramaswamy Venkataraman, President in Parliament. New Delhi: Lok Sabha 
Secretariat, 1992. 10 and 359. 
28 South Asia Division. Philippines- India Relations. An Overview. Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of the Philippines. 2008. 6-8. 
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It should be noted, however, that even after India’s LEP was launched, the Philippines 
has been observed to be still on the periphery of India’s trading networks. India’s 
bilateral trade with the Philippines did not really pick up whereas India’s trade with 
other countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam grew 
rapidly.29  This limitation was brought about by some influential factors. One of these 
is the geographical distance of the Philippines. Compared to Malaysia and Indonesia, 
the Philippines is geographically separated from the mainland Southeast Asia where 
India has an immediate strategic access. Despite the insular conditions of Malaysia and 
Indonesia, their proximity to the mainland offered more cost advantage in terms of 
product transport and distribution than the Philippines.  
 
The less liberal immigration policy of the Philippine government to Indian and other 
South Asian tourists and investors also contributed to this slow turnover. Indian 
businessmen especially those in software line found difficulty of getting visa to come 
to the Philippines. Issuance of visa, for instance, was only accommodated in New 
Delhi and the Philippine consulates in the cities of Madras (now Chennai), Bombay 
(Mumbai) and Calcutta (Kolkata) were previously functioning only for economic 
interactions.30 Indian businessmen from Mumbai or Bangalore who were interested to 
transact their businesses in the Philippines were discouraged due to the inconvenience 
of the Philippine embassy’s visa issuance system in New Delhi. For Mumbai 
entrepreneurs, filing their visa applications in New Delhi was troublesome.  This 
meant the withholding of their passports for several days of processing and prohibited 
                                                
29 Navrekha Sharma. “Philippines has been outside India’s trade radar.” Rediff India Abroad. 
31 October 2005. 28 January 2008. <http://www.rediff.com>. 
30 Ambassador Rosalinda Tirona. Interview 16 December 2008. Miss Tirona was the former 
ambassador of the Philippines in India from 1986 to 1988.  
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them from transacting their businesses in countries other than the Philippines.31 These 
immigration related-woes were believed to have emanated from an early perception 
that Indians are potential ‘overstayers’. This absurd situation even went as far as 
applying the same restriction to well known people like Ratan Tata. Businessmen, 
including Ratan Tata, when applying their visas in the Philippine Consulate in Hong 
Kong had to wait for weeks to process their documents since the said office would 
have to receive permission from Manila.32 This meant a lot of missed business 
opportunities.  
 
Thirdly, the diasporic affiliation and orientation of Indian communities in the 
Philippines was a little bit different from their counterparts in the mainland. Many of 
the Indians in the Philippines have been involved in micro-financing businesses since 
the business environment was almost if not all controlled by the Chinese and 
American entrepreneurs. If ever they were in retailing and wholesaling, the products 
traded were made from China and not from India. Unlike their counterparts in the 
mainland, the primary source of living has been both trading and financing and that 
would translate to the flooding of more Indian products in the host country.  
 
Lastly, the ambiguous posture of the Philippines to the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) in the early years of its establishment also placed it in the peripheral of trade 
and diplomatic radar of India. Despite these limitations, the Philippines managed to 
get a portion of India’s trade volume and eventually reciprocated a smaller volume of 
its own produce. Through the years, the total bulk of bilateral trade has increased but 
                                                
31 Navrekha Sharma. Interview. 28 January 2009. Also, Dilip Lahiri. 
32 Rodolfo Severino. Interview. 18 January 2010. Also, Dante Ang. “Philippines Missing Out 
on India’s Boom.” Manila Times. 10 March 2011. 26 April 2011. 
<http://www.manilatimes.net/news/topstories/philippines-missing-out-on-india’s-boom/>.  
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its unevenness in favour to India was still noticeable. In spite of this situation, the 
Philippine and Indian governments strived to explore more ways to push forward the 
bilateral interactions.  As a result, the various frameworks of bilateral cooperation 
were sealed and subsequently activated as an offshoot of high level visits by the 
officials of both countries. These developments led to a new chapter of India-
Philippine relations, the era of reorientation. 
 
5.4.1. Period of Reorientation: 1991 to 2000  
Building on the limited visits prior to the 1990s, several official trips were undertaken 
to realise the growing confidence building measures (CBM) of both countries. 
Foremost was the state visit of President Fidel V. Ramos to India in March 1997.33 
The former president revisited again India in his capacity as the special envoy of 
President Arroyo in 2001.34 On the Indian side, the Minister of State for External 
Affairs Smt. Vasundhara Raje visited the Philippines in June 1998. Moreover, Shri 
Jaswant Singh came to Manila in his capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission, who led the Indian delegation to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 
the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in July 1998. Shri V. Dhananjaya Kumar, 
Minister of State for Finance, visited Manila when the India-Philippine Agreement on 
Promotion and Protection of Investments was signed in January 2000.35 
 
                                                
33 Joefe Santarita. Spells, Spills and Spoils: The First State Visit of the Philippine President in 
India. South Asian Bibliography Module- SN5101 (Unpublished Work). November 2007. 1. 
34 Indian embassy in Manila. 
35 Ibid. 
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From 1991 to 2000, various agreements were concluded. Foremost was the conclusion 
of a convention for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion 
with respect to taxes on income was done on 12 February 1991.36    
 
On 29 April 1991, two long-term agreements on cooperation in atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes, and agriculture were respectively signed as an offshoot of President 
Venkataraman’s state visit in the Philippines. The former was a follow up to similar 
agreements done on atomic related cooperation in the 1960s. Both countries agreed to 
cooperate in programmes involving the use of research reactors, application of 
radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture, engineering and general scientific research and 
many more.37 The latter, on the other hand, was a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on cooperation in the field of agricultural, science and technology. Both 
countries adhered to the implementation of joint activities in areas of rice production 
and processing, multi-cropping system, dry land farming system, water management 
and others.38   
 
Moreover, both governments also expanded their bilateral and cultural interactions 
through an executive programme of cultural exchanges that was signed in Manila on 
                                                
36 Under this agreement, the areas covered for the avoidance of double taxation include 
income from immovable property, business profits, air transport, shipping, associated 
enterprises, dividend, interest, royalties, capital gains, independent and dependent personal 
services, directors’ fess, entertainers and athletes, government service, non-government 
pensions and annuities, students and trainees, professors and teachers and other income. 
Details of this convention are elaborated in Appendix J. 
37 The pact allowed the exchange of scientific and technical publications, technical personnel, 
equipment, samples and materials between India and the Philippines. For details, see 
Appendix K. 
38 Under this memorandum, the agriculture agencies of the Philippines and India are 
designated as coordinating offices. Refer to Appendix L for the detailed description. 
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29 December 1992.39 This collaboration was again revived through similar medium in 
1994 and took effect for the period 1995 to 1997. The programme focused more on 
education, arts and culture, archaeology and mass media.40 
 
Two MoUs were signed on 3 March 1997 during the state visit of President Fidel 
Ramos in India. One was on scientific and technological cooperation with focus on 
pharmaceuticals while the other cooperation was between the National Small Scale 
Industries Corporation Ltd. (NSSIC) of India and the Bureau of Small and Medium 
Business Development (BSMED) of the Philippines. The former emphasised the 
collaboration on manpower development, joint project on medicinal plant research as 
well as exchange of updated information on drug development.41 The latter called for a 
close cooperation between NSSIC and BSMED in establishing a suitable policy 
framework for the organised growth of small enterprises based on the experience of 
India and the Philippines including the establishment of centres with technical 
expertise.42 
 
The last but the most important accord in 2000 was the agreement for promotion and 
protection of investments. This was signed in 28 January at Makati, Philippines.43 
                                                
39 India and the Philippines expanded the bilateral cultural exchanges and strengthened further 
the friendly relations on the basis of the Cultural Agreement signed on 6 September 1969 
through the exchanges of writers, dance experts, theatre performers, professors as well as 
holding of art installations and production of cultural programmes. For details, see Appendix 
M. 
40 Aside from cultural exchanges, this pact interestingly included the exchange of information 
on the prevention and cure of the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (HIV/AIDS) as well as discouraged the commercial trafficking of cultural artefacts. 
For details, see Appendix N. 
41 This MoU remained in force for three years and automatically renewed for another three 
years unless one of the contracting parties terminated it. For details, see Appendix O. 
42 For details, see Appendix P. 
43 The documents are courtesy of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of the Philippines. 
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Other details such as expropriation, treatment, compensation for loss, transfers of 
funds, subrogation, dispute settlement and others are mentioned in Appendix Q. 
 
Aside from these agreements, the relations between India and the Philippines during 
this period were steadily improving as reflected in the increase in the total trade. 
Though there was lopsided trading since then, such improvement was brought about 
by collaborative efforts of both governments in diversifying their respective basket of 
exports to achieve continued and optimal growth. In fact, a major breakthrough at that 
time has been achieved in the supply of agricultural commodities including rice and 
meat when the Philippines started the importation of Indian rice. On the part of the 
Philippines, it accredited those Indian agencies such as State Trading Corporation 
(STC) that opened up prospects for higher exports.44 
 
Aside from rice and meat, major items of Indian exports include oil cakes, industrial 
salt, groundnuts, fabrics, refrigerants, rubber/plastic machinery, frozen buffalo meat, 
pharmaceuticals, iron and steel manufactures and tools, textile yarn, petrochemicals, 
auto and motorcycle parts, cereals, organic chemicals, electronic components, and 
other things. On the other hand, major imports from the Philippines include semi-
conductors, inorganic chemicals, auto parts, newsprint, minerals, garments, toys, 
industrial resource-based commodities (industrial oils, seaweeds), machineries and 
transport equipment. With the liberal foreign trade policies implemented in both 
countries, the two-way trade poised a significant expansion.45 In fact, the total bilateral 
trade in 2010 registered a progressive rate of almost six percent improvement from the 
                                                
44 “India, Philippines Target US $ 500 Million Bilateral Trade by 2000 A.D.” 29 January 
1998. 28 January 2008. <http://www.indlaw.com>. 
45 “India and the Philippines: Old Relations, New Horizons.” Philippine Star. 3 March 1997. 
S-1. 
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2009 figure and more than 90 percent movement from the 1991 trade value of merely 
US $96.2 million (see Table 6.2). 
 
The Joint Working Group on Trade and Investments (JWGT) as well as the Joint 
Business Council (JBC) from the private sector have also provided the institutional 
framework for trade and investment between the two countries. The two bodies 
accordingly identified the areas of pharmaceuticals, development of small and medium 
enterprises, railway projects, satellite communication systems, computer literacy 
programmes and fashion designing for further cooperation.46 
 
As for the project undertakings, the KEC International Limited has brought in and 
operated a drilling rig to enhance steam production in a geothermal project.47 
Moreover, the India-Philippines Textiles, established in 1975 by the Birla joint 
venture, was the first textile mills in the Philippines that continuously produced local 
jobs for the Filipinos. Also, the Tata group of companies in August 1993 signed the 
MoU for a joint venture agreement with the Philippine company, Autocorp, for the 
production and distribution of Tata commercial vehicles.48  
 
Another significant facet of India-Philippine relations in the 1990s was the partnership 
in human resource development. Over the last decade, more than a thousand Filipinos 
had benefited from Indian scholarship programme under the Indian Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (ITEC). In addition, there were more than 760 Filipinos who 
                                                
46  Ibid. The Philippine legislature passed the bill on cheaper medicine and was signed into law 
by President Gloria Arroyo known as Republic Act 9502 in 2008. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Annual Report, 1993-1994. 01 January 
1993. 14.  
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benefited on its technical courses such as computer software, agriculture and rural 
development, water resources management, small scale industries, banking, finance 
and accounts, quality control and marketing, planning and public administration, 
research and development, textiles and others.49 Aside from these courses, the 
technical assistance through the transfer of equipment and technology was also 
extended. The Indian government also donated five million pesos in the establishment 
of the hand-tool design centre in Angeles City in Pampanga.50 
 
The ITEC programme contributed significantly to the development of sericulture 
technology in the Philippines. The Indian government provided training and sets of 
sericulture equipment such as reeling and spinning machines to Don Mariano Marcos 
Memorial State University (DMMMSU) in launching a fairly advanced programme to 
promote sericulture.51 
 
Another first for the ITEC programme in the Philippines was the gift of an artificial 
limb manufacturing unit to produce the famous ‘Jaipur foot’.52 A grant was awarded 
for the first time to Mahaveer Philippine Foundation, a non-governmental 
                                                
49 Philippine Star. 3 March 1997. 
50 “India and the Philippines: Partners in Human Resource Development –The ITEC Way.”  
Manila Bulletin.  26 January 1997. SS-1. The centre offers services in designing and 
manufacturing of hand tools for agriculture and industry as well as serves as training and 
supply hub for custom made metal dies for workshops.  
51 Ibid.  
52 The ‘Jaipur foot’ is a prosthetic foot that has dorsi-flexion, inversion, eversion, supination, 
pronation and axial rotation allowing an amputee not only to walk comfortably but also to 
squat (sitting on hunches), kneel, crouch, sit on cross leg, walk on undulated terrain, run, 
climb a tree and drive an automobile. It was first conceived and developed in 1968 by Ram 
Chander Sharma in Jaipur, India. “Jaipur Technology.” Jaipurfoot.org 2007. 12 June 2010. 
<http://www.jaipurfoot.org>. 
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organisation, to supervise the operations of Jaipur foot facilities in the Philippines and 
distribute artificial limbs for free to Filipino amputees.53  
 
On the part of the Philippines, some Filipino companies also started establishing their 
businesses in India. For example, Del Monte Pacific Limited established Del Monte 
Foods India Private Limited and built a manufacturing facility near Bangalore. The 
facility was designed to accommodate the production, distribution and sale of 
processed fruits (guava and mango) and vegetable products.54 Del Monte has also 
entered into a joint venture with India’s Bharti Enterprises to create FieldFresh Foods 
Pvt. Ltd. By doing this, the conglomeration has enabled to offer Del Monte branded 
processed food and beverage products in India as well as FieldFresh branded fresh 
fruits and vegetables in India and other countries.55 Another important Philippine 
enterprise that made lucrative inroads into India in 1996 were EasyCall 
Communications Philippines Inc. (ECPI) and Pocketbell for offering paging services 
to the Indians prior to the popularisation of cellular phones.56 
 
5.4.2. Period of Growing Diversity: 2001 to 2010  
Due to the reinvigorated ties that began in 1990s, the interactions cumulatively 
produced more favourable outputs and explored more areas of collaboration for both 
countries. As a matter of fact, a number of agreements were forged in 2003 which 
include MoU between Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and the University of 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
54 As of 2007, the company owned 40.1 percent of the Fieldfresh Foods Private Limited of 
Bharti Enterprises and Rothschild Group. n.d. 11 October 2008. 
<http://www.delmontepacific.com/about/index.html>.  
55  “Bharti & Del Monte Tie Up.” FieldFresh Foods Pvt. Ltd. 10 March 2010. 
<http://www.fieldfreshfoods.in>.  
56 Margarita Roa. “Paging Companies Join Forces for Self-Regulation.” Nikkei Electronics 
Asia 5.5 (1996). n.d. 21 September 2007. <http://www.nikkeibp.com/nea/may/mayphil.html>. 
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Philippines (UP), between the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) and the 
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), as well as between GAIL and the 
Department of Energy. In 2004, two accords were signed such as the MoU between 
Pharmaceuticals Export Promotion Council (PHARMEXCIL) and the Philippine 
International Trading Cooperation (PITC) as well as the Extradition Treaty. These 
collaborations between two countries were even strengthened with the signing of 
various agreements on cooperation in defence, tourism, agriculture and related fields 
during the state visit of President Abdul Kalam in Manila in February 2006.57  
 
During his visit, the Indian president addressed the joint session of the Philippine 
Congress and visited some academic and research institutions in the country. Some of 
these were the College of Nursing of the University of Philippines in Manila (UPM), 
Philippine Science High School (PSHS), Philippine Institute of Volcanology and 
Seismology (PHIVOLCS) and the University of Philippines in Diliman, (UPD) as well 
as the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in Laguna.58 
 
More bilateral agreements were also forged when President Arroyo made her state 
visit in India in October 2007. Among the agreements that were signed during this 
official trip include the establishment of a joint commission on bilateral cooperation, 
enhanced cooperation in the field of renewable energy, exemption of visa 
requirements for holders of diplomatic and official passports, cooperation in the field 
of health and medicine, declaration on framework of bilateral cooperation, and the 
                                                
57 The documents are courtesy of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of the Philippines. 
58 Indian embassy in Makati. 
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joint declaration for cooperation to combat international terrorism.59 In addition, both 
governments also agreed to deputise their Foreign Service Institutes to engage on 
collaborative activities, as well as the State Trading Corporation of India Limited 
(STC) and PITC to further the trading exchanges. The Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines also sealed a credit line of US $15 million with the Export-Import 
Bank of India.  
 
To complement the state visits, various ministers, department secretaries and other 
government officials visited their respective counterparts to follow up, strengthen and 
even propose new collaborative undertakings beneficial for both sides. In April 2005, 
the Speaker of Lok Sabha, Shri Somnath Chatterjee and his eight-member 
parliamentary delegation attended the 112th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) in Manila.  The Indian Speaker was awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Achievement and honoured with a citation by his Philippine counterpart, 
Representative Jose de Venecia.60 Furthermore, Shri E. Ahamed, Minister of State for 
External Affairs also made a goodwill visit in Manila in September 2005.  He met 
Secretary Alberto Romulo of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and former 
President Ramos.61 
 
Aside from government visits, commercial delegations were also encouraged. The first 
quarter of 2005 witnessed the arrival of Indian delegation to Manila that was 
sponsored by the Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion Council 
(ESC) from 16 to 18 January 2005. This visit gave the Philippine companies an 
                                                
59 South Asia Division, Asia Pacific Directorship, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of 
the Philippines. 11 July 2008. 
60 <http://www.embindia.org.ph>. 
61 Ibid. 
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opportunity to participate in the ‘Buyer Seller Meet’ on 17 January 2005.62 From 06 to 
08 March 2005, an Indian trade mission sponsored by the Basic Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Export Promotion Council (CHEMEXCIL) and 
PHARMEXCIL visited Manila to promote Indian pharmaceutical products, herbal 
medicines, chemicals, dyes and cosmetics. On 07 March 2005, the Embassy of India in 
Makati in association with the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) 
and PITC organised the business meeting as well as One-on-One Business Meeting.63 
As a result, PITC chairperson Pagdanganan visited Mumbai in November 2006 to sign 
the MoU with Mumbai-based India Chemical Council (ICC) for the substantial 
increase in imports of affordable medicines by the Philippines.64 In fact, the Arroyo’s 
administration pet project ‘Botika ng Bayan’ (BnB) or People’s Pharmacy has been 
banking on affordable yet good quality drugs from India.65   
 
A 10-member delegation associated with paper, paperboard and other paper products 
visited Manila in August 2006. Chemicals and Allied Products Export Promotion 
Council (CAPEXCIL) sponsored the said trip. In this visit, the Embassy of India in 
Manila organised a ‘Buyer Seller Meet’ that was co-sponsored by the PCCI.66   
 
Also, in August 2006, a seven-member delegation sponsored by the Confederation of 
Indian Industry (CII - Goa Council) visited Manila.  The Board of Investments (BOI), 
Bureau of Mines, Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), PCCI and the office 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Sharma: Philippine Star 2005. 
65 Manila Bulletin. 27 March 2007. 
66 Ibid. 
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of Undersecretary Edsel Custodio of the DFA organised their respective briefings for 
the delegation.67   
 
On the Philippine side, then Tourism Secretary Richard Gordon, visited India from 26 
November to 2 December 2006 at the invitation of Commerce and Industry Minister of 
India.   During the said visit, the former secretary addressed the India Economic 
Summit at the Plenary Session on ‘India and the World.’68 Furthermore, a Philippine 
business delegation led by former President Ramos visited India from 15 to 20 January 
2007.  The delegation was comprised of representatives from both government and 
private organisations.  This high profile group was composed of officials from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), DFA and PITC as well as delegates from the 
private sectors (pharmaceuticals, IT, TV/movie production, telecom, logistical 
industries) and representatives of the Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce (FICC), 
Ramos Peace and Development Foundation (RPDF) and Asian Institute of 
Management (AIM). They made exploratory visits to the cities of Mumbai, Kolkata 
and New Delhi.  In Kolkata, Mr. Ramos addressed the partnership summit organised 
by the CII.69 
 
As manifestation of the seriousness of both Indian and Philippine governments to 
improve their relations and encourage further people to people interactions, annual 
foreign office consultations were established in 2004 and expanded to include an 
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annual security dialogue.70 As a result, the flow of senior officials and businessmen on 
official trips to and from India and Philippines has improved since 2004. 
 
The trade between the two countries was observed to have increased dramatically 
compared to the past export-import performances. Although compared to other 
Southeast Asian counterparts, the Philippine total bilateral trade with India was still 
limited.71 The total trade figure in 2010 reached for the first time more than one billion 
US dollars that represented a growth of almost six percent over the 2009 trade figure.72 
Exports from India mainly comprised carabeef or buffalo meat, iron, steel, and 
pharmaceuticals while leading exports from the Philippines were electronics, auto 
parts and newsprint. The Joint Working Group on Trade and Economic Relations in 
2005 suggested for the widening the field of cooperation to include bamboo, oil and 
gas, renewable energy resources, gems and jewellery, construction materials and 
services.73 
 
Also, the gradual improvement of economic ties has been facilitated by the presence of 
the Indian-Filipino economic organisations such as FICC and Philippines-India 
Business Council (PIBC) in the Philippines as well as India-Philippine Business 
Advisory Council (IPBAC) in India.  
 
FICC is one of the pioneer ethnic chambers of commerce in the Philippines that is 
engaged in promoting the business and social interests of the Filipino-Indian 
                                                
70 Navrekha Sharma. “Ambassador’s message in the 57th Anniversary of the Indian Republic.” 
Philippine Star. 26 January 2006, E-1. 
71 Johnny Chotrani. Email Interview. 25 February 2010. 
72 “Tradeline data bank.” Department of Commerce. n.d. 19 February 2010. 
<http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp>. 
73 Kantha Rao. Interview. 27 February 2009. 
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community in the archipelago. Established in 1951, it has offered free services and 
guidance to Indian students as well as visiting Indian businessmen.  It also invited 
senior government officials to its general body meetings to speak on issues affecting 
business and foreign community. This 60 year-old body is affiliated to the PCCI, the 
Employer Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP) as well as to the Asia Pacific 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (APICCI). 
 
PIBC, on one hand, is one of the ethnic-based bodies of the Philippine Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (PCCI).  It actively promotes and facilitates trade and 
investments between India and the Philippines through the conduct of business 
meetings, seminars and forum in partnership with various government agencies and 
other business organisations. Its latest activity organised was a forum on Philippine-
India renewable energy opportunities on 22 June 2010 with Indian Minister of New 
and Renewable Energy, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, as guest speaker.74 
 
IPBAC is a business support group designed to promote and develop trade and 
investment activities among Indian companies with the Philippines. This council 
functions under the Office of the Commercial Attaché, Philippine Embassy in India.75 
In March 2011, IPBAC coordinated several activities in India. In the first day of 
March, the Philippine Investment Promotion Seminar in New Delhi was organised in 
cooperation with the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
                                                
74 “Welcome Reception and Forum on Philippines-India Renewable Energy Opportunities.” 




75 “Kapil Rampal to Head India Philippines Business Council Advisory Council (IPBAC).” 
Creative Crest. 22 February 2011. 1 March 2011. <http://www.prkpo.com/content/kapil-
rampal-head-india-india-philippines-business-advisory-council-ipbac>. 
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(ASSOCHAM). By 10 March 2011, it coordinated with the CII-Karnataka Council in 
holding the first Philippines-India Outsourcing Partnership Summit in Bangalore.76      
 
Over the years, with the continuous lobbying of the chamber to the various agencies of 
the Philippine government as well as the business to business interactions, companies 
of Indian origin such as Birla Group, ISPAT Group (of Pramod Mittal), and the 
Hinduja started to invest and made both name and fortune for themselves in the 
Philippines. They also have created employment for local people even in some 
conflict-inflicted areas in Mindanao.77 In 2004, the Ispat Group took over the defunct 
National Steel Corporation (NSC) in Iligan City, Mindanao. The plant was inaugurated 
on 03 February 2004 and since then has started to export cold rolled coils. The 
company was named as Global Steelworks International Inc. (GSII) in 2004, and 
renamed as Arcelor Mittal in 2009.   
 
Another Indian based company, Pan Century, part of the Aditya Birla Group has 
acquired M/s. Primo-Oleo-chemical plant in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte in 
January 2006.  The plant’s new name is Pan Century Surfactants Inc. (PCSI), and had 
commenced its operation in August 2008.78  The facilities include natural detergents 
alcohol, fatty acid, glycerine and oil-pre-treatment plants. This is the first plant in the 
world to commercialise the ‘low pressure hydrogenation technology’ that is 
significantly superior to competing fatty alcohol technologies. It supplies alcohol to 
leading MNCs in the Philippines.79 
                                                
76 India Philippines Business Advisory Council. 2011. 13 March 2011. 
<http://www.ipbac.com/2011/02/visi/>. 
77 Ibid. 
78 www.embindia.org.ph. August 2006. 
79 “Pan Century Surfactants Inc.” Aditya Birla.com. 2010. 10 June 2010. 
<http://www.adityabirla.com/our_companies/international_companies/pan_century_surfactant
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In terms of information technology investments, Indian firms are estimated to have the 
combined capacity of about 47,000 contact centre seats in the Philippines. In the latest 
count, 24 Indian contact centres operate in the Philippines and are dispersed in 55 sub-
locators all over the archipelago. 85 percent of these are concentrated in the island of 
Luzon particularly in Metro Manila, 11 percent in Visayan Islands and only two sub-
locators in Mindanao80 (see Chapter 7).  
 
With regards to pharmaceutical trade, India exported to the Philippines around US $25 
million worth of pharmaceuticals in 2008.81 PITC alone had been importing medicines 
worth US $1.5 million annually for the past years from India to supply in the 
government hospitals all over the country.82 A MoU between PHARMEXCIL and 
PITC was signed in November 2004.83 This bilateral agreement opened doors of 
opportunities such as the coming of two business delegations in Manila sponsored by 
CHEMEXCIL and PHARMEXCIL in March 2005 to promote exportation of Indian 
drugs and other related products84 (see Chapter 8).  
 
On the part of livestock development cooperation, India as the world’s largest 
producer of milk (including milk of tropical buffalo or carabao) has been assisting the 
                                                
s.htm>. 
80 Joefe Santarita. “Strategies to Promote the Mushrooming of Indian Contact Center in the 
Philippines.” Paper on Information Communication Technology Policy Module –NM 5203 
(Unpublished Work). April 2008. 1. 
81 There has been a significant increase of about US $7.5 million from the Indian 
pharmaceutical imports in the Philippines in 2006 and 2007. 
82 Joefe Santarita. “Indian Pharmaceutical Trade in the Philippines.” 1997-2007. Paper on 
Economies of Southeast Asia Module –SE  6233 (Unpublished Work). April 2008. 12. 
83 PHARMEXCIL acts as nodal agency on behalf of the Philippines to coordinate with Indian 
government and pharmaceutical companies as well as provide training to PITC technical 
officials. Conversely, PITC facilitates close interaction with the Philippine Bureau of Food 
and Drugs (BFAD) and help promote the image of Indian pharmaceuticals in the Philippines. 
For more information, see Appendix R. 
84 “Philippines.” Ministry of External Affairs. n.d. 17 August 2007. 
<http://www.mea.gov.in/foreignrelations/philippines.htm>.  
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Philippines with the technology in a small way.85 The government of India assisted the 
collection of ovaries and retrieval of female Murrah buffalo ‘eggs’ to be transported to 
the Philippines. These were taken from the embryo laboratory in Mumbai.86 A total of 
2,034 frozen embryos were brought to the Philippine Carabao Center (PCC) to be 
nurtured under a complete artificial production system. The experiment was successful 
and consequently produced the world’s first calf through vitro-derived vitrified 
embryo technology. The calf was called ‘Glory’ after it was born exactly on the natal 
day of then Philippine president, Gloria Arroyo.87 This was considered a major 
scientific programme between India and the Philippines. Interestingly, the strain of the 
Philippine carabao does not produce enough milk. Thus, embryos of Indian buffalos 
were being nurtured and implanted into the Philippine carabao. Many of the offspring 
are now grown into very healthy milk producing animals.88 Unfortunately, due to 
persistent importers’ lobby, it was not making progress the way it was expected.89  
 
With regards to tourism development, the Philippines began to attract Indian tourists to 
visit the country. From 7,000 Indian tourists in 1991, there was an increase in 2010 of 
almost 74.62 percent.90 This 2010 figure was almost five percent higher than the 
previous year.91 Thus, creating ‘package’ tours to Manila which include ‘malling’ and 
‘casino hopping’ for Indian tourists are proven to be a big draw.92  This development 
was complemented further with the hosting of Philippine Travel Exchange (PHITEX) 
                                                
85 Sharma. Philippine Star. E-1. 
86 Navrekha Sharma. Interview. 28 January 2009. 
87 “India’s Role in Philippine Livestock Development.” Philippine Star. 26 January 2004. SS8. 
Also cited in the website of the Philippine Carabao Center. 
88 Eufrocina Atabay. Interview. 18 May 2011. 
89 Sharma. Interview. 
90 Tourist Data, 1991-2007.  Department of Tourism, Republic of the Philippines. 26 
September and 9 October 2008. Courtesy of Miss Milagros Say and Mr. Glen Agustin. 
91 Tourist Data, 2009-2010. Department of Tourism, Republic of the Philippines. 3 February 
2011. 
92 Sharma. Philippine Star. E-1. 
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exhibition for Indian travel agencies in September 2008. This initiative was a joint 
project between the Philippine Tourism Department (DOT) and Singapore Airlines 
(SIA). Furthermore, the opening of SIA’s flight from Manila to New Delhi in August 
200893 and the launching of Philippine Airlines’ (PAL) flight service between Manila 
and New Delhi on 27 March 201194 were expected to contribute to the coming of more 
Indian tourists in the country. 
 
When it comes to deep cultural and linguistic ties, the Philippines and India renewed 
their 1969 Cultural Exchange Agreement (CEA) in the form of Executive Programme 
of Cultural Exchanges in 1997. Despite the absence of formal CEA, cultural and 
educational exchanges from either side had taken place regularly95 under the 
sponsorship of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). Aside from that, the 
offering of the ITEC scholarships did not only provide life-sustaining skills to the 
Filipinos but also a taste of multiculturalism and pluralistic secular ethos of India. 
Over the years, the ITEC became a powerful instrument of projecting India’s soft 
power and its cultural diplomacy as most of the students retained a lifelong association 
with India long after their brief stay in the country.96  
 
The film industry players of both countries also tried to initiate a joint venture in film 
productions.97 It received a boost in 2007 by the Philippine president’s invitation to 
Indian film producers to consider some scenic sites of the archipelago as possible 
                                                
93 RPIndia.info. 
94 “India Relaxes Visa Rules as PAL Flies to Delhi March 27.” Philippine Airlines. 18 January 
2011. 24 February 2011. <www.philippineairlines.com>. 
95 http://www.embindia.org.ph. August 2006. 
96 Mitter. Philippine Star. J-1. 
97 Philippine superstar Nora Aunor and Indian Actor Sajid Khan, star of the 1957 movie 
‘Mother India’, starred in the 1971 movie entitled ‘The Singing Filipina’. “Nora Reconnects 
with 70s Screen Partner Sajid Khan.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 8 April 2010. 24 June 2010. 
<http://www.showbizandstyle.inquirer.net>. 
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shooting locations for Bollywood film productions. In return, one of the Philippine 
local movie outfits produced in 2010 a romance action film ‘Tum: My Pledge of Love’ 
in English that was shot entirely in India with supporting Bollywood casts. 
 
Also, the selection of a number of Indian artists and intellectuals as Ramon Magsaysay 
Awardees in different fields, although not directly a product of the established 
diplomatic relations, contributed in a way in strengthening the existing ties. 
 
In spite of the lopsided economic relations between the two countries, it is also worthy 
to mention that the Philippines through the joint initiatives of various government 
agencies and business sectors strived in increasing further the archipelago’s export to 
India. At the same time, the Philippine government also encouraged its businessmen to 
invest in India. These Filipino companies began to pour in their FDI in India since 
1991. It is quite interesting to note that their investments in the mid 1990s have landed 
the Philippines among the top 30 largest foreign direct investors in India98 (see 
Chapter 6). Some of the pioneers were J.V. Merida Ecological Industries that made a 
joint venture in waste processing in 2001 in Bangalore, the Ayala Group which teamed 
up with the Larsen and Toubro Limited (L&T) for consultancy in the construction of 
Howrah Road Bridge, and the Philippine Wireless, Inc. that made a joint venture with 
Usha India Ltd in 2000 as paging services providers.99 Moreover, SPI Technologies, 
Inc. (SPi), a provider of IT-enabled business process outsourcing solutions, expanded 
the book services capabilities in India through the acquisition of Kolam Information 
                                                
98 “Cumulative FDI inflows to India, August 1991 to May 2007.” Department of Industrial 
Policy and Promotion. May 2007. 8 May 2008. 
<http://www.dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/India_FDI_May_2007.pdf>. 
99 “Brief on India-Philippine Economic and Commercial Relations.” Embassy of India in the 
Philippines. n.d. 6 January 2010.  <http://www.emindia.org.ph/commercialbrief.pdf>. 
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Services in 2003.100 In the same manner, Thapar Institute of Technology (TIT) and 
Asian Institute of Management (AIM) signed an agreement in 2001 to collaborate in 
the promotion of management education in Pune, India. 
 
In 2005, Chikka Asia Philippines, the country’s leader in wireless application service 
opened its popular internet based gateway to send free text messages to virtually all 
cellular phone subscribers in India.101 Simultaneously, the Ayala Group subsidiary, the 
Manila Water Co. Inc. operated a US $20 million water and wastewater facility in the 
province of Tirupur in cooperation with Mahindra Group and the British firm, United 
Utilities Plc.102 
 
Lastly, it is also interesting to point out that a stream of Filipino technical personnel 
has started taking up jobs in areas such as information technology and textile 
engineering since 2005 aside from the few Filipino clergies and diplomats in India. 
About 402 or more Filipinos have already found jobs in India and is expected to 
increase in number as the Indian economy expands and diversifies. 
 
5.5. Conclusion    
The disintegration of former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s 
brought cumulative effects to the world and to India. In particular, the Indian 
                                                
100 Mr. Michael L. Sarandona. E-mail Interview. 11 February 2010. Marketing Head of SPi 
Technology Inc. SPi was established in 1980 as Saztech Incorporated. It has 3 knowledge 
based processing offices in India. 
101 Chikka created the world’s first instant messenger for online chat to integrate mobile 
features via short message service (SMS). In 2000, Chikka’s Text MessengerTM was tested in 
the Philippines for launch by its very first mobile operator partner, Smart Communications. 
Currently subscribers can send text through Chikka via internet to US, the Philippines, Guam, 
India, Hongkong (Smart 1528 only), UK, Spain, Indonesia (XLcom only), Saipan and Italy. 
“Chikka Corporate.”  Chikka.com. 2007-2008. 12 June 2010. <http://www.chikka.com>. 
102 “Filipinos in India.” RP India.info. n.d. 20 September 2008.  
<http://www.rpindia.info/expats.php>. 
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government introduced reform in its economy with simultaneous reorientation of 
foreign policy to its extended neighbourhood including Southeast Asia. The region, 
which for some years did not register much in New Delhi’s foreign office, lately 
gained much attention after some of the countries achieved rapid economic growth. To 
supplement its economic opening to the world, India needs foreign capitals that 
Southeast Asia at that time could provide.  
 
In order to maximise the region’s economic advantages in a short period of time, India 
launched the LEP as a tool to take advantage the economic growth of the region while 
assuaging at the same time some negative reactions on its naval and political 
manoeuvring in the 1980s. Through the years, the LEP became an effective instrument 
in reaching out to the region. It also evolved into a multi-pronged mechanism to 
highlight the substantial cooperation between India and countries of Southeast Asia 
amidst the influence of other powers in the region such as China. India to some extent 
reached out to those countries such as the Philippines that were formerly alienated by 
India’s global aspiration and ideological stance.  
 
In the process, the mechanism was able to bridge the gaps that were previously 
affected by such differences and in effect enliven the economic partnerships between 
India and the Philippines. It is also worthy to highlight that all these initiatives and 
collaborations between the government and private sectors since 1992 were clear 
evidences of active interaction of regionalism and regionalisation between India and 
Southeast Asia particularly the Philippines. What follows is a chapter that highlights 
the continuing economic partnership as nucleus of the renewed interest between India 
and the Philippines.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS: CORE OF REVITALISED INDIAN 
RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the expansion of India’s ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) in Southeast Asia, the most 
tangible manifestation is economic cooperation. The same is true in the Philippines 
wherein economic collaborations emerged as nucleus of its bilateral relations with 
India. This chapter examines the existing economic ties between these countries in 
terms of merchandise trade, investment and tourism flows as well as trade in services.1 
There is also a conscientious effort in documenting the manpower flows in this section 
but the absence of enough data limits the discussion. Moreover, essays on a particular 
facet of trade in services such as Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry 
particularly the contact centres as well as on merchandise trade specifically the 
distribution as well as supply of Indian pharmaceutical products in the Philippines are 
separately undertaken in the next two chapters. The said industries are recently 
considered as the most active and promising joint ventures between India and the 
Philippines.  
 
Chapter 6 is organised as follows. The first section provides an overview of the 
economies of India and the Philippines. The second part highlights the total bilateral 
                                                
1 These criteria are borrowed from the variables identified by Drs. Rahul Sen, Mukul Asher 
and Ramkishen Rajan in writing their article entitled “ASEAN-India Economic Relations: 
Current Status and Future Prospects.” The article is part of the edited book by V. Ramani and 
Aparna Bellur’s “India’s Global Trade Relations” and published by ICFAI University Press in 
New Delhi last 2005. 112-146. 
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interactions particularly on trade directions between the two countries from 1990 to 
2010. The third section traces the volume of Indian foreign direct investments (FDIs) 
particularly on BPO sector and pharmaceutical imports in the Philippines. The fourth 
section documents the increase of Indian tourists in the archipelago from 1991 to 
2010. The fifth one, on the other hand, discusses the presence of Indian professionals 
and workers in the Philippines while the last section wraps up this chapter.  
 
6.2. Merchandise Trade Relations 
The bilateral trade between India and the Philippines did not start only in the 1990s. It 
began when both countries opened officially their diplomatic missions in New Delhi 
and Manila respectively in 1949 and continued in trickles despite the Cold War 
differences. Based on the earliest available data, as shown earlier in Table 4.1, the total 
trade of India and the Philippines in 1964 was US $2.3 million. It is interesting to 
point out that the lowest annual bilateral trade figure in the history of India-Philippine 
economic interactions happened in 1966 with US $818,443.2  In 1991, the 
merchandise trade improved considerably a hundred times although still less than US 
$100 million. In fact in 1992 and 1993, the trade registered a bit lower than the 1991 
figure of about US $64 million. The trade performance recovered only in 1994 
onwards when figures soared more than US $100 million. In 2010, the total bilateral 
trade showed a remarkable performance for the last 18 years since the implementation 
of India’s LEP by finally exceeding the US $1 billion mark (see Table 6.1).3 
                                                
2 National Statistics Office (NSO). Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines, 1965-1990. 
Manila: NSO. 1966-1991. 
3 The total bilateral trade of India and the Philippines in 2009-2010 is miniscule compared to 
other ASEAN neighbours such Singapore with US $14.04 billion, Malaysia with US $8.01, 
Indonesia with US $11.72, Thailand with US $4.67, Vietnam with US $2.36 and Myanmar 
with US $1.49 billion. Countries that are below a billion mark are Brunei with US $453 
million, Laos with US $36.98 million, and Cambodia with US $50.60 million. “Export-Import 
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Table 6.1. India’s Total Bilateral Trade with the Philippines, 
1991-2010 in US $ million 
 
Year Import Export Total Trade 
1991-1992* 31.5 64.7 96.2 
1992-1993* 9.8 54.7 64.5 
1993-1994* 5.9 58.2 64.1 
1994-1995* 11.8 99.5 111.3 
1995-1996* 21.5 144.5 166.0 
1996-1997* 16.5 183.8 200.3 
1997-1998 23.06 238.72 261.78 
1998-1999 37.25 118.74 155.99 
1999-2000 56.24 143.53 199.78 
2000-2001 63.04 202.61 265.65 
2001-2002 94.84 247.79 342.63 
2002-2003 123.77 472.00 595.77 
2003-2004 122.11 321.53 443.64 
2004-2005 187.39 412.23 599.62 
2005-2006 235.49 494.66 730.16 
2006-2007 166.79 580.98 747.77 
2007-2008 204.54 620.32 824.86 
2008-2009 254.77 743.77 998.54 
2009-2010 313.07 748.77 1,061.84 
Source:  
*Data from 1991 to 1996 are taken from Rahul Sen, Mukul Asher and 
Ramkishen Rajan. ‘ASEAN-India Economic Relations: Current Status 
and Future Prospects.’ India’s Global Trade Relations. Eds. V.V. 
Ramani and Aparna Bellur. Hyderabad: IFCFAI University Press, 2005. 
120 and 122.  
 
Trade figures from 1997 to 2010 are generated from the EXIM Data 
Bank of Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Government of India. 24 February 2010. 
 
 
A closer examination of an available trade data by major product grouping as of 2008 
shows that the items commonly involved in the transactions between India and the 
Philippines are consumer manufactures, food and food preparations, resource-based 
                                                
Data Bank.” Department of Commerce, Government of India. n.d. 10 March 2011. 
<http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecntq.asp>.  
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products, industrial manufactures and special transactions. Most likely, these are still 
the products being included in 2010 trading of India and the Philippines.4 
 
Commodities usually included under consumer manufactures were garments, 
household wares, holiday decorations, toys and dolls, fashion accessories, furniture, 
builder’s woodworks, wood products, footwear, giftware and others. Food and food 
preparations, on one hand, consisted of processed foods, fresh foods and marine 
products. On the other hand, the resource-based products comprised those goods made 
from coconut, mineral, marble, petroleum and forest as well as tobacco, seaweeds, 
carrageenan5, cutflowers, ornamental plants, textile yarns, twine and cords, non-
metallic mineral, and other resource-based commodities while industrial manufactures 
covered electronics, machineries, transport equipment, metal manufactures, 
construction materials, chemicals and other industrial manufactures.6 
 
In terms of consumer manufactures, garments included in the transactions were 
men/boy’s and women/girl’s wears; apparels; household wares such as shellcrafts, 
ceramics, stoneware, articles of textile materials, metal works; glass articles such as 
decorative/hand blown glass, and glassware; and other household wares such as rugs 
and carpets, lamp bases and shades and others; holiday decorations; toys and dolls; 
                                                
4 As of April 2011, the data for major export-import grouping for 2009 and 2010 are not yet 
available. According to the National Statistics Office of the Philippines, the annual reports for 
these years are still in process for publication. 
5 Carrageenan is a gelatinous extract from red seaweeds used as food additives to make 
dessert, ice cream, milk shakes, sweetened condensed milk, beer, toothpaste, fire fighting 
foam, shampoo, air freshener gels, marbling, shoe polish, water-based paints, pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology uses and even personal lubricants. Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations. Training Manual on Gracilaria Culture and Seaweed processing in China. 
Series No. 6. 1990. 1990. 4 November 2009. 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/field/003/AB730E/AB730E03.htm>.  
6 Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines. 2 vols. Manila: National Statistics Office, 
Republic of the Philippines, 1990-2008. Also, “Summary of Philippine Merchandise Exports-
India.” Tradeline Philippines. 2006. 19 February 2008. <http://www.tradelinephil.dti.gov.ph>. 
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fashion accessories such as costume and precious jewelleries, hats and other 
headgears, handbags and belts, leather and non-leather gloves, travel goods and other 
fashion accessories; furniture such as furnishings, metal furniture, parts of furniture, 
wood furniture and furniture of other materials; builder’s woodworks; wood products; 
footwear such as non-leather footwear and parts of it; giftware such as desk 
accessories, picture frames and articles made of shell; other consumer manufactures 
such as audio-visual products; printing and publishing materials; paper and other paper 
products; pharmaceutical products; medical supplies; cosmetics and personal care; 
soaps and detergents; household products; cutlery and similar items; sporting goods; 
school and office supplies; timepieces; cameras and lenses; and other consumer 
manufactures.7 
 
With regards to food and food preparations, the following items included in processed 
foods were meat and meat preparations; dairy products and processed bird’s eggs; 
cereal and flour preparations; processed fruits such as dried, glazed, crystallised fruits; 
jams; jellies; marmalades and prepared/preserved fruits; juices; purees and 
concentrates; dried, prepared, preserved and homogenised vegetables; sugar and sugar 
preparations; processed coffee and cocoa; non-alcoholic beverages; nuts and processed 
coconut products; sauces; condiments; spices; animal feeding stuff; confectionary and 
honey; tea and mate; and other miscellaneous edible preparations. On the other hand, 
fresh foods consisted of fresh meat, cereals, fresh vegetables, fresh nuts and coconut 
products while marine products comprised of fresh/chilled/frozen fish and tuna.8 
 
                                                
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
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For resource-based products category, the items included were other base metal ores 
and concentrates; plywood and veneer; tobacco manufactures and unmanufactured as 
well as cigars and cigarettes; seaweeds; carrageenan; marble products; cutflowers and 
ornamental plants; textile yarns, twine and cordages; non-metallic mineral; petroleum 
products; and other resource-based commodities such as natural oils, fats and waxes, 
natural rubber, leather hides and skins, fertilisers and others.9 
 
When it comes to industrial manufactures, electronic items were in demand. 
Components; semi conductor devices; electronic data processing; medical/industrial 
instrumentation; control and instrumentation, communication and radar, 
telecommunications, automotive electronics and consumer electronics were also 
included in this group. On one hand, transport equipment and apparatus and parts; 
metal machinery; equipment and apparatus parts; transport equipment such as motor 
vehicles, automobile parts, motorcycle and parts and others were categorised as 
machineries. Moreover, metal manufactures included products such as iron and steel; 
copper manufactures and other metal manufactures.  
 
For construction materials, these comprised metal-based construction materials; 
sanitary wares and bathroom fixtures; clay and ceramic materials; cement and related 
products and others. Products classified under chemicals, on the other hand, were 
organic and inorganic chemicals; fertilisers manufactured other than those of subgroup 
272; oleo-chemicals; dyeing; tanning; and colouring materials; other chemicals as well 
as petrochemicals such as primary (upstream) products; intermediate and fabricated 
ones; as well as plastic products both in primary and non-primary forms. Likewise, 
                                                
9 Ibid.  
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other industrial manufactures included glass, metal, paper, plastic and fibre/textile-
based packaging products.10 
 
 
Table 6.2. Philippine Exports to India by Major Product 
Grouping, 1997-2008 
FOB Value in US Dollars (Amount in Million) 
 
Year CM FFP RBD IM ST TOTAL 
1997 2.3 1.1 14.8 13.0 2.5 33.8 
1998 1.9 0.9 3.1 28.6 2.9 37.5 
1999 2.9 0.3 6.9 28.5 2.7 41.5 
2000 6.2 1.1 4.4 50.8 1.5 64.0 
2001 15.6 1.1 5.1 48.1 1.2 71.1 
2002 16.5 1.1 4.1 65.8 1.8 89.3 
2003 12.9 2.9 8.1 76.0 2.0 101.9 
2004 17.4 2.4 9.9 54.5 5.1 89.3 
2005 28.5 1.2 6.6 47.6 2.3 86.2 
2006 24.7 0.7 9.9 82.4 2.3 120.0 
2007 17.4 1.5 24.5 93.7 108.6 245.7 
2008 33.5 14.9 33.3 80.3 31.6 193.6 
 
Source: Generated from the data available in the National Statistics Office, 
Philippines and Bureau of Export Trade Promotion, Department of Trade 
and Industry, Philippines. January 10, 2010. 
 
• CM stands for consumer manufactures ranging from garments, 
house wares, holiday decorations, toys and dolls, fashion 
accessories, furniture, builders’ woodworks, wood products, 
footwear, giftware and other consumer manufactures 
• FFP refers to food and food preparations which include processed 
and fresh foods as well as marine products 
• RBD means resource-based products such as products from 
coconut, mineral, forest, marble and petroleum as well as tobacco, 
seaweeds, carrageenan, cutflower/ornamental plants, textile yarns, 
twine and cordages, non-metallic mineral and other resource-based 
commodities. 
• IM stands for Industrial manufactures like electronics, 
machineries/transport equipment/apparatus, metal manufactures, 
construction materials, chemicals and others. 




                                                
10 Ibid.  
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As shown in Table 6.2, the Philippine total exports to India from 1997 to 2008 
progressively increased through these years but remained tilting in favour of India. It 
is also observable that the export figure increased from US $33.7 million in 1997 to 
more than US $100 million in 2003. Surprisingly, the total export plunged by almost 
US $11 million in 2004 and US $15 million in 2005. The Philippine exports recovered 
only in 2006 onwards. Nevertheless, the 2010 Philippine total exports to India 
escalated by almost four times higher than its 1997 total exports.   
 
From the major product groupings, the resource based as well as industrial 
manufactures gained prominence among major exports of the Philippines to India such 
as textile and electronics. These products registered more than US $10 million 
respectively in 1997. Resource based products, however, were observably 
retrogressing its supply year after year as it registered few thousand US dollars below 
compared from its total exports in 1985. Exportation of industrial manufactures, on the 
other hand, showed a great leap in 2006 by about six times from its 1997 output and 
almost twice to the 2005 figure. This development was partly contributed by the 
increase of steel production after Mittal’s Global Steel, now known as Arcelor Mittal, 
acquired the National Steel Company based in Iligan City in southern Philippines in 
2004. With the recent demand for construction and other technological projects, 
production will surely increase in the coming years. Moreover, there was also a shift 
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Table 6.3. Indian Exports to the Philippines by Major Product 
Grouping, 1997-2008 
FOB Value in US Dollars (Amount in Million) 
 
Year CM FFP RBD IM ST TOTAL 
1997 8.1 110.7 39.8 69.3 .77 228.67 
1998 6.9 76.5 12.4 45.8 .29 140.99 
1999 9.4 52.6 21.9 51.2 .32 135.6 
2000 14.2 53.4 27.7 67.5 3.4 166.5 
2001 17.1 100.8 26.6 102.6 .86 248.2 
2002 27.0 287.1 29.6 84.0 .73 428.5 
2003 26.5 114.7 23.4 139.0 .51 304.3 
2004 21.9 105.2 33.7 121.7 .25 282.9 
2005 27.8 117.9 32.1 166.1 .29 344.3 
2006 35.7 104.3 51.1 207.4 .75 399.6 
2007 32.2 159.9 64.2 135.8 6.6 398.7 
2008 32.8 213.4 125.4 242.8 3.4 617.8 
 
Source: Generated from the data available in the National Statistics Office, 
Philippines and Bureau of Export Trade Promotion, Department of Trade and 
Industry, Philippines. 10 January 2010. 
 
• CM stands for consumer manufactures ranging from garments, house 
wares, holiday decorations, toys and dolls, fashion accessories, 
furniture, builders’ woodworks, wood products, footwear, giftware and 
other consumer manufactures 
• FFP refers to food and food preparations which include processed and 
fresh foods as well as marine products 
• RBD means resource-based products such as products from coconut, 
mineral, forest, marble and petroleum as well as tobacco, seaweeds, 
carrageenan, cutflower/ornamental plants, textile yarns, twine and 
cordages, non-metallic mineral and other resource-based commodities. 
• IM stands for Industrial manufactures like electronics, 
machineries/transport equipment/apparatus, metal manufactures, 
construction materials, chemicals and others. 
• ST simply means special transactions. 
 
 
When it comes to India’s exports to the Philippines, as can be seen in Table 6.3, the 
growth from 1997 to 2008 was observably erratic year after year. In 2008, for instance, 
the big bulk of imports from India came from industrial manufactures particularly 
metal products in the amount of about US $242.8 million. The demand of carrageenan-
based products was also increasing but the highest figure was registered in 1999 worth 
US $492,054. Indian food and food preparations were the second highest Indian 
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exports to the Philippines. It is also interesting to note that India’s special transactions 
with the Philippines made considerable improvement in 2007 in the amount of US 
$6.6 million. A significant progress from those transactions made from 1997 to 2008 
that did not exceed more than US $1 million annually except in 2000 and 2008 when 
the value reached US $3.4 million. Nevertheless, the recent decade witnessed the 
considerable improvement in terms of trade between India and the Philippines. The 
substantial entry of India’s investments, especially from 2009 to 2010, further 
complemented this development. 
 
6.3. Investment Relations 
The first wave of Indian FDI abroad in 1970s laid in its South-South11 impact. In 
Southeast Asia, Indian investments increasingly went to countries known to house 
expatriate Indian communities such as Malaysia, Thailand and to some extent 
Indonesia. Indian joint ventures abroad have been concentrated in manufacturing 
activities especially in light engineering, textiles with other traditional industries in 
which India has been known for possessing domestic capabilities.12 In the Philippines, 
the clearly successful Indian joint ventures were concentrated in textile productions. 
The Aditya Birla group of companies established in 1975 the Indo-Phil Textiles13 and 
                                                
11 South-South cooperation is loosely defined as an exchange of expertise between 
governments, organisations and individuals in developing nations. Developing countries help 
and support each other with knowledge, technical assistance, and/or investments. The strong 
driver behind the South-South momentum is the increasing role and leadership of middle-
income countries in the international system. “The South-South Opportunity.” South-
South.info. 2010. 10 June 2010. <http://www.southsouth.info>. 
12 Jorgen Dige Pedersen. “The Second Wave of Indian Investments Abroad.” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia. 38.4. (November 2008): 621. 
13 Indo-Phil Textiles is the first India-Filipino joint venture textile plant in the Philippines set 
up by late Aditya Vikram Birla in 1975. It commenced its operations with over 15,500 
spindles for knitting yarns. In February 1988, a new parallel unit based on state-of-the-art-
technology was flagged off. Two year after, lndoPhil Acrylic Manufacturing Corporation was 
set up with 3856 worsted spindles epitomising world class technology. In April 1993, lndoPhil 
Cotton Mills was established with 11,520 spindles. Recently, lndoPhil has a capacity of more 
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the Kewalram Chanrai Group set up the Kewalram Philippines, Inc.14 in 1989. Such 
move was primarily intended to defend and even expand the market for their export 
products.15  Moreover, the presence of Indian immigrants in the host countries, 
regardless of size, also played a contributory role in the existence of Indian companies 
in the region. Indian communities in the Philippines served as efficient 
‘entrepreneurial moles’ of potential investments in the country as well as effective 
facilitators to Indian businessmen who are ready to invest in the Philippines. In India, 
they also served as effective liaison for the Philippines. They are efficient mediators 
to both Filipino and Indian businessmen who are on their initial stage of cooperation 
as well as best facilitator for both groups to penetrate those exclusive and/or elusive 
economic circles.16 
 
After 1983, however, the flow of FDI around the world stagnated for 10 long years 
and had its recovery only in the early 1990s. In fact in 1994, the Indian companies 
received government approvals to invest in 100 different countries and as of 2004, 
India was running businesses in 90 different countries all over the world.17 These 
recent investment are still concentrated in the manufacturing sector, although, non-
financial services made up an increasing share.18 This is particularly true in the case of 
                                                
than 90,884 spindles producing yarns of the highest quality. “History of Indo-Phil.” Indo-Phil 
Textiles. n.d. 30 March 2010. <http://www.indophil.com.ph/aboutus.htm>.  
14 Kewalram Philippines Inc. was established in 1989 in Calamba, Laguna Philippines. The 
company offers polyester semi-dull and optical bright yarns. The company is the single largest 
exporter of yarns to USA and Great Britain. 
15 Pedersen. 626. Essar director Anshuman Ruia said that the acquisition venture in the 
Philippines has provided his company with knowledge on the Philippine economic and 
business landscape which he likened to India's development. Anna Valmero. “Aegis 
PeopleSupport eyes $1B sales growth.”  Philippine Daily Inquirer. 1 April 2009. 10 March 
2010. <http://services.inquirer.net/print/print.php?article_id=20090401-197414>.  
16 Joefe Santarita. “Beyond ‘Bombay’: Indians in the Philippines.” Indian Forum. University 
of the Philippines. 23 September 2009.  
17 Padersen. 625. 
18 Ibid. 621. 
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the Philippines as it is currently experiencing an increase of FDI in BPO specifically 
on contact centre sector. Indian owned/based BPO companies trickled to the 
archipelago in early 2000 and their numbers suddenly increased within few years. 
From just one in 2004, Indian BPO companies swelled to 24 in the first quarter of 
2011 and are still increasing in the next few months. Other BPO companies in India 
are also planning to open offices and delivery sites in the Philippines in the years to 
come as an addition to approximately 600 BPO companies currently operating in the 
country (see Chapter 7).19   
 
Indian pharmaceutical companies also ventured in the Philippines by setting up their 
respective representative offices and facilities in the country in partnership with 
Filipino enterprises. Making these subsidiaries and conglomerates as springboards for 
entry into several regulated and less regulated international markets20 such as the 
Philippines appeared as effective strategy. Among the Indian companies are Glenmark 
Phamaceuticals, Ltd. that made its presence in the country through its subsidiary 
Glenmark Philippines Incorporated (2003) and collaborated with the largest Philippine 
drug distributor, Metro Drug21, Torrent Pharmaceutical Limited established the 
Torrent Pharma Philippines, Inc. (2004)22, Reliance Life Sciences of India allied with 
Ambica Philippines to set up the Ambica Biotechnologies (2005)23, Ranbaxy (2007)24, 
                                                
19 There were attempts to access the data and interview key players in the industry but the 
responses were minimal citing confidentiality. Ran out of options, the data presented is 
generated from the business bulletins, industries’ white papers and newspaper reports both in 
India and the Philippines as well as from the websites of these companies. 
20 “Corporate Profile.” Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited.com. n.d. 20 March 2010. 
<http://www.torrentpharma.com/corporate%20profile.php>.  
21 “Asia Market-Philippines.” Glenmark Pharma.com. n.d.  April 2006. 1 January 2008. 
<http://www.glenmarkpharma.com/business/asia/philip.html>. 
22 “33rd Annual Report 2005-2006.” Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited.com. 7. n.d. 8 
September 2009. <http://www.torrentpharma.com/milestones.php>. 
23 “Ambica Philippines.” Ambica International Trading Corporation.com. n.d. 22 February 
2010. <http://www.ambicaphilippines.com>.  
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Dr. Reddy Laboratories Limited partnered with Britton Marketing Corporation (BMC) 
(2007)25, Emcure Pharmaceuticals Limited with the Philippines’ Macropharma 
Corporation (2007)26, Panacea Biotec with M/S Family Vaccines (2007)27, and Lupin 
Limited acquired majority stake of Multicare Pharmaceuticals Philippines, Inc. (MPPI) 
(2009).28 Moreover, Sandhu Pharmaceuticals Limited is also recognised as a 
distributor of medicines for better child health, gynaecological and chronic ailments in 
the Philippines.29 Their presence along with the implementation of parallel 
importation30 of drugs from India as an offshoot of the private sectors as well as of the 
Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) and India’s State Trading 
Corporation’s (STC) collaborations challenged the decades long monopoly of Western 
countries multinational drug companies (see Chapter 8).31   
 
In sum, Indian FDI in the Philippines is relatively low when compared to other foreign 
investors in the country. In 2009, FDI in the Philippines was valued at US $1.5 billion, 
with the bulk of investments coming from the US, Japan, Hong Kong, and the 
                                                
24 It started business in the Philippines in 1998, through a tie up with a local marketing and 
distribution company. Almost a decade after, it established its own subsidiary in the 
Philippines. “Philippines.” Ranbaxy.com. n.d. 28 March 2010. 
<http://www.ranbaxy.com/operations/operationcountry.aspx?Cid=221&Rname=Asia+Pacific
&flag=&Rid=61>.  
25 “Dr. Reddy’s commences operations in Philippines.” Times of India. 28 September 2007. 18 
October 2009. <http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.  
26 “Emcure Signs Agreement for Supply of Products to Philippines.” Emcure.co. October 
2007. 28 January 2008. <http://www.emcure.co.in/philippines.html>.  
27 “Corporate View.” Panacea Biotec.  4 October 2007. 28 November 2007. 
<http://www.panacea-biotec.com>. 
28 “History and Milestones.” Lupin World.com. n.d. 28 March 2010.  
<http://www.lupinworld.com/history.htm>.  
29 “Activities of HLN in the Philippines.” HL Naturmal.com. n.d. 22 February 2010. 
<http://www.hlnphil.com>. 
30 Parallel importation refers to the buying of branded, off-patent (patents held by the drug 
companies had already expired) medicines from other countries such as India. Solita Monsod. 
“Pharmaceutical Power.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 11 August 2007. 28 January 2008. 
<http://www.opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view_article.php?article_id=81846
>.  
31 Joefe Santarita. “Health is Wealth: India Pharmaceutical Trades in the Philippines, 1997-
2007.” International Convention of Asia Scholars. Daejeon, South Korea. August 2009.  
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Netherlands.  The recipient industries involved are from sectors of manufacturing, real 
estate, construction, services (business process outsourcing), financial intermediation, 
mining, trade/commerce, and transportation/ storage/communications.32 The outflows 
of FDI in the Philippines as one of the recipient countries are primarily credited to the 
interest of more firms in expanding their markets, acquiring brand names and 
technology as well as accessing the natural resources. These companies are also 
attracted to the favourable business climate of the Philippines such as the rise of 
foreign exchange reserves, improvement of outward FDI policy environment, the 
increasing support from home governments, existence of weak dollars as well as the 
rising intra-regional investment due to strengthened regional integration.33 The last 
factor succinctly substantiates an argument that India’s LEP as a regional tool really 
played a significant role in the entry of these investments in the Philippines.  
 
Based on the study conducted by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the 
Philippines) in 2006, as shown in Table 6.4, the companies with Indian equity had 
relatively a low investment of about US $800,000 and that they primarily were 
concentrated on BPO related businesses.  This translated to about 0.2 percent of the 




                                                
32 “Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment Continue in November; January-November FDI 
Net Inflows at US$1.4B.” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 10 February 2010. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.bsp.gov.ph/printpage.asp?ref=http://www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media.asp?id=
2262>.  
33 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment 
Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge. Switzerland: 
UNCTAD, 2008. n.p. 
34 “Survey of IT and IT-Enabled Service.” Department of Economic Statistics, Bangko Sentral 
ng Pilipinas. October 2008. 5 
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Table 6.4. Foreign Equity in Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) 
in the Philippines by Country of Investor, 2006 
 
Investor Amount (US $ Million) % Distribution 
USA 268.9 71.5 
Japan 80.9 21.5 
Europe 21.5 5.7 
Asia 2.5 5.7 
Australia 1.4 0.4 
India 0.8 0.2 
Total 376.0 100.0 
 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Survey of IT and IT-Enabled Services. 
October 2008. 5. 
 
 
In 2010, the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) released the data of 
Indian FDI in the amount of approximately US $42.58 million. A significant 
improvement of 67.6 percent from the 2009 FDI value of US $13.76 million and about 
54 times higher than the figure accounted in 2006 (see Figure 6.1).  
 
 
Figure 6. 1. Indian Foreign Direct Investments in the Philippines, 1999-2010 
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The biggest bulk went to finance as well as real estate and followed by private services 




Table 6.5. India’s Total Approved Investments in the Philippines 
by Industry 
First Quarter 2009 to Fourth Quarter 2009 











Agriculture 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 
Finance and Real Estate 0 117.4 164.3 121.1 402.8 
Manufacturing 4.0 0.2 0 0 4.2 
Private Services 0 197.9 14.5 0 212.4 
Trade 0 0 6.0 8.0 14.0 
Total 4.0 315.5 184.9 129.7 634.1 
 
Source:  Consolidated by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) 
for the Quarterly Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) Report published by the 
NSCB in cooperation with the Inter Agency Committee on FDI Statistics 
(IACFDIS). Courtesy of Miss Regina Reyes, National Statistical Coordination 
Board. 30 March 2010. 
 
1 US$ = P 46.08 as of December 2009, Indian FDI is about US $13.76 million 
 
 
As of 2010, the companies with Indian equity that were registered in the Philippine 
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) are Aditya Birla Minacs Philippines Inc.; 
Allsectech Manila, Inc.; B V & R Commodities Corp.; Competitive Global 
Manufacturing Philippine Islands; L.L.C. - Phil. Branch Office; First Source Solutions 
Limited; Hinduja Global Solutions Limited; IGT-Interglobe Technologies Philippines, 
Inc.; Infosys BPO Limited - Philippine Branch; Intelenet Global Philippines, Inc.; 
Market-Research International Resources Corp.; Midtown Mfg. Philippines, Inc.; 
Motif Limited - Philippine Branch; MTE Precision Toolings, Inc.; Saihati Group 
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International Corp.; and Sutherland Global Services Philippines, Inc.35 By February 
2011, PEZA added to its list six more companies such as BlastAsia, Inc.; Creative 
Crest, Inc.; iTouchpoint Softech Private Limited; Magente BPO Co. Ltd; Olsworld, 
Inc.; and vCustomer Philippines, Inc.36  
 
 
Table 6.6. Annual Distribution of Philippine Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) in India, 1991-2010 
 





















Source: FDI data from 1991 to 2006 is courtesy of S.L. Dave, 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP). India. 
February 2009. 
FDI data from 2007 to 2010 is generated from the monthly 




                                                




36 Ibid. 28 February 2011. 28 April 2011.  
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On the other hand, the Philippine FDI in India was quite dismal since 1949. With 
reference to Table 6.6, the most striking are the figures from 1992 to 1996. From 1992 
to 1994, for instance, the Philippine FDI registered more than a million US dollars and 
in 1995 soared almost 20 times. The highest investment by Filipino entrepreneurs in 
India was registered in 1996 with about US $82 million. By 1997, however, the 
investments dropped to about a million US dollars and failed to recover until 2004. 
The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) is said to have contributed to this unfavourable 
situation. On one hand, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion of India 
(DIPP) disclosed the resurgence of Philippine FDI of about US $5 million in 2004 and 
US $3 million in 2005. The figures, however, continued to plummet in less than a 
million US dollars from 2006 to 2010.    
 
A close look at the Philippine FDI in India from 1991 to 2009 shows that the big bulk 
goes to miscellaneous industries such as sewage management investment. As shown in 
Table 6.7, the miscellaneous group constituted about 61.4 percent of the US $123.36 
million investments in India. It was followed by telecommunications and service 
sectors of 18.39 percent and 15.55 percent respectively. The rest were chemicals, 
textiles, food processing industries, electrical equipment, glue and gelatine, 
consultancy services and trading. 
 
The cumulative entry of Indian FDI in the country has directly encouraged or 
otherwise the mobility of people from India to the Philippines. Despite the absence of 
direct flight service from New Delhi or elsewhere from India to Manila and vice versa 
before 2011, Indians were getting curious about the Philippines and they came either 
for leisure purposes or scouting primarily for possible business opportunities in the 




Table 6.7. Sectoral Distribution of Philippine Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) in India, 1991-2009 
 














1 Miscellaneous Industries 6 2,599.53 75.52 61.43 
2 Telecommunications 5 778.20 24.45 18.39 
3 Service Sector 8 658.03 17.06 15.55 
4 Chemicals (other than 
Fertilisers) 
3 80.89 2.62 1.91 
5 Textiles (Include dyed 
printed) 
2 63.53 2.07 1.50 
6 Food Processing 
Industries 
2 44.92 1.44 1.06 
7 Electrical Equipment 
(Including S/w & Elec) 
1 4.00 0.13 0.09 
8 Glue and Gelatine 1 2.25 0.05 0.05 
9 Consultancy services 1 0.34 0.01 0.01 
10 Trading 1 0.05 0 0 
 TOTAL 1 4,231.74 123.36 100 
 
Source: FDI data from 1991 to 2009 is courtesy of S.L. Dave, Department of 
Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP). India. February 2009. 
 
 
6.4. Tourism Flows 
The advent of Indian tourists in the Philippines is increasing year after year. In Table 
6.8, there were more than 7,000 Indians who came to the country in 1991. Few 
hundreds were added in 1992 and a thousand in 1993. By 1994, the figure of Indian 
tourists exceeded 10,000 individuals and increased to 34,581 in 2010. This only shows 
that Indian tourists are potential revenue source of the Philippines in its fledging 
tourism industry.  
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Table 6.8. Indian Tourists in the Philippines 1991-2010 
 





















Source: Annual Reports, 1991-2010. Department of Tourism, Republic 
of the Philippines. 2009 and 2010 statistics are also available online at 
Tourism’ website <http://www.dot.gov.ph>.    
 
 
It is interesting to note that there was an increase of Indian tourists in the country 
despite the AFC from 1997 to 1998. Almost 21,000 Indians took advantage of cheaper 
and competitive rates of airfares, hotel and other types of accommodation among 
others that were offered by tourism related institutions in the archipelago. What is 
significant here is that India at this time was not greatly affected by the AFC. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the number of Indian tourists, instead, decreased 
between 2001 and 2003. The figures were within the range of more or less 15,000 
individuals, and the year 2002 was the lowest by having 14,000 Indian tourists only.37 
Luckily, the numbers began to pick up in 2004 onwards until the highest inflows were 
                                                
37 Travel related activities in Asia were affected by avian flu and severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) epidemics. 
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registered in the history of Indian tourism in the Philippines in 2010. 
 
Based on the NSCB report in 2008, tourism receipts to GDP ratio grew from 1.9 
percent in 2003 to 3.4 percent in 2007. Tourism’s average share to the country’s GDP 
in 2000 to 2007 was 6.2 percent, making the sector a key growth driver.38  In 2008, 
Indian tourists to Cebu posted 42 percent growth as the Department of Tourism (DOT) 
pursued aggressive promotions on incentive travel, shopping and leisure holiday.  
 
 
Illustration 6.1. Astral Travels’ Promotion of the Philippines. February 2009. Author. 
 
The support of private sector through familiarisation trips and participation in travel 
fairs created more partnership-sealed deals and greater collaboration in this market. As 
a matter of fact, the DOT of the Philippines had forged partnership with travel 
agencies in India such as Astral Travels Pvt. Ltd. Taking the case of Astral as an 
                                                
38 Joseph Durano. Philippine Tourism: Stable Amidst A Global Tourism Downturn. Manila: 
Department of Tourism. 2009. N.d. 
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example, the mere display of attractive yellow streamer stressing the word 
‘PHILIPPINES’ in front of their Lajpat Nagar office has significantly promoted the 
country aside from an aggressive marketing through brochures and fliers. The place is 
so strategic that anybody passing Adjoining Defence Colony flyover could see the 
word from a distance (see figure 6.2).39 Astral is particularly offering a travel package 
to Cebu City and Bohol in Central Philippines. 
 
This increase of Indian tourists in the country placed India as one of the top markets 
by growth with 13.88 percent despite global recession and the lack of direct flight 
connectivity.40 Such improvement was credited to an aggressive marketing of the DOT 
under the sterling leadership of then Secretary Joseph Ace Durano for the past four 
years. The Philippine tourism department was serious in developing India as the new 
tourism market. Such seriousness was materialised with the establishment of an Indian 
desk headed by Glen Agustin. India, with its fast-growing economy as the fourth 
largest in the world41, having a labour force that has a high purchasing power,42 and 
with a large percentage of middle class, is just the perfect target of this initiative. To 
enhance this marketing strategy, the DOT has worked with national flag carrier 
Philippine Airlines (PAL) to initiate flight service between India and the Philippines.43 
As a result, PAL has commenced 6 flights weekly (three times direct flight and 
                                                
39 Personally visited by the researcher in February 2009. 
40 Durano. 
41 As of 2009, the World Bank ranked India as the 4th largest economy by purchasing power 
parity (PPP) with US $3,808,443 million. World Bank. World Development Indicators 
Database. 14 April 2011. 30 May 2011. 
<http://sitesources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/…/GDP_PPP.pdf>.  
42 Ibid. Joseph Durano is the former secretary of the Philippine Department of Tourism whose 
term started in 2008 and ended in June 2010. “Joseph Durano.” Office of the President. 2010. 
12 June 2010. <http://www.ops.gov.ph/news/dot-durano.htm>.  
43  “India Eyed as New Philippine Tourism Market.” Lakbay Pilipinas.com. 17 March  2009. 
29 March 2010. <http://www.lakbaypilipinas.com/blog/2009/03/17/india-eyed-as-new-
philippine-tourism-market/>.  
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another three via Bangkok) between Manila and New Delhi with an inaugural service 
on 27 March 2011.44 
 
The growth of the tourism sector despite the global economic slump was traced in part 
to massive investments in tourism-related infrastructures in Central Philippines since 
2001. Complementing these was the development of other tourism support 
infrastructures and services including communications, banks, hospitals and health 
facilities. To address the energy requirements of Visayas, five power plants were also 
commissioned. Private sectors also invested to improve the tourism facilities in 
Central Philippines. It increased hotel room capacity in the area by 16 percent from 
8,046 in 2006 to 9,361 in 2007 while resort rooms increased by 41 percent from 2,780 
rooms in 2006 to 3,917 in 2007.45 The figure, though not that impressive, is very 
promising considering the three-year period of strengthening the Philippine tourism 
industry. 
 
Along with these improvements, Indian tourists in the coming years are expected to 
swarm the archipelago, especially with the operation of Resorts World Manila and the 
rise of more megamalls in the metropolis. With such amenities in place, it will attract 
potential professionals to work in the Philippines as well as Indian expatriates to 




                                                
44 Mabuhay Magazine. 33.2. (February 2011): 85.   
45 “Tourism corridor is next in PGMA's "super region" swing.” Office of the President. 21 
February 2010. 10 March 2010. 
<http://www.op.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27553&Itemid=2>.  
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6.5. Manpower Flows 
The discussion on manpower flows of Indians in the Philippines and vice versa has 
been covered on a very limited scale due to the absence of data. In fact, even Sen, 
Asher and Rajan acknowledged the unavailability of data in detailing the extent of 
manpower flows between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN).46  Likewise, even the international agency specializing on labour and 
manpower such as International Labour Organization (ILO) has not produced a full-
blown study that documents the mobility of manpower from India to Southeast Asian 
countries particularly the Philippines or the other way around. Thus, the discussion 
will just maximise the availability of the Bureau of Immigration’s (BI) list of Indian 
immigrants who are granted with pro-investment visa from 2004 to 2010 as point of 
reference. 
 
BI’s statistics show that there are 21,476 Indian migrants in the country from 2004 to 
2010 and 42 percent is considered part of the Philippine workforce. The rest are either 
dependents of these workers or plainly students. This computation is based on BI’s 
registry of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) card. Indians who are either 
holding visa by virtue of Executive Order (EO) 758, Presidential Decree (PD) 419, 
Republic Act (RA) 7919, Section (Sec) 13, Sec 47 (A) 2, Sec 9A, Sec 9G and Special 
Visa for Employment Generation47 (SVEG) such as Cagayan Economic Zone 
                                                
46 Rahul Sen, Mukul Asher and Ramkishen Rajan. ‘ASEAN-India Economic Relations: 
Current Status and Future Prospects.’ India’s Global Trade Relations. Eds. V Ramani and 
Aparna Bellur. New Delhi: ICFAI University Press, 2005. 134. 
47 SVEG is a special visa issued to  a qualified non-immigrant foreigner who shall actually 
employ at least ten (10) Filipinos in a lawful and sustainable enterprise, trade or industry. 
Qualified foreigners who are granted the SVEG shall be considered special non-immigrants 
with multiply entry privileges and conditional extended stay, without need of prior departure 
from the Philippines. 
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Authority (CEZA)48, Special Investor Resident Visa (SIRV)49, SIRV EO 226 and 
Subic Special Working Visa (SSWV)50 are counted as part of manpower.  Based on 
these categories, approximately 9,000 Indians are working in various companies in the 
Philippines (see Table 6.9).  
 
In terms of employment, Indians holding SVEG will generate 1,070 jobs for the 
Filipinos on the assumption that only 107 out of 307 Indians under the special 
category, exclusion of 200 in the category of Sec 47 (A) 2, are required to employ a 
minimum 10 Filipino workers in exchange of this special entitlement. Section 47 (a) 2 
does not demand any employment generating requirements to all foreign businessmen 
including the 200 Indians under the Commonwealth Act No. 613. However, if these 
Indian businessmen will also employ about 10 persons in their businesses, more than 
3,000 jobs are generated in various parts of the country. This, however, is a very 
reserved estimate considering the increasing number of seats offered by Indian BPO 
companies in the country.  
 
 
                                                
48 Under CEZA, any foreign investor who establishes a business enterprise within the Zone 
and who maintains capital investment of not less than US $150,000 shall be granted, along 
with his or her spouse, dependents, and unmarried children below twenty-one (21) years of 
age, a permanent resident status within the Zone. The responsibility and authority to grant 
such permanent resident status is delegated to the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority. 
“Republic Act 7922.” Cagayan Economic Zone Authority. n.d. 10 March 2010. 
<http://www.ceza.gov.ph/pdf%20files/ra%207922%20(almost).pdf>.  
49 SIRV of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 allows any alien who is at least 21 years of 
age, who has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, not afflicted with any 
loathsome, dangerous or contagious disease, not been institutionalized for any mental disorder 
or disability and is willing and able to invest the amount of at least US $75,000.00. 
“Philippines Special Investors Resident Visa.” Philippine Portal.com. 2009. 10 March 2010. 
<http://www.philippine-portal.com/visas/special-investors-resident-visa-sirv.html>.  
50 SSWV is another form of SVEG except that the recommendation and approval for the 
issuance come from the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and that the investment is 
located in Subic area in Zambales. 
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Table 6.9. Registered Indian Nationals in the Philippines,  
2004-2010 
 
RA 7919 4,929 
Sec 13 516 
 
Immigrant 




Sec 9G 3,680   
Non-immigrant Sec 9A 8 
 
3,688 




SIRV EO226 11 
EO 758 (SVEG) 10 
RA 8756 4 

















Grand Total 9,442 
Source: Bureau of Immigration, Republic of the Philippines. 
 
Note: CEZA stands for special visa granted to foreigners doing business in 
Cagayan Economic Zone Authority  
EO 758 (SVEG) is special visa issued to  a qualified non-immigrant foreigner 
who shall actually employ at least ten (10) Filipinos in a lawful and 
sustainable enterprise, trade or industry. 
PD 419 allows Indian non-immigrants to acquire permanent residence 
RA 7919 refers to Indian who is naturalised by virtue of this law. 
SCWV refers to Special Clark Working Visa 
Sec 13 allows for Quota or Preference Immigrant Visa 
Sec 47 (A) 2 warrants the admission of businessmen as special non-immigrant 
under Commonwealth Act No. 613.  
Sec 9G is Pre-arranged Employee 
SIRV refers to Special Investor Resident Visa 
SIRV EO 226 is Special Investor Resident Visa 
SSWV stands for Subic Special Working Visa 
 
 
Aside from business, there are also Indians working as consultants and officials of 
ADB, International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), United Nations Organization, 
World Health Organization (WHO), and International Finance Corporation World 
Bank (IFC-WB). A good number are also employed as managers or heads of 
multinational companies such as Aventis, Citibank, Citi Financial, Citigroup, 
Hongkong Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Cadbury Philippines, Diageo Philippines 
    188 
(J. Walker), Dole Philippines, UPS Philippines, M. Gandhi International School, Satya 
Sai International School, BIOSTADT Philippines, American Orient Company 
Philippines Inc., Compass Philippines, Pillsbury Philippines, Renaissance New World, 
Ambergris Solutions Philippines, Inc. (presently known as Telus International), Genie 
Technology Inc., Hinduja Global Solutions (formerly HTMT), Magnetron Technology 
Philippines Corporation, Oracle Philippines Corporation, Sutherland, Technopaq, Inc., 
Philippine American Life Insurance Company, Indo Phil textile Mills, Johnson and 
Johnson, Muntinlupa Diagnostic Inc., Gulf Oil, Global Sources, Metro Railway 
Transit, Barber Ship Management, Makro, Lloyds, Global Steel (now known as 
ArcelorMittal), Alcatel, Nestle, Proctor and Gamble (P&G), State Bank of India, New 
India Assurance Company, Ltd and others.51 The expatriates, residing in the provinces, 
are few. But notably among them are the families employed at ArcelorMittal which 
are numbered around 100.52 
 
On the other hand, the number of Filipinos in India is relatively small. The total 
population is only about 500 dispersed in the cities of New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, 
Pune and Chandigarh. These consisted of diplomats and their families, heads of 
international organisations based in New Delhi, engineers working in the metro 
railway projects in New Delhi, chefs in five star hotels, engineering designers, workers 
in non-governmental organisations (NGOs), spouses of Indian nationals and even 
domestic helpers of foreign diplomats posted in New Delhi.53  There are also nuns 
connected with Mother Teresa’s Mission of Charities (MC) in Kolkata.54 Filipinos 
                                                
51 Vishnu Hathiramani, ed. “Indian Expats in the Philippines.” Philippines-India Business 
Guidebook 2006. Manila: Popular Publishing House, 2006. 115. 
52 “Indians in the Philippines.” RP India.info. 2007.19 February 2010. 
<http://www.rpindia.info/expats.php>.  
53  Focus Group Discussions. Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi. 18 and 25 January 2009.  
54 Ibid. 
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who are in India are communicating with their fellowmen using the web platform, an 
e-group powered by yahoo ‘Filipinos in India’.55 There are 325 members in this group.  
 
With the increasing interaction between India and the Philippines in recent years, it is 
expected that many Filipinos will venture to work in India especially in health and 
engineering related jobs. The strength of the working relations between India and the 
Philippines always relies on a good people to people contacts hoping that they will 
serve effectively as good conduits of harmonious collaboration and understanding. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
After 18 years of implementing economic reforms in both countries and of India’s 
LEP, remarkable progress has been registered recently in the history of economic 
relations between India and the Philippines. The merchandise trade, for instance, has 
picked up from US $100 million in 1994 to nine times higher in 2010. Indian tourist 
inflows in the Philippines also improved progressively through the years.  
 
Reciprocally, the number of Filipino tourists in India also increased annually. Indeed, 
Sandeep Kumar is right when he identified healthcare, cooperation in IT related 
services as well as sourcing of manpower and education services as important areas of 
                                                
55 The researcher was accepted as an associate member of this e-group and was privileged to 
access its database. This platform was established in August 2006 through an initiative of then 
Philippine Ambassador Laura del Rosario in New Delhi. The e-group serves either as 
electronic bulletin to inform the Filipinos about the latest embassy’s policies especially on visa 
matter, reminders of incoming birthday and send off parties, basketball practises, and other 
social activities on weekends and holidays. Although being discouraged, the e-group account 
also serves as space for those interested to advertise their wares ranging from Filipino foods, 
real estate properties in the Philippines as well as posting of job opportunities. In worst cases, 
chat/messages of some members inquiring on safe, swift and inexpensive way of sending 
remittances to their relatives in the Philippines, number of jokes and anecdotes flooded the e-
mail account of all subscribers. 
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mutual economic cooperation between India and the Philippines.56 In fact, the 
manpower flows in recent years between these countries, although small in number, is 
a promising component of the relations. If properly mobilised, both countries will 
surely benefit from these professionals and relatively younger, technological savvy 
workforce. This group will reinforce the bargaining power of the middle class whose 
needs and wants will fuel the economy of these nations in the near future.  
 
The Indian investments, which hardly come to the Philippines in the past years, are 
beginning to show some improvements with the advent of Indian companies interested 
to venture in pharmaceutical and outsourcing sectors. Such eagerness among Indians 
in recent years to operate and collaborate with the Filipinos on BPO57 industry is 
highlighted in the following chapter.
                                                
56 Sandeep Kumar. ‘Indo-ASEAN Economic Relations: Some Dimensions.’ Economic  
Growth and Foreign Trade Relations Among India, China and ASEAN. Ed. V.B. Jugale. New 
Delhi: Serials Publications, 2009. 135. 
57 It is defined as "the delegation of one or more IT-intensive business processes to an external 
provider that, in turn, owns, administrates, and manages the selected process or processes 
based on defined and measurable performance metrics. “Understanding the Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO) Industry  in the Philippines.” National Statistical Coordination Board, 
Republic of the Philippines. 9 November 2007. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.nscb.gov.ph/factsheet/pdf07/FS-200711-ES2-01_BPO.asp#1>. Moreover, 
Samulevicius and Samonis also defined BPO as the transfer of control of the business process 
to external suppliers. It is the practise of turning over the operation of an internal business 
process to a third party service provider. Jurgis Samulevicius and Val Samonis. “Business 
Process Outsourcing to Emerging Markets: A Knowledge Management Approach to Models 
and Strategies.” Outsourcing and Offshoring in the 21st Century. Eds. Harbhajan Kehal and 
Varinder Singh. United States and United Kingdom: Idea Group Inc. 2006. 141-142. BPO 
services are generally into horizontal or vertical services. A horizontal BPO involves function 
centric outsourcing - the vendor specializes in carrying out particular functions across different 
industry domains. Examples of horizontal BPO are outsourcing in procurement, payroll 
processing, human resources, facilities management and similar functions. On the other hand, 
a vertical BPO focuses on providing various functional services in a limited number of 
industry domains such as healthcare, financial services, manufacturing and retail. In the 
Philippines, the major components of the BPO industry are contact centre, software 
development, animation/creative, back office and engineering design. NSCB. 9 November 
2007. 17 March 2010.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
AFTER THE ‘SILENT KNIGHT’: INDIAN INTERESTS IN PHILIPPINE 
BUSINESS PROCESS OUTSOURCING (BPO) INDUSTRY 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 7 continues the saga of India’s regionalism in the Philippines as manifested 
by the growing presence of Indian based/owned BPO companies in the archipelago. 
The first section assesses the recent condition of the BPO industry in the Philippines. 
The second section documents and classifies the existence of 24 BPO companies with 
Indian equity in the archipelago. The third section argues the complementarities of the 
Indian BPO companies to the holistic development of the Philippine BPO industry 
and its growing share to the global outsourcing market. The last section concludes this 
chapter. 
 
In particular, this chapter discusses one of the newest and fastest growing economic 
collaborations of India and the Philippines. Called as the ‘silent knight’1, the BPO 
industry has produced revenues amounting to US $7.2 billion in 2009.2 Despite global 
recession, a 19 percent growth was registered against the 2008 figure of only US $6 
                                                
1 Everest Research Institute used this term to describe the condition of Business Process 
Outsourcing-Information Technology (BPO-IT) as Philippines’ sunshine industry. Lynda 
Corpuz. “e-Services: Phil BPO to Boom Despite Crisis.” Breakthroughs. January-March 2009. 
3. The climb was lower than the forecasted growth of 30 to 35 percent in 2008 due to the 
delayed implementation of some projects in the fourth quarter of 2009 which was brought 
about by the global financial crisis. 
2 Jennifer Ng. “RP’s BPO revenue grows 19% in 2009.” BusinessMirror. 10 February 2010. 
20 March 2010. 
<http://businessmirror.com.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21636:rps-
bpo-revenue-grows-19-in-2009&catid=23:topnews&Itemid=58>. In 2007, this sector earned 
US $4.9 billion. 
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billion.3 In 2010, the industry generated revenues of US $8.9 billion with 26 percent 
growth from 2009 figure.  Employment also increased by 25 percent in 2010 to 
525,000 BPO skilled workers and professionals, an increase of 100,000 jobs.4 
 
The Philippine BPO industry, upon closer examination, is linked with India either 
through representative of clusters, or inter-firm linkages (e.g. foreign investments).5 In 
fact, most if not all of the existing Indian owned/based BPO companies in the 
Philippines are manifestations of clustering. In terms of inter-firm linkages, the case 
of Aegis PeopleSupport serves as a good example when it acquired the Philippine-
based PeopleSupport company. There are five similar BPO companies in the 
archipelago that existed through this clustering process. Aside from these types of 
linkages, the recent progress in BPO industry is also attributed to the role played by 
transnational communities in facilitating the expansion of Indian BPO companies in 
the Philippines.  
 
The expansion was brought about by favourable conditions offered in the country. 
The choice to set up an office in the Philippines for instance, according to Vipul 
                                                
3 “Executive Summary. IT-BPO Sector in India: Strategic Review 2010.” National Association 
of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM). 2010. 19 March 2010. 
<http://www.nasscom.in/upload/SR10/ExecutiveSummary.pdf>.  
4 Michael Alan Hamlin. “Philippines’ IT-BPO Industry Continues to Impress Investors.” 
Asian Pundit. 18 April 2011. 29 April 2011. 
<http://www.asianpundit.com/2011/04/philippines-it-bpo-industry-continues-t0-impress-
investors/>.  
5 Ted Tschang. “The Philippines’ IT-Enabled Services Industry.” World Bank.org. n.d. 3 May 
2010. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPHILIPPINES/Resources/Tschang-word.pdf>. 
Clusters as defined by Tschang are special case of concentrations in which various inter-firm 
linkages (e.g. supply chains and business alliances) tie the firms together within a geographic 
region. Other inter-firm linkages include whole range of business alliances such as foreign 
investments, strategic alliances, cooperative research organisations, joint ventures, mergers 
and acquisitions, and increasingly co- production agreements. Many multinational companies 
are also choosing to ally with or to acquire domestic outsourcing service providers. Tschang 
did not, however, consider the role of the transnational communities (TNC) in the case of the 
Philippines. In recent development, TNC also facilitated knowledge and resource flows across 
countries. 
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Doshi, was primarily based on the quality of infrastructure, government support, 
quality of workforce and most importantly from the demand of clients.6 With these 
conditions7 and the trust to the growing influence of India’s ‘Look East’ policy (LEP), 
top executives of Indian owned BPO companies chose the Philippines as one of their 
companies’ back office facilities and/or delivery sites. A situation that Indians and 
Southeast Asians’ policy makers has foreseen in 2004 to happen not only in the 
Philippines but also to other countries in the region. Indian IT firms were induced to 
‘look east’ in tune with India’s LEP in order to explore business opportunities in joint 
initiatives. The said move was envisioned to strengthen the IT foundation of the 
region by 2020.8 
 
Surprisingly, some parts of the vision have been recently realised nine years ahead of 
the target date. The influx of some Indian companies and conglomerates in the various 
parts of the country warrants the swift transformation of the industry and of the dire 
need to highlight this advancement in this chapter. 
 
                                                
6 Mr. Doshi is the Chief Executive Officer of InterGlobal Technologies. Emilia David. “BPO 
firm to expand 1,000 seats in a year.” BusinessWorld. 19 December 2009. 19 March 2010. 
<http://www.bworldonline.com/main/content.php?id=3479>.  
7 The Philippines, according to 2006 Global Outsourcing Index, is ranked in the 13th place 
from the top 20 outsourcing destinations and in the 9th place based on future outsourcing 
index in 2015. The criteria are based on the level of risks in geo-political, human capital, IT 
competency, economic, legal, cultural and IT infrastructure. The selected countries are also 
assessed in terms of their market opportunity index that includes IT outsourcing market, global 
competitiveness index, business external index and expert opinion index; and also by cost. 
India dominates in the 2006 assessment but will be overrun by China in 2015 forecast.  Mark 
Minevich, Frank-Jurgen Richter and Ratings Contributors. “2006 Global Outsourcing Report.” 
Six Billion Minds. Eds. Mark Minevich, Frank-Jurgen Richter and Faisal Hoque. United 
States of America: Aspatore Inc, 2006. 263-264. 
8 Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries 
(RIS). ASEAN-India Vision 2020: Working Together for a Shared Prosperity. New Delhi: 
RIS, 2004. 30.  
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Figure 7.1. Global Outsourcing and Offshoring Industry, 2008. Everest Group, Board of 
Investments (BOI) and BPO Services Association (BSAU) 
 
7.2. State of BPO Industry in the Philippines 
The Philippines has gradually becoming one of the major players in the BPO industry 
particularly on global BPO with an estimated addressable market of US $300 billion. 
A rapid growth has been observed since 2005 in industry’s various subsectors such as 
back office operations, medical transcription, software development, animation, 
contact centres and others.9 In such large-scale undertaking, the Philippines got a 
healthy 15 percent of the global offshore BPO market10 (see Figure 7.1). Despite the 
global recession, the country still emerged as one of the world’s fastest growing 
                                                
9 Dahl Bennett. “BPO Roadmap Plots Philippines Direction for 2010.” Breakthroughs. May-
July 2007. 1-2. 
10 “RP has moved up in BPO value chain.” Manila Bulletin. 16 March 2010. 16 March 2010. 
<http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/247881/rp-has-moved-bpo-value-chain>. 
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destinations for BPO since it engaged in offshore outsourcing for global companies. 
In fact, the Philippines has been bestowed by the National Outsourcing Association in 
United Kingdom (UK) as the Best Offshoring Destination of the Year Award for 
2007, 2009 and 2010 for its BPO sector.11 
 
From two to three percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004, the BPO 
industry in the Philippines has contributed another six percent to GDP in 200912 and 
contributed roughly 7.9 percent by the end of 2010.13 Reflecting on the sheer scale of 
the industry, Philippine tycoon Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala expressed this 
observation in the launching of the Integreon14 delivery site in the country in 2009. 
Ayala believed that the emergence and success of the BPO are just beginnings of a 
major re-positioning of the Philippines from being a supplier of agricultural products 
or manpower to provider of outsourced, high-value professional services to the 
world’s business organisations.15 
 
                                                
11 Martin Crisostomo. “The Philippines Wins the UK Outsourcing Award for the Third Time." 
Breakthroughs. October 2010-January 2011. 1-2. 
12 Corpuz. 2. The voice segment or contact centre subsector added 65 percent to the revenue 
while the non-voice like back office operations contributed 17 percent, the rest was from IT 
and engineering design sectors. The industry also produced additional 74,000 talents to its 
workforce. 
13Oficina Economica y Commercial de la Embajada de Espana en Manila. The BPO Sector in 
the Philippines. Manila: Embassy of Spain. March 2011. In 2008, the projected contribution of 
the BPO sector to the National GDP is about eight percent. Cora Llamas. “Phils Boosts its 
BPO Capabilities to Go Beyond Non-voice.” Breakthroughs. January-March 2008. 1. 
14 Integreon is a global leader in corporate, legal and financial complex knowledge process 
outsourcing (KPO). “Integreon Launches RP Operations.” Breakthroughs. January-March 
2008. 19. KPO is a specialized form of outsourcing work that entails more than just encoding 
business documents or conveying a memorised set of information to clients. It is a delegation 
of knowledge based, non-core operations of a firm to an offshore office specializing in the 
management of that operation such as financial, legal research and analysis. Eva Goyena. “B 
& M Global Services: KPO is the Future.” Breakthroughs. May-July 2007. 14. 
15 Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala. Chairman and CEO of Ayala Corp. “The Philippines: From 
Agricultural Producer to KPO Powerhouse.” Breakthroughs. January-March 2008. 16. 
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In the history of the BPO industry, nobody expected that this sector, particularly the 
voice-based or contact centre sector, could develop so fast in less than a decade. 
Amazingly, the industry itself is now racing side by side with the technology that 
powered it. Looking closely at the evolution of the contact centre16 segment in the 
Philippines, it appeared that this BPO sector developed rapidly in less than 10 years. 
In 2001, the American Online (AOL) set-up an in-house call centre at Clark Special 
Economic Zone (CSEZ) in Pampanga.17 Then another three companies joined the 
business in 2006 and were stationed only in Luzon. Investors started to outsource their 
business in the country and began to cater clients from the United States of America 
(US), United Kingdom (UK), and Australia. The number of industry players grew 
from an estimated 300 companies in 2004 to 618 in 2008 with an increase of 51.46 
percent in just a matter of five years.18  
 
Such expansion was believed to have been facilitated by competitive advantages of 
the Philippines such as Filipino labour force’ closest cultural affinity to the US, 
superior English proficiency, availability of a highly educated and skilled workforce, 
consultative customer service mind set and most of all being the low cost but not low 
key offshore destination.19 These advantages offset the low rate given by investors 
                                                
16 Contact centre is an advanced call centre (headset-wearing switch-board) operation that 
handles not only phone calls but also email, and online communication – including instant 
messaging. It caters to both inbound and outbound services. The former is an interaction 
initiated by the customer to include customer service, sales and technical support while the 
latter is initiated by the contact centres in their telemarketing and collection services. 
17 Jorge Sibal. “Strengthening Offshoring in the Philippines in the Philippines: Issues and 
Concerns.” Freidrich Ebert Stiftung. n.d. 12 March 2008. 
<http://www.fes.org.ph/pdf/Offshoring%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf>.  
18 “Offshoring & Outsourcing Industry: Philippines’ IT/BPO Services Sector.” BPO Services 
Association Unlimited (BSA/U). September 2009. 19 March 2010. 
<http://www.bsau.org/downloads/BSAU.ORG_PhilippinesIT_BPOServicesSector_Sept2009-
3.pdf>.  
19 Philippine Information Technology Offshore Network. The Philippine – BPO Destination of 
Choice. n.d. 18 February 2008. <http://www.piton-global.com/resource02.html>.  
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and industry actors in terms of people and skills availability as well as in business 
environment.20 The less staff turnover in the country also played well in favour of the 
Philippines despite the higher expenditure on wages in Manila compared to New 
Delhi, Mumbai or Bengaluru. It was believed that the relative shortage of higher 
paying software development and other business processing jobs was seen to have 
caused the low attrition rate.21 Such condition was confirmed by Vikas Kapoor, 
IQoR’s chief executive, when he said that these attributes will even secure the 
Philippines a place not only to compete but also to dominate the contact centre sector 
in the very near future.22  
 
Given these indicators, the Philippines is now emerging as a global outsourcing hub 
with excellent infrastructure, right policies, cultural similarities with the West and 
availability of English-speaking population.23 The country, for instance, offers 36 
million work force with over 450,000 college graduates annually. The Philippines has 
also provided diverse choices of suitable locations all over the archipelago with the 
so-called ‘next wave cities’24 (NWC) and strong government support among others.25 
                                                
20 A.T. Kearney Global Services Location Index-2005. 
21 James Hookway. “Outsourcers Call for Backup.” The Wall Street Journal. 5 October 2004. 
22 “Filipinos are taking more calls in outsourcing boom.” The New York Times. November 
2006. Also, “We are iQor.” iQor. n.d. 4 April 2008. <http://www.iqor.com>. 
23 Sachin Bhatia, Drishti vice president for international business. “Drishti gears up to 
capitalize on Filipino Contact Center market growth.” Drishti-soft.com. 2009. 20 March 2010. 
<http://www.drishti-soft.com/filipino.php>.  
24 Next Wave Cities (NWC) are areas outside Metro Manila that are seen as possible areas for 
BPOs outside crowded urban centres. These places are selected based on talent, infrastructure, 
cost, and business environment. NWC in the Philippines are Metro Laguna, Metro Cavite, 
Iloilo City, Davao City, Bacolod City, Metro Pampanga, Bulacan East and West, Cagayan de 
Oro City, and Lipa City. Next Wave Cities 2009. Executive Summary. Business Processing 
Association of the Philippines (BPAP), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and 
Commission on Information and Communications Technology (CICT). 2009.  
25 Jonathan De Luzuriaga. Interview. 23 September 2009. Government supports include the 
implementation of enabling laws such as Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 2004-
2010 that aims to reduce connectivity cost and develop ICT human resource; Executive Order 
561 creating the Philippine Cyber Corridor, 2009 Investment Priorities plan that provides 
fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to interested BPO-IT companies; allocation of 350 million 
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These NWC’s are located in cyber corridor26, a government restructured super region 
of the archipelago. The active involvement also of private organisations such as the 
Business Processing Outsourcing Association of the Philippines (BPAP)27, BPO 
Association Services Unlimited (BSAU)28, Contact Center Association of the 
Philippines (CCAP)29 as well as Information and Communication Technology 
Councils (ICTC) in various provinces of the country contributed to the Philippine 






                                                
pesos scholarship funds for training of near-hires in IT-BPO; and the proposal of having a data 
privacy bill to protect the personal information in ICT systems in government and private 
sectors. 
26 It is an ICT belt stretching 600 miles from Baguio in Northern Luzon to Zamboanga in 
Mindanao. It is served by a US $10 billion high bandwidth fibre backbone and digital network 
and home to 75,000 call centres and BPO agents who all speak English. “Offshoring & 
Outsourcing Industry…”; also David Kinnear. “From 1989 to the Present: A Story of BPO in 
the Philippines.” FS Outsourcing. November 2005-January 2006. 2. 
27 BPAP is an umbrella organisation for the fastest-growing industry in the Philippines: 
offshoring and outsourcing (O&O). It serves as the one-stop information and advocacy 
gateway for the country's key O&O services sector and has over 200 company members, 
including 5 association members. “Welcome to BPAP!” Business Process Outsourcing 
Association of the Philippines. 2008. 19 March 2010. <http://www.bpap.org/bpap/index.asp>. 
28 BSAU was formed in 2006 by members of the outsourcing association as a private-sector 
led organisation to aggregate the collective interests of BPO providers. It has recently 200 
members with size capacity vary from 10 to 7,000 staff. “BSAU.” BPO Services Association 
Unlimited. 2009. 19 March 2010. <http://www.bsau.org/>. 
29 CCAP is the official organisation of contact centres in the Philippines. Its mission is to 
promote the Philippines as the country-of-choice for contact centre services, develop 
professional standards and practises, organize learning and networking events, and work with 
various stakeholders to further the industry’s contribution to the national economy and 
strengthen its market position worldwide. Established in October 2001 by seven founding 
member companies, CCAP now counts 53 outsource and in-house contact centres as members, 
representing more than 80 percent of call centre seats in the Philippines. “Overview.” Contact 
Center Association of the Philippines. 29 November 2008. 17 March 2010. 
<http://ccaponline.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=85
&Itemid=272>.  
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Table 7.1. BPO Companies in Philippine Sub Locations 
 
Sub Locations Number Total 
Batangas 2 
Eastwood City-Libis 34 
La Union 1 
Las Pinas 9 
Mandaluyong 35 
Marikina 1 
Ortigas Center 146 
Tarlac 1 
San Juan 13 




































         
VISAYAS Cebu 53 
 
66 




Source: Data generated from www.callcenterdirectory.net as of 18 March 
2011. 
 
Thus in 2010, there were more than 600 BPO companies particularly contact centres30 
that operated in 859 sub-locations all over the Philippines. As seen in Table 7.1, 85 
                                                
30 Tonette Consuelo, research consultant. Business Processing Association of the Philippines 
(BPAP). E-mail Interview. March 2010; “Call Centre.” Business Processing Association 
Philippines. 2006. 05 February 2008. <http://www.bpap.org/itesict/callcenter.asp>. 
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percent were located in the island of Luzon, almost 11 percent were in the islands of 
Visayas and the rest were in Mindanao.31 These BPO companies produced 280,000 
jobs in 2009 and another 90,000 new jobs generated in 2010.32 Out of this number, 
three percent comprised the Indian based/owned enterprises33 which shared 16 percent 
of the total BPO seats in the country.  
 
This small yet significant presence was facilitated by the competitive advantages 
offered by the Philippines.  Top Indian executives were encouraged to establish their 
company’s operation centre and/or delivery site in the country since the calibre of 
English is better and most importantly, companies do not have to put up with the 
‘mess’ that existed in India. According to Pramod Bhasin, the ‘mess’ includes the 
arrangement of transport for employees, security, power back-up in offices, and basic 
infrastructures that entailed additional expenses to these companies in India.34  
 
The English accent proficiency of Filipino call centre agents also favoured the 
Philippines when it comes to the preferences of BPO’s clients.35 The case of Citibank 
was a fitting example.36 Moreover, the time zone advantages of the Philippines also 
                                                
31 Figures are collected from the www.callcenterdirectory.net and are personally processed for 
this purpose. 18 March 2011. 
32 Report and projection of Oscar Sanez, BPAP president. Out of 90,000 target jobs, call centre 
agents will account for 55 percent while non-voice service agents will fill up the remaining 45 
percent. “BPO targets 90,000 more jobs in 2010.” ABS CBN. 22 February 2010. 20 March 
2010. <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/02/22/10/bpo-targets-90000-more-jobs-2010>.  
33 Alastair McIndoe. “Outsourcing Trail: From US to India… to the Philippines.” The Straits 
Times.  18 January 2008, 6. 
34 Pramod Bhasin, president and CEO of Genpact. Shelley Singh. “Indian BPO lose ‘voice’ to 
Philippines.” Economic Times. n.d. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5379192.cms?prtpage=1>.   
35 Ananda Mukherji, MD and CEO of Firstsource Solutions. Ibid. 
36 Citibank is a good example of company that is looking to the Philippines as an exit from 
India due to accent-related issues. The company met a lot of resistance in their Australian 
operations due to the Indian accent. Brandon Miller and Mark Thaler with contributions from 
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made the country the natural choice for providing 24/7 service to global companies 
particularly those based in the US.37 
 
7.3. Expansion of Indian BPO Companies in the Philippines 
Indian firms in the country are estimated to have a combined capacity of 46,000 
seats38 or working stations in the Philippines. The BPAP in 2006 believed that the 
said presence at first was just simply to test the market. No one expected that the 
number soon increased hastily within a short period of time. The market responded 
well to these initiatives and in 2008, 1039 Indian owned/based BPO companies in the 
country were registered. In 2010, the number increased to 24.40   
 
The presence41 of Indian-based BPO companies in the Philippines is categorised into 
four types:  (1) delivery sites of Indian owned BPO companies based in India, (2) 
                                                
Richard Mills and Moi Lee-Rodriguez. ‘What’s in an Accent?’ Breakthroughs. May-July 
2007. 2. 
37 Prabhakar Bisen, head of WNS Philippines. Shelley Singh. 
38 A ‘seat’ in the contact centre world means a working station of an agent assigned in one of 
the three or four shifts within the 24/7 service of one contact centre. This working space 
enabled an agent to transact to outside world via interactive voice response (IVR) 
technologies, email, speech recognition and web channels. Catronia Wallace. “An Overview 
of the Indian Contact Centre Industry.” The Next Available Operator. Eds. Mohan Thite and 
Bob Russell. New Delhi: Response, 2009. 16. 
39 Joefe Santarita. “Strategies to Address the Mushrooming of Indian Contact Centers in the 
Philippines.” Conference in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of Philippines and India 
Ties. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines and Asian Center, University 
of the Philippines in cooperation with the Indian Embassy in Manila and Foreign Service 
Institute. Quezon City, Philippines. 23 September 2009. 
40 The initial list on Indian contact centres in the Philippines was provided by Tsewang 
Namgyal, former Political Councillor of the Indian Embassy in Manila.  Figures are also taken 
from the respective websites of these BPO-contact centres and from the list of Business 
Processing Association of the Philippines (BPAP). “By Nationality-Indian Equity.” Philippine 
Economic Zone Authority. n.d. 10 March 2011. 
<http://www.peza.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=138&itemid=167
&nationality=indian>.  
41 For the company to be considered in this study, it should be an Indian based and/or owned 
enterprise that has an office or delivery site/s in the Philippines. Companies that are 
established by Indian citizens in the United States of America but have facilities in the 
country, and also in the Philippines are also included. The fact that they are registered and 
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products of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures with Philippine based BPO 
companies, (3) subsidiaries of Indian established companies based in the US, and (4) 
locally established BPO company in the Philippines with Indian equity. 
 
7.3.1. Delivery sites of Indian owned BPO companies based in India  
Out of 24 Indian BPO companies that operated in the Philippines, 12 are primarily 
serving as delivery sites and/or back office facilities of those Indian owned companies 
based in the Indian cities of New Delhi, Haryana and Mumbai. These include Aditya 
Birla Minacs (ABM), Aranca Research (Aranca), Drishti, First Source Solutions 
Limited (FSSL), Genpact, Infosys BPO Limited- Philippine Branch (IBLPB), 
Intelenet Global Philippines, Inc. (IGPI), InterGlobe Technologies Philippines, Inc. 
(IGT), iQor, iTouchPoint (ITP), Tata Consultancy Services (Philippines), Inc. 
(TCSPI), and Wipro Spectramind Ltd. (WSL).  
 
Foremost is the ABM. Formerly known as TransWorks is a subsidiary of Aditya Birla 
Nuvo that currently employs over 11,000 employees across 30 facilities in Canada, 
Germany, Hungary, India, UK, US, and the Philippines who are providing services in 
28 languages. ABM delivers superior outsourced solutions to global 1,000 companies 
that specialised on automotive, financial, technology and telecom services. It began its 
operation in the archipelago on 15 August 2007.42 The Philippine facility currently 
has about 800 employees providing inbound customer services to global clients. The 
company also added 200 more people to its Manila operation in addition to its current 
                                                
recognized by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) under Indian equity category 
greatly factored in this study. 
42 “Overview.” Aditya Birla Nuvo.net. 15 August 2007. 3 April 2008.  
<http://www.adityabirlanuvo.net/media/press_releases/200707aug/minacs_facility_in_philippi
nes.htm. 15 August 2007>.  
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strength of 600 people. These additional recruits include French and Spanish speaking 
Filipino agents who will serve those customers from Caribbean and South America.43 
 
Another global provider of an end-to-end customised investment and business 
research, valuation services and intellectual property research services is Aranca. 
Incorporated in Mumbai in 2003,44 Aranca has been providing investment, business 
and economic research services to over 70 clients in the UK, US, Australia and Asia 
since 2006. But with the increasing global interest in the Asian markets, the company 
decided to establish an operation centre in Manila that serves both as a business 
development office as well as an operation delivering office.45 
 
Drishti46, on the other hand, is considered a leading contact centre solution provider 
with core expertise in call centre software and enterprise communication technology. 
The company caters to multiple verticals like customer support, telemarketing, 
mortgage, marketing research, directory services, hospitality and entertainment. Its 
flagship product, DACX™ Contact Center Suite has a wide presence in India and the 
Philippines.47 Drishti has its headquarters in Gurgaon, India and has multiple regional 
offices in India (Bangalore, Pune, Kolkata) and the Philippines. Drishti Philippines, 
                                                
43 Nanda Kasabe. “Aditya Birla Minacs hires staff speaking foreign languages to serve better.” 
The Financial Express. 24 February 2010. 9 March 2010. 
<http://www.financialexpress.com/printer/news/583550/>.  
44 “About us.” Aranca.com. n.d. 18 March 2010. <http://www.aranca.com/about-us.aspx>. 
45 “Indian BPO Firms Opening Offices Outside Country.” MoneyControl.com. 24 May 2006. 
18 March 2010. <http://www.aranca.com/media-coverage.aspx#Indian-BPO-Firms-Opening-
Offices-Outside-Country>.  
46 Drishti is the Sanskrit word for vision. “About Drishti.” Drishti Philippines. 2009. 18 March 
2010. <http://www.drishti-soft.ph/company.php>. 
47 <http://www.drishti-soft.com/filipino.php>. DACX™ Contact Center Suite is an innovative 
all-in-one Contact Centre Solution designed to maximum the Return on Investment (ROI) of 
call centres through high up-time and low Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), along with short 
implementation and customisation cycles. It is an ideal solution for any kind of call centre 
irrespective of size, technology (TDM or VoIP), or locations (single location or multi-
location). 
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Inc. has already acquired clients in all major cities including Makati, Manila, and 
Cebu since its establishment in September 2006.48   
 
Another leading global provider of BPO services is the FSSL. Formerly known as 
ICICI Onesource, this company offers a wide range of services across banking 
and financial services, telecommunications and media, and healthcare industry. It also 
provides services throughout the customer lifecycle, including customer acquisition, 
customer care, billing and collections, transaction processing as well as business 
research and analytics. Established in 2001, FSSL has quickly risen to the top of the 
BPO and contact centre industry49 and has operated in 36 delivery centres with more 
than 26,000 employees across four continents - in India, Philippines, US, UK and 
Argentina. In the Philippines, its office is located at the North Cybergate in Alabang, 
Muntinlupa50 with 500 seats capacity.  
 
Another occupant of Alabang is Genpact company. This enterprise is recognised as 
one of the pioneers of BPO industry in India. It is now acknowledged as the leader in 
globalisation of services and technology that manages business processes for 
companies around the world. Genpact was established in 1997 by Pramod Bhasin as 
GE Capital International Services. Today, it serves its customers from over 35 
operation centres in 13 countries, with over 38,600 employees across a wide range of 
business processes, technologies and industries.51 In November 2006, Genpact opened 
its 5,400 square meter facility that houses 200 professionals in Muntinlupa City. 
                                                
48 <http://www.drishti-soft.com/about.php>. n.d. 03 April 2008.  
49 “Overview.” First Source.com. 2008 17 March 2010. <http://www.firstsource.com/about-
us/Overview.aspx>.  
50 “Global Presence-Philippines.” First Source.com. 2008. 17 March 2010. 
http://www.firstsource.com/about-us/Global-Presence/Philippines.aspx>.  
51 “Pramod Bhasin.” Genpact.com. 2010. 18 March 2010. 
<http://www.genpact.com/home/aboutgenpact/management-team/pramod-bhasin.aspx>. 
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These agents were trained to provide finance and accounting services, customer-
service support, collections, and IT services to Genpact’s increasing roster of global 
clients. Alabang is Genpact’s 25th global operation centre with 2000 seats capacity. 
Others are located in India, China, Hungary, Romania, US, Poland and Mexico.52 
 
IBLPB is a subsidiary of Infosys India that was established in 1981 by N. R. 
Narayana Murthy. Along with six engineers in Pune, he started the operation of the 
company with an initial capital of US $250 only.53 In 2010, it grew into a multi-
million dollar global BPO enterprise with 12 delivery centres across Asia Pacific, 
Latin America, Europe and India. In the Philippines, its office is located at Fort 
Bonifacio, Taguig City. It has currently 1,100 seats capacity since 2007 and plans to 
expand its delivery centre capacity to about 3,000 seats in the coming years. Like 
other BPO companies, Infosys BPO also serves as an end-to-end service provider 
across industries such as banking, insurance, media, retail, manufacturing, automotive 
and others with focus on customer service, contact centre, collections, sales and 
fulfilment, finance and accounting as well as legal process outsourcing.54 
 
IGPI, on one hand, is part of a decade old Indian BPO company based in Mumbai, 
India. The company is one of the leading global suppliers of BPO services with more 
than 32,000 employees and a global operational footprint spanning across India, USA, 
                                                
52 “Her Excellency, President Gloria Macagal-Arroyo Inaugurates the Genpact Business 
Services and Technology Center.” GenPact.com. 2006. 19 March 2010. 
<http://www.genpact.com/pdf/GenpactPhillipinesLaunch_171106.pdf>.  
53 “Who We Are?” Infosys.com. 2010. 16 March 2010. <http://www.infosys.com/about/who-
we-are/pages/history.aspx>.  
54 Maricel Burgonio. “India’s Infosys to expand Philippine operations.” The Manila Times.net. 
20 February 2010. 20 March 2010. <http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/business-
columns/11848-indias-infosys-to-exp>.  
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UK, Australia, Mauritius, Philippines and Poland.55 It has a total of 39 global delivery 
centres all over the world and 26 of these are in India, three in North America, two 
each for UK and Mauritius while one each for Poland and the Philippines. IGPI has an 
office in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City which has a capacity of 330 seats. 
 
IGT is part of IGT Pvt. Ltd., is the leading pure-play travel technology organisation 
that provides services and solutions to travel corporations worldwide in areas of BPO 
and Information and Technology (IT). Specifically, its services include 
airline reservation system, departure control system, revenue management system, 
internet booking engines, agency back office automation, travel technology 
consulting, back office BPO, airline contact centres and more. Its headquarters is in 
Gurgaon, Haryana, India and has delivery centres in Mumbai in India and Taguig in 
the Philippines.56 IGT provides both voice and non-voice services to companies like 
United Airlines (UA), Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), Virgin Airlines, and Expedia. It 
has a total capacity of 1,500 seats.57 
 
Likewise, IQoR serves clients from customer care to customer retention and revenue 
recovery. IQoR started its Philippine operations in February 2005 in Manila58 and has 
generated more than 2,500 jobs in the Philippines since the opening of its first call 
centre in the country. The company also established its second and third call centres 
within CSEZ. The first Clark Centre opened in August 2006 with 50 employees and 
in 2008, it reached the full capacity of the facility and now has opened a new state of 
                                                
55 “Who We Are?” Intelenet.com. n.d. 16 March 2010. 
<http://intelenetglobal.com/whoweare_index.html>.  
56 “About Us.” Interglobe Technologies.com. n.d. 16 March 2010. 
<http://www.interglobetechnologies.com/About-Interglobe-technologies.asp>.  
57 David. 
58 The New York Times. November 2006; also, <http://www.iqor.com>.  
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the art 32,000 square foot centre to meet the growing client demands. iQor is proud to 
have employed the proprietary technology known as ‘FeAther’59 that allows iQor to 
flexibly secure delivery calls anywhere in the world to any iQor call centres as well as 
to agents who worked at home.60 
 
ITP is a business process solutions company that offers complete contact management 
solutions to 2000 global companies through telephone, e-mail, website (live pro-
active and reactive chat) and fax. ITP pioneered the ‘dual delivery centres’ model 
with five fully equipped delivery centres located both in the Philippines and India. 
The said company commenced its business at Eastwood Cyber Park in Quezon City in 
200461 with about 500 seats capacity. 
 
TCSPI, on the other hand, is an indirectly held subsidiary of the Tata Consultancy 
Services (TCS).62 TCS offers a consulting-led, integrated portfolio of IT and OS 
delivered through its unique Global Network Delivery Model, recognised as 
benchmark of excellence in software development. A part of Tata Group, India’s 
largest industrial conglomerate, TCS has over 140,000 of world's best-trained IT 
                                                
59 FeAther is a new technology that requires iQor’s network to use biometric identification 
once call centre agent’s finger touches their keyboard, to determine who they are, what 
systems they can access and what calls they can handle. It therefore allows call centre services 
to be securely handled by any worker in any of iQor’s centres worldwide, as well as to people 
who have high-speed internet access at home. “iQor CEO Vikas Kapoor Launches 
Groundbreaking Technology at a Meeting with President Arroyo.” iQor.com. 6 October 2008. 
10 October 2008. <http://iqor.com/PressReleases.aspx?id=19>.  
60 Paolo Romero. “BPO firm launches virtual call center technology in RP.” The Philippine 
Star. 6 October 2008. 
61 “iTouchpoint’s Dual Delivery Centre (DDC) Model Ensures 100% Uptime with 24x7 
Hotsynced Centers in India & Philippines since over a year.” iTouchpoint.com. 5 April 2008. 
<http://www.itouchpoint.com/about/whyitp.asp>.  
62 “About TCS.” Tata Consultancy Services.com. 2010. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.tcs.com/about/corp_facts/subsidiaries/Pages/default.aspx>.  
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consultants in 42 countries.63 In the Philippines, its office is located in the business 
district of Makati City and has a total capacity of 1,000 seats. 
 
Lastly, WSL began its operation in January 2008 in Cebu City in Central Philippines. 
The expansion in the Philippines was part of the company’s plan B locations to hedge 
against risk of earthquakes or civil disruptions disturbing back-office work. It is a unit 
of India’s Wipro Ltd that initially hired 1,000 Filipino workers.64 The company has a 
45,000 square-foot facility that can handle customer-focused support processes. It is 
also looking at establishing additional centres in other fast-growing cities in the 
Philippines.65   
 
7.3.2. Products of Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures 
Aside from being designed as delivery sites, there are six more Indian BPO 
companies that existed in the archipelago through inter-firm linkages either by 
mergers, acquisitions or joint ventures. These companies are Aegis PeopleSupport, 
Allsec Technology Manila, Inc. (ATMI), Hinduja Global Solutions Ltd. of India-
HTMT Philippines (HTMT), IBM Daksh Business Process Services Philippines, Inc. 
(IBM Daksh), TeleTech Customer Care Management Philippines, Inc. (Teletech), and 
WNS Philippines, Inc. (WNSPI). 
 
                                                
63 “Philippines Depository Rolls out TCS BaNCS for all Asset Classe.” Tata Consultancy 
Services.com. 2009. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.tcs.com/news_events/press_releases/Pages/Philippines-Depository-TCS-
BaNCS.aspx>.  
64 Sagar Satapathy. “The Elite List of Top Ten BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) 
Companies in India.” Breaking News Online. 13 March 2008. 4 April 2008. 
<http://www.breakingnewsonline.net/2008/03/elite-list-of-top-ten-bpo-companies-in.html>.  
65 “Wipro opens BPO center in the Philippines.” Wipro.com. 3 January 2008. 5 April 2008. 
<http://www.wipro.com/News/NewsDetails.aspx?id=1058>.  
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The Mumbai based Aegis PeopleSupport, a member of Essar Group of companies, 
commenced its operation in the Philippines in 2008 after completing its US $250 
million purchase of the Philippine-based BPO company, PeopleSupport.66 The said 
merger was believed to be the first deal among series of mergers and acquisitions that 
had happened in Asia Pacific region. It only showed that smaller players, especially 
those catering specifically to banking, financial services and insurance sector in the 
US and elsewhere, may represent a valuable asset for larger outsourcers67 and will set 
a trend in the outsourcing industry in the near future. 
 
Aegis has a global headcount of 39,000 seats and 12,000 of these are in the 
Philippines. Having an office in the Philippines, according to Aparup Sengupta, the 
global chief executive officer and managing director of Aegis, is a destination of 
choice that gives the company a diverse geography of outposts to deliver services 
globally to customers in a diverse manner.68 It has served more than 135 clients from 
40 delivery centres across India, the Philippines, US, UK, Australia, South Africa, 
Kenya, Costa Rica and Sri Lanka.69  
 
Another company with multiple delivery centres in India which is now in the 
Philippines is the ATMI. It is a subsidiary of Allsec Technologies Limited that offers 
voice and Non-Voice services with world-class back office acumen. Founded in 1998, 
                                                
66 Joel Pinaroc. “Indian Outsourcer Plans More Philippine Deals.” BusinessWeek. 1 April 
2009. 2 October 2009. 
<http://www.businessweek.com/print/globalbiz/content/apr2009/gb2009041_059450.htm>.  
67 Kunal Kakodkar and Shivanu Shukla. “Contact Center Outsourcing Trends in the Asia 
Pacific Market, 2008-2011.” Contact Center Outsourcing Trends in Asia Pacific. United States 
of America: Frost and Sullivan. 9. 
68 Amil Tripathi. “Aegis Buys Filipino Outsourcer for 250M.” DNA Money. 5 August 2009. 
24 February 2010.  <http://www.aegisbpo.com/article.aspx?cont_id=owGvSueU2Ac=>.  
69 David Sims. “Aegis Named to Gartner’s Magic Quadrant.” TMCnet. 12 January 2010. 9 
March 2010. <http://www.tmcnet.com>.  
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Allsectech is a prime provider of client services support, technical support, quality 
assurance, sales, collections, customer satisfaction, payroll solutions, web 
development services as well as e-mail and even chat support.70 The company began 
to expand in the Philippines to complement the demands of the US clients who 
preferred to be outsourced in the country than in India due to its affinity to American 
culture, as well as to tap other potential Southeast Asian markets.71 The 150-seater 
BPO Kingdom Builders, Inc. (KBI) in Ortigas was bought by Allsec Technologies in 
October 2007 and consequently increased its capacity in Manila from 600 to 750 seats 
in 2009.72 The company has four international delivery centres, three in India 
particularly in Chennai, Trichy and Bangalore; and the fourth one is in Taguig City, 
Philippines. It has also nine domestic delivery centres across India.73 
 
Hinduja Global Solutions Ltd. of India (HGSL), on one hand, has entered into an 
arrangement with a company in the Philippines for initially providing services with 
138 customer service representatives (CSRs) to service one of its clients in the US. 
The operations in the Philippines started on 15 November 2002. This move was in 
line with the company’s strategy of exploring offshore locations. Thus, the move of 
having a Philippine office was intended to de-risk the businesses as well as meet the 
expectations of existing and potential clients.74 HGSL made a name in the Philippine 
BPO industry as HTMT Philippines when it acquired the Philippine-based C-cubed 
                                                
70 “Allsec-Leader in Global BPO Services.” Allsec Technologies. n.d.17 March 2010. 
<http://www.allsectech.com/Allsec/>.  
71 “Allsec Technologies.” Call Center Directory.net. n.d. 19 March 2010. 
<http://www.callcenterdirectory.net/call-center-companies/Allsec-Technologies-2326.html>.  
72 Adi Saravanan. Interview. IndiaInfoline.com. 24 March 2009. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.allsectech.com/Allsec/detailedNews.aspx?bmV3c2lkPTIzMg>. Mr. Saravanan is 
the founder and president of Allsec Technologies. 
73 “Allsec-Location.” Allsec Technologies. n.d.17 March 2010. 
<http://www.allsectech.com/Allsec/about-location.aspx>. 
74 “Hinduja TMT Ties up in the Philippines.” The Hindu Business Line.com. 2002. 3 April 
2008. <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2002/11/01/stories/2002110101150702.htm>.  
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and Source One Communications Asia (SOCA) in July 2005 at a total cost of US $9.8 
million.75 HGSL has served 80 clients worldwide including the US, Europe, 
Mauritius, India and even the Philippines. It also opened its 3,522 square meter 
facility in Eastwood Cyberpark in Quezon City worth US $2.5 million.76 It has a total 
capacity of 3,000 seats.77 
 
IBM Daksh manages customer care services and back office processes for the leading 
global organisations in the fields of banking, insurance, financial services, travel, 
technology, telecom and retail.78 The company has 14 service delivery centres in India 
(four in NCR, four in Bangalore, one each in Mumbai, Pune, Kolkata and 
Chandigarh). Its two branches in Manila commenced their operations in 2004.79 The 
company has offered more than a thousand job opportunities to Filipinos since its 
establishment.  
 
Teletech is a joint venture of TeleTech Holdings, Inc., and Bharti Enterprises (India) 
Ltd that combines the best of BPO and telecom capabilities with India’s distinct value 
propositions as world’s preferred outsourcing destination. Teletech started its 
operation in the Philippines in 2001. The company offers the entire spectrum of front-
to-back-office business processes ranging from voice and non-voice customer support 
                                                
75 “HTMT to buy out minority shareholders stake to get 100% ownership of its Philippines 
subsidiaries.” Hinduja Ventures.com. 30 July 2005. 3 April 2008. 
<http://www.hindujaventures.com/en/news/press_r/pdf/HTMT-philipin.pdf>. 
76 Joyce Pangco Panares. “Arroyo launches Indian BPO in Eastwood.” Manila Standard 
Today. 30 January 2010. 31 January 2010. 
<http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/insideBusiness.htm?f=2010/january/30/business2.isx&
d=2010/january/30>.  
77 “Hinduja boosts RP BPO sector with $2.5-million investment.” The Philippine Star. 21 
January 2010. 19 March 2010. 
<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=545261&publicationSubCategoryId=66>.  
78 Satapathy. Also, <http://www.daksh.com>. 
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to back office administration. In 2008, the company’s operation has been fragmented 
to eight sub-locations in the archipelago80 with a total capacity of 17,000 seats. 
 
Lastly, the WNSPI is a joint venture of Advanced Contact Solutions, Inc. (ACS), a 
pioneer and leader in BPO services and customer care in the Philippines, and WNS 
Limited of India as majority owner. The company established its first delivery centre 
in the Philippines in 2008 with initial seats of 200.81 Established in India in 1996, this 
enterprise delivers BPO services from shared back office processes to industry-
specific front and middle office processes and all the way to complex, actionable 
research and analytics. Specifically, its offers industry focused solutions in banking 
and financial, communications, healthcare, insurance, logistics, manufacturing, retail 
and consumer products, travel and leisure, utilities, and energy. Furthermore, WNS 
also provides cross industry solutions to customer care, finance and accounting, legal 
services, procurement, research analytics and transformation solutions. WNS as a 
global company has a network of 21 delivery centres in US, Costa Rica, UK, 
Romania, India, Sri Lanka, Singapore and the Philippines. These centres are dispersed 
intentionally to respond to the needs of clients in terms of language, cultural 
alignment, redundancy and 24/7 operations. In the Philippines, the 1,100 seat delivery 




                                                
80 “About Us.” Teletech India.com. n.d. 4 April 2008. 
<http://www.teletechindia.com/aboutus/aboutus.html>.  
81 “WNS forms a joint venture with Advanced Contact Solutions Inc in the Philippines.” 
WNS.com. 4 April 2008. 21 March 2010. <http//:www.wns.com>.  
82 “WNS Corporate Factsheet.” WNS.com. February 2010. 21 March 2010. 
<http://www.wns.com/AboutUs/CorporateOverview/tabid/65/Default.aspx>.  
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7.3.3. Subsidiaries of Indian established BPO companies based in the United States of 
America (US)  
There are also five BPO companies in the Philippines that are subsidiaries of Indian 
established BPO companies based in the US. These are EXL Service (EXLS), Motif 
Limited Philippine Branch (Motif), Sutherland Global Services (SGS), vCustomer 
and 24/7 Customer Philippines (24/7).  
 
EXLS has its headquarters in New York and has also offices in New Jersey and 
London despite being an Indian initiated company in 1999. It expanded its operation 
in the Philippines in 2008 with a total capacity of over 1000 seats. EXLS’ new 
delivery centre in the country serves as its first major outsourcing service delivery 
location outside of India. Such move is considered by the company as an important 
and first step in its strategy of providing seamless global delivery from countries 
around the world.83 Aside from the Philippines, EXLS has another 11 delivery centres 
located in India particularly in Noida, Gurgaon and Pune, one each in Czech Republic 
and Romania respectively. EXLS offers outsourcing services to global companies in 
multiple industries including insurance, banking, financial services, utilities, 
transportation and travel.84 
 
Another US-based company, Motif was founded in California by Kaushal Mehta in 
2000. It started as a software company and then transformed into customer centric 
BPO enterprise that provides the following lines of service ranging from customer 
support to online fraud prevention, research and analytics as well as back-office 
                                                
83 “EXL Service Establishes New Delivery Center in Pasay City.” Breakthroughs. April-June 
2008. 22. 
84 “Locations.” EXL Service.com. 2006. 16 March 2010. 
<http://www.exlservice.com/contact/locations.aspx>.  
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processes.85 Motif’s office in the Philippines offers 450 seats and is located at 
Cyberpark, Bagumbayan in Quezon City.86 It has been serving clients in the 
Philippines since 2006.87 
 
SGS is another multinational BPO company that specialises in customer management 
and back-office services for 1000 global clients.  Having started its operations in 1986 
in Rochester, New York, Sutherland now employs over 15,000 professionals offering 
global process management blended services from its 18 delivery centres in India, US, 
the Philippines, Canada, and Mexico. It began its operation in 2005 in Manila and 
expanded to areas such as Clark in Pampanga, Camarines Sur in Bicol and Davao in 
Mindanao in 2006. For the record, it is the first Indian BPO company that puts up a 
delivery centre in the island of Mindanao and still plans to venture in tiers two (2) and 
three (3) cities such as Iloilo.88 
 
vCustomer, on the other hand, is based in Kirkland, Washington. It is the leader in 
outsourced customer care and technical support solutions under the supervision of 
                                                
85 “About Motif.” Motifinc.com. 2009. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.motifinc.com/aboutus_new.htm>. Customer support includes chat and voice 
support, personalized email response services, travel reservation changes and content 
moderation. Online fraud prevention focuses on site monitoring for online retail and credit 
card fraud prevention for online travel while research and analytics specializes on data 
analytics, social media listening and key opinion (KOL) profiling. The back-office processes, 
on the other hand, concerns on benefits administration, financial reconciliation, mortgage 
services such as loans origination, servicing and closing and lastly insurance services database 
reconciliation. 
86 “Contact Us.” Motifinc.com. 2009. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.motifinc.com/contact.asp>. 
87 “Indian BPO firm opens delivery centre in Philippines.” Thaindian News. 17 December 
2008. 17 March 2010. <http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/business/indian-bpo-firm-
opens-delivery-centre-in-philippines_100132135.html>.  
88 “Sutherland’s third centre in the Philippines.” The Hindu. 21 December 2006. 05 April 
2008. <http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/21/stories/2006122107341804.htm. 04 April 
2008>. Also, “Sutherland Global Services Opens New Delivery Center in Clark, Pampanga 
Global Employee Strength Crosses 15,000 Philippines Headcount to Touch 3000 
Professionals in 12 Months.” n.d.19 March 2010. Sutherland.com. 21 December 2006. 05 
April 2008. <http://www.suth.com/company_pressrel_dec1906.htm>. 
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Sanjay Kumar as its founder and CEO. Established in 1999 and privately held, 
vCustomer has facilities in the US, India and the Philippines. The company provides 
industry expertise in communications, retail and consumer technology sectors.89  In 
2008, it established a facility at Eastwood City Cyberpark in Quezon City, 
Philippines.90  
 
Lastly, 24/7 is part of the 24/7 Customer Care BPO company based in Campbell, 
California. Founded by PV Kannan and Shanmugam Nagarajan in 2000,91 it is the 
first offshore-based integrated Customer Lifecycle Management (CLM) services 
company in the world.92  24/7 manages end customer interactions across channels 
spanning the entire customer lifecycle. This includes all customer contacts from 
acquisition to service, technical support to loyalty management, retention and lastly 
upsell/cross sell activities by means of phone, email and chat. These services are 
delivered in nine languages including English, Spanish, French, Mandarin, Cantonese, 
Taiwanese, Korean, Malay and Japanese.93 The company has over 8,000 employees 
worldwide across nine delivery centres located in the Philippines, India, Guatemala 
                                                
89 “Company Overview.” vCustomer.com. 1999. 4 April 2008. 
<http://www.vcustomer.com/vcustomer-company-overview.html>.  
90 “vCustomer Philippine Contact Center Sets New Automation Standards.” vCustomer.com. 9 
September 2008. 08 February 2010. <http://www.vcustomer.com/press_releases/vCustomer-
Philippine-Contact-Center.html>.  
91 “PV Kannan.” 247customer.com. 2010. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.247customer.com/company/board-of-directors.php>. PV Kannan mentioned that 
in January 2000, he set up this company in Bangalore with Alta Vista as first customer. PV 
Kannan. Interview. Adrian Bye. 03 January 2008. 17 March 2010. Meet Innovators.com. 
<http://meetinnovators.com/2008/01/03/pv-kannan-from-247-customer/>. 
92 “24/7 Customer Philippines.” Call Center Directory.net. 17 March 2010. 17 March 2010. 
<http://www.callcenterdirectory.net/call-center-companies/247-Customer-Philippines-
288.html#rate>.  
93 “Contact Center Management.” 247customer.com. 2010. 17 March 2010. 
http://www.247customer.com/solutions/contact-center-management.php>.  
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and China. In the Philippines, it has four delivery centres all located in the business 
district of Makati City and has a total capacity of over 1,000 seats.94 
 
7.3.4. Locally Established BPO Company in the Philippines with Indian Equity 
As of 2010, Blast Asia, Inc. (BAI) holds the distinction as the only locally established 
Indian owned BPO company in the country. BAI began to build its competency and 
track record in the Philippine local market in 2004 by providing IT services to 
government and private institutions, and then established itself as a global company 
offering outsourced IT services. BAI’s headquarters is located in Pasig City, 
Philippines. Mr. Arup Maity supervises the company as its founding president and 
chief executive officer (CEO).95  BAI is now servicing clients from seven countries 
with focus on partnering with technology companies in high cost regions. It offers 
services on outsourced product development, software quality testing, creative and 
design services, customer software development, application support and maintenance 
services as well as dedicated developer service/offshore development centre.96 
 
In sum, these Indian based/owned BPO companies dispersed their operations into 55 
sub-locators all over the archipelago. Majority of these were concentrated in the island 
of Luzon particularly in Metro Manila with almost 85 percent while the 11 percent 




                                                
94 Meet Innovators.com. 
95 “Blast Asia: Competency and Capability Profile.” Blast Asia Inc. 2010. 18 March 2010 
<http://www.blastasia.com>. 3. 
96 Ibid. 4. 
    217 
 
Table 7.2. Indian BPO Companies in the Philippines 
 
Delivery Sites Indian BPO Companies Seats 
Luz Vis Min 
Total 
 
ADITYA BIRLA MINACS 200 1 0 0 1 
AEGIS 12,000 2 1 1 4 
ALLSEC TECHNOLOGIES 750 1 0 0 1 
ARANCA RESEARCH n.d. 1 0 0 1 
BLAST ASIA INC. n.d. 1 0 0 1 
DRISHTI n.d. 1 0 0 1 
EXL 1000 1 0 0 1 
FIRST SOURCE 500 1 0 0 1 
GENPACT 2000 1 0 0 1 
HINDUJA GLOBAL 3000 2 0 0 2 
IBM DAKSH 1000 6 0 0 6 
INFOSYS 1100 1 0 0 1 
INTELENET 330 1 0 0 1 
INTERGLOBE 1500 1 0 0 1 
iQOR 2500 3 0 0 3 
iTOUCH POINT 500 1 0 0 1 
MOTIF 450 1 0 0 1 
SUTHERLAND 3000 5 0 1 6 
TATA CONSULTANCY  1000 1 0 0 1 
TELETECH 17000 8 4 0 12 
vCUSTOMER n.d. 1 0 0 1 
WIPRO 1000 0 1 0 1 
WNS 200 2 0 0 2 
24/7 Customer Philippines 1000 4 0 0 4 
TOTAL 49,650 47 6 2 55 
 
Source: Generated from the data available in www.callcenterdirectory.net, 
various newspaper reports, and respective website of various BPO companies. 
Note: n.d. means no available data 
          Luz for Luzon, Vis for Visayas and Min for Mindanao 
 
 
7.4. Indian BPO Companies: A Threat or Treat to the Philippines? 
The presence of Indian BPO companies in the Philippines has worried more the 
Indians than the Filipinos. Such move deprived Indians more than 100,000 jobs and 
another 100,000 more employment opportunities. Because of this, the country for 
some time was seen as a competitor to Indian BPO sector. Lately, however, Indian 
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companies realised the need to invest in the Philippines in order to benefit from its 
recent competitiveness.97 Such decisions were exactly done at the right time. Their 
entry in the archipelago helped in boosting further India’s stature as the leader in 
some of the outsourcing sectors and consequently strengthened the industry against 
protectionism.   
 
As rightly pointed out by Ameet Nivsarkar, National Association of Software 
Services Companies’ (NASSCOM) vice president for global trade development, the 
BPO sectors of India and the Philippines are joining hands to combat protectionism 
from EU nations and the US as well as to increase cooperation between nations that 
traditionally were competitors as ‘low cost’ outsourcing destinations.98  For Kapil 
Rampal, CEO of Creative Crest, the Philippines offers platform to compliment India’s 
strength in global outsourcing stage. Likewise, the vice chairman of the CII-Karnataka 
State Council, S. Chandrasekhar, also shared the same belief that the Philippines is 
not a threat but a compliment. He was convinced that there is a huge potential for both 
countries to collaborate in the BPO and outsourcing sector for mutual trust.99 
 
Given the success of the initial entry of Indian owned/based companies in the 
Philippines, other interested Indian enterprises also followed by establishing their 
offices in the Philippines and in others parts of the world. Some Indian BPO 
companies retained their primary facilities in India but outsourced the support services 
                                                
97 Rahul Sen, Mukul Asher and Ramkishen Rajan. “ASEAN-India Economic Relations: 
Current Status and Future Prospects.” India’s Global Trade Relations. Eds. V. Ramani and 
Aparna Bellur. Hyderabad: ICFAI University Press, 2005. 125. 
98 Rajesh Kurup and Shivani Shinde. “Nasscom, Philippine Counterpart to sign MoU.” 
Business Standard. 26 August 2009. 21 October 2009. <http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news/nasscom-philippine-counterpart-to-sign-mou/368150>.  
99 “Philippines-India Outsourcing Partnership Summit in Bangalore.” Creative Crest. 10 
March 2011. 27 April 2011. <http//:www.prkpo.com/content/philippines-india-outsourcing-
partnership-summit-bangalore>.  
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to the Philippines.100 Just like the case of EXLS, its presence in the Philippines was 
intended to further enhance its company’s business continuity capabilities and provide 
disaster recovery framework.101 
 
For the Filipinos, the presence of these companies is viewed as a complement to the 
growing industry. It becomes more a treat for the Philippine government since the 
latter is even encouraging more BPO companies to invest in the Philippines. The more 
Indian companies interested to come and invest in the archipelago simply imply more 
jobs to the growing number of unemployed Filipinos.102  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
The expansion of the Indian BPO companies, especially the contact centre sector in 
the Philippines is openly welcomed not only by the government, particularly the local 
government units, but also by people who are directly involved in this industry and its 
allied businesses. 
 
The presence of Indian contact centres in the country was triggered not only by the 
competitive advantages of the Philippines but also due to the archipelago’s disaster 
recovery importance in case of natural or political crises in India. 
 
Thus, it is imperative for the government, particularly its regulator, to maximise the 
fruits of this cluster by introducing both short and long term strategies in enhancing 
                                                
100 “Philippines Attracting More BPOs as India’s Wages and Infrastructure Costs Increase.” 
Breakthroughs. May-July 2007. 1. 
101 Breakthroughs. April-June 2008. 22. 
102 Unemployment rate in the Philippines is 7.3 percent while the underemployment rate is 
19.7 percent as of January 2010. “Press Release.” Census.gov. 2009. 20 March 2010. 
<http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2009/lf1001tx.html>.  
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and promoting the fragmentation of BPO companies not only within the metropolitan 
centre but also in the NWCs outside Luzon.103 
 
The emergence of Indian contact centres in the country is indeed an inevitable yet 
positive occurrence of the ‘offshore nation’.104  Such development has been favoured 
by external events which impact has defined not only the political but also the 
economic visage of the world. Furthermore, the entry of more Indian and other 
foreign-based firms to the Philippines is also expected to swell in the coming days, 
especially with fiscal and non-fiscal incentives that were made available by the 
Philippine government to all interested investors in the country.  
 
Similarly, another equally fast developing collaborations between India and the 
Philippines in recent years that caught the attention of both government and private 
sectors is the existence of low cost but good quality medicines in the archipelago from 
South Asia especially from India. The importation of such Indian commodities as well 
as the existence of a structured distributorship system in the village level created some 
excitements on both sectors and more importantly to consumers. The existence of 
Indian pharmaceutical products in the country has been an issue of health for the 
consumers and wealth for pharmaceutical companies in the Philippines, a concern that 
befits to be highlighted in the succeeding chapter.
                                                
103 Santarita. September 2009. 
104 According to Atul and Avinash Vashistha, it is a nation of buyers and sellers of offshore 
services. A nation of progress for mutual benefit, of the quest for innovation, the perfection of 
quality, and the refinement of the total customer service. Atul Vashistha and Avinash 
Vashistha. The Offshore Nation: Strategies for Success in Global Outsourcing and Offshoring. 
New York: Tata McGraw Hill, 2006. 34.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 




The swift entry of India’s business process outsourcing (BPO) companies in the 
country was also complemented by the rapid increase of Indian pharmaceutical 
imports in the Philippines. The existence of bilateral instruments and the mechanisms 
instituted to complement India’s ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) have intensified further the 
volume of Indian produced drugs in the country through parallel importation.1 
 
Through its bilateral ties, the Philippines in recent decade considered India as one of 
its primary suppliers of medicines to sustain President Gloria Arroyo’s legacy 
programme on health. At the current rate of wellness development in the country, it is 
fitting to describe this phenomenon within the ‘health is wealth’ context. For the 
Filipino consumers and patients, the parallel importation literally implies value 
appropriation for health while it figuratively means profits for Indian and Filipino 
entrepreneurs. 
                                                
1 Parallel importation is a system wherein an international manufacturer or supplier distributes 
products through an authorized distributorship network within geographic regions being 
allocated to each distributor. Robert Howell in collaboration with Khaw Lake Tee. “Parallel 
Importation of Wares and Reputation Spillover: Examples of Transnationalization of Law.” 
Asia-Pacific Legal Development. Eds. Douglas Johnston and Gerry Ferguson. Vancouver, 
Canada: UBC Press, 1998. 86. In the Philippine context, parallel importation refers to 
importation, without the consent of the patent holder, of a patented product that is marketed in 
another country. Competition in the supply of drugs or medicines is thus increased because of 
the importation of much lower priced identical drugs. Simply, parallel importation allows one 
to ‘shop around’ for a good price.  
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This chapter is discussed into five sections. The first one highlights the success stories 
of Indian pharmaceutical industry and the policy initiatives of the Indian government 
to outdo the decades-old monopoly of multinational corporations. The second section 
presents the condition of the Philippine pharmaceutical and wellness industry. The 
third part documents the growing importation of Indian pharmaceutical products in 
the Philippines from 1997 to 2010. The fourth section points out the role and impact 
of parallel importation of Indian pharmaceutical products in the Philippine 
government’s health programmes as well as in the delivery of basic health services to 
the Filipinos. The last section concludes this chapter. 
 
8.2. Pharmaceutical Industry: Indian Competitiveness  
India’s pharmaceutical industry is seen to have grown at a remarkably fast pace. India 
supplied eight percent of the world’s output of drugs and 22 percent of the world’s 
output of generic drugs.2 Of all the Third World pharmaceutical industries, India is 
among the leaders in scientific development, standards and range of medication 
produced. The products are ranging from simple medicine for headaches to antibiotics 
as well as medications for heart ailment. This industry provides more than 70 percent 
of the domestic requirement for wholesale and retail medicines, pills, and other 
intravenous medicines.3 With the current rate, the industry players are now seeing a 
brighter future for the Indian pharmaceutical industry as it continuously gaining 
                                                
2 Jayan Jose Thomas. “Innovation in India and China: Challenges and Prospects in 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology.” The New Asian Innovation Dynamics: China and India 
in Perspective. Eds. Parayil, Govindan and Anthony D’Costa. United Kingdom: Palgrave 
Macmillan Ltd., 2009. 11. 
3 “Learn About India.” India Generic.com. n.d. 08 April 2008. 
<http://www.indiageneric.com/indiandrugpharmacies.php>.  
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strength in various clusters such as contract research, bulk drug exports, formulation 
exports and domestic formulation. 4 
 
In 2007 to 2008, the strong gross domestic product (GDP) growth and significant cost 
advantages contributed to the progress of Indian pharmaceutical industry in the 
amount of US $17 billion. It is projected to grow around US $31.1 billion in 2011 and 
US $49.7 billion in 2015 with domestic formulation as the biggest contributor. There 
is also an increasing participation of India in the international pharmaceutical market. 
With more products going generic in developed countries, Indian formulation and 
bulk drug exports have grown significantly. Thus, the Indian pharmaceutical exports 
reached to about US $8.6 billion in 2007 to 2008.5 
 
With the enormous potential of this industry, there are 10,563 pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in India and 77.4 percent of these are producing ‘formulation’ drugs 
while the rest are engaged in manufacturing of bulk drugs.6 Nevertheless, this exciting 
development in pharmaceutical industry of India did not happen overnight. It was a 
product of long economic as well as political brawling of Indian government and local 
private sectors with the influential multinational corporations (MNCs). It started with 
                                                
4 Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: Vision 2015. Mumbai: YES Bank Ltd. and Organisation of 
Pharmaceutical Producers of India, 2008. 8. 
5 Ibid. In 2007-2008 figures, contract research registered US $4 million profit while bulk drug 
exports had US $4.2 billion, formulation exports had $4 billion and the biggest share comes 
from domestic formulation with $8.4 billion. The latter is projected to increase to US $13.4 
billion in 2011 and US $21.5 billion in 2015. However, these results will be swept away by the 
combined figures of bulk drug and formulation exports with US $16.4 billion in 2011 to 2012 
and US $25.2 billion three years after. 
6 “Directory of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Units in India: 2007.” National Pharmaceutical 
Pricing Authority - India. 2007. 15 April 2008. <http://www.nppaindia.nic.in/Directory-
NPPA.pdf>. The figures provided, however, by the World Bank show that there were almost 
20,000 manufacturers that existed in India as of 2002. Ramesh Govindaraj and Gnanaraj 
Chellaraj. The Indian Pharmaceutical Sector: Issues and Options for Health Sector Reform. 
Washington: World Bank, 2002. 10.  
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the Indian government empowered its agencies by implementing three key policy 
initiatives in the 1970s. The first policy was the Drug Price Control Order (DPCO) by 
which the Indian government sought to control the prices of drugs. The second 
initiative was the adoption of a new weak patent act that was passed in 1970 by the 
Indian parliament and took effect in 1972. The third initiative was an adoption in 1978 
of a drug policy that called for an elaborate use of industrial licensing to organise 
capacities in keeping with the broad objective of capability creation in domestic 
pharmaceutical firms. In addition, the Foreign Exchange Related Act (FERA) also 
delimited the clout and influence of multinational pharmaceutical firms by reducing 
their foreign holdings to 40 percent.7  
 
All these contributed to the success of Indian pharmaceutical industry in recent 
decade. With effective interventions of the state, domestic firms were allowed to grow 
as leading producers of generic drugs.8 The government made sure that these domestic 
firms were given enough time to develop their structures and competitiveness. It was 
only in the mid-1990s and thereafter that the government allowed some Indian 
pharmaceutical firms to move towards export markets specifically the generic markets 
in some advanced countries. This was possibly done either by buying some American 
pharmaceutical companies or by forging distributorship scheme in those countries to 
penetrate the market.9 Lately, the production also allows expansion to other potential 
emerging markets such as the Philippines.  
 
                                                
7 Dinar Kale and Steve Little. “From Imitation to Innovation: The Evolution of R & D 
Capabilities and Learning Processes in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry.” Technology 
Analysis and Strategic Management. 19.5. (September 2007): 595. 
8 Thomas. 12. 
9 Kale and Little. 599. 
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At the onset, Indian pharmaceutical companies knew that most of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries were heavily dependent upon imported 
drugs and health care equipment. Given the rapidly rising health care cost in many 
ASEAN countries due to populating, ageing and rising fatality of sexually transmitted 
diseases, business opportunities have existed in terms of health care activities as well 
as generics and other drugs including those sourcing for Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus- Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV-AIDS) medicines.10 This 
provided some pharmaceutical companies enough reason to venture out in Southeast 
Asia.  
 
To penetrate the market, Indian pharmaceutical companies made themselves 
internationally competitive in certain areas particularly in generic drugs by offering 
much cheaper price than the branded ones. In the case of the Philippines, there were 
few but market-driven Indian companies that were supplying bulk of pharmaceutical 
products in the Philippines such as Emcure, Panacea Biotec, Glenmark 
Pharmaceuticals Limited, and Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited. Some of them 
managed to establish their own representative offices in the archipelago. Due to these 
initiatives, India became the eight largest pharmaceutical supplier with 5.02 percent 
share after Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), France, US, Singapore and 
Australia in the Philippine market.11  
 
 
                                                
10Sandeep Kumar. “Indo-ASEAN Economic Relations: Some Dimensions.” Economic Growth 
and Foreign Trade Relations Among India, China and ASEAN. Ed. V.B. Jugale. New Delhi: 
Serials Publications, 2009. 136. 
11 Republic of the Philippines. Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines, 2002. Cited from the 
PHAP Philippine Pharmaceutical Industry Factbook - 6th Edition. Manila: Pharmaceutical and 
Healthcare Association of the Philippines, 2003. 
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8.3. Pharmaceutical Condition: The Philippine Experience 
If India’s health condition and its related industry are passing through an exciting 
episode of their development, the health conditions in the Philippines are the exact 
opposite. In fact, the recent situation is really disturbing. Many Filipinos died not 
because of sickness per se but due to the absence of medicines or inadequate 
treatment services in public hospitals.  Based on the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) report, the 10 leading causes of morbidity in the country were cardio-vascular 
diseases, accident of all types as well as infection related illnesses. Eight of the 10 
causes of death were due to infections that include acute lower respiratory tract 
infection and pneumonia, acute watery diarrhoea, bronchitis, influenza, tuberculosis, 
malaria, acute febrile illness, and dengue fever.12 Except for accidents, the rest could 
be treated well if given proper medications and hence prevent further fatalities.  
 
Aside from costly prices of medicines in the country, the limited budget allocated by 
the government to health sector worsened the situation. The Arroyo administration 
appropriated only 2.2 percent of the national budget in the amount of 33.6 billion 
pesos for the year 2010.13 This translates merely to about 366 pesos for each Filipino 
for the whole year.14 
 
This situation was even aggravated by the drug monopoly of MNCs in the early 
decades prior to parallel importation of drugs from South Asia in 1990s. In spite of 
                                                
12 WHO Western Pacific Office. Country Health Information Profiles- Philippines. Manila: 
World Health Organization (WHO). 338. 
13 Office of the Secretary. Budget Appropriations for the Year 2010. Manila: Department of 
Budget and Management, 2010. 19 February 2010. <http://www.dbm.gov.ph>.   
14 This budget if appropriated to each Filipino of about 92 million population, the health 
allocation for each person is less than four hundred pesos or about US $8 only per year. 1 US 
= 44.3340 PHP as of 26 April 2010. This amount can support only for few anti-diarrhoea or 
pain reliever medicines. 
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the implementation of a law on cheaper medicine, branded medicines still dominate at 
least 97 percent of the Philippine market.15 Various factors are identified to explain 
this conspiracy. First, the patronage of generic drugs among consumers was 
observably too low. Some doctors continued to prescribe drugs to their patients that 
were produced by their pharmaceutical sponsors. Roberto Pagdanganan, chairperson 
of the Medicine Transparency Alliance Council Philippines (METAP), even attributed 
the exorbitant drug price in the country to the expenses for promoting medicines to 
professionals and doctors and to send them to do continuing education abroad.16 The 
said companies also lured these medical professionals by giving them freebies or by 
sponsoring their leisure trips within and outside the country.  
 
The other factor is accessibility. Despite the technological and infrastructural 
revolution, there are still areas in the country that are not yet reached by government 
run pharmacies that offered generic drugs.  
 
Moreover, some consumers are hesitant in trying the generics especially those 
produced from India thus slowed down the initiative. The Filipinos were made to 
believe by MNCs that medicines produced outside the Philippines, except from US 
and European Union (EU), were counterfeit or of poor quality. As a result, the 
Filipino consumers for decades were forced to buy expensive drugs produced in the 
Philippines by the same company that distribute similar yet less costly medicines in 
the neighbouring countries. A typical example is the anti-hypertension brand 
‘Norvasc’. Its retail price in the Philippines is eight times higher than India and four 
times than Pakistan.  
                                                
15 Boo Chanco. “Supply and Demand.” Philippine Star. 28 February 2008. 3. 
16 Roberto Pagdanganan. Interview. 2011. Focus Report. 
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Table 8.1. Comparative Trade Prices of Branded Medicines in 
Pakistan, India and the Philippines, 2007 and 2010, All prices in 
Philippine Peso 
 
2007 2010* Drug Name Manufacturer 
Pak India Phil Phil 
Ponstan 500 mg 
tab 
Pfizer 1.38 2.61 21.82 27.70 
Lopid 300 mg cap Pfizer 2.72 12.27 36.39 40.00 
Buscopan 10 mg 
tab 
Boehringer 0.57 2.28 9.61 19.70 
Bactrim 400 mg 
tab 
Roche 1.03 0.69 15.55 19.95 
Adalat Retard 20 
mg tab 
Bayer 3.63 1.40 37.56 36.00 
Lasix 40 mg tab Aventis 1.21 0.49 8.99 10.50 
Plendil ER 5 mg 
tab 
AstraZeneca 7.78 4.58 35.93 45.80 
Diamicron 80 mg 
tab 
Servier 4.71 7.05 11.46 9.60 
Ventolin 100 mcg 
inhaler 
Glaxo 62.10 123.31 315.00 317.00 
Voltaren 50 mg tab Novartis 3.70 0.86 17.98 23.40 
Isordil 5 mg SL tab Wyeth 0.22 0.24 10.29 17.30 
Imodium 2 mg cap Janssen 1.83 3.05 10.70 14.60 
Fortum 1 g 
injection 
Glaxo 304.22 390.00 980.00 991.50 
 
Source: World Health Organization-Western Pacific Region. Essential Drugs & 
Medicines Policy. 7 (2007): 2. Data provided by Philippine International Trading 
Corporation. The prices of drugs in the Philippines as of 25 April 2010. Courtesy 
of Ma. Fe Santarita and Rosemarie Billones. 
 
Note: There are no available updated data on Pakistan prices other than the 2007 
figures. The prices for 2010, however, are still assumed to be more or less closer 
to the 2007 figures since the distribution is rigidly governed by the maximum 
retail price (MRP) policy in Pakistan as well as India. If there are increases after 
three years due to inflation, the prices will just hike by few paise or its 
equivalent Philippine cents. 
 
 
Likewise, the cost of ‘Bactrim’, a brand of antibiotic, is almost 23 times higher than 
the price of similar drug produced by the same company in India. The same is true 
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with the anti-hypertensive drug ‘Adalat Retard’ made by Bayer. Its cost in the 
Philippines is almost 27 times higher than in India (see Table 8.1).17 
 
Also, the expenses of these MNCs to lobby with sympathisers in Philippine Congress 
during the passing of legislative bills on cheaper medicine, promotional activities 
(freebies, travel budget for sponsored doctors and medical representatives), and others 
further contributed to worsening health conditions of the Filipinos.  
 
Despite the implementation of 2008 law on cheaper medicine, the prices of some 
pharmaceutical drugs in the Philippines were really costly. Such unfortunate condition 
was brought about by the lenient provision of previous Philippine Intellectual 
Property Code (IPC). The law gave a 25-year patent rights to the pharmaceutical 
companies that discovered or developed certain drugs. In spite of the 2008 law, the 
distribution of most of medicines in the archipelago is still governed by an old law 
that granted exclusive rights to companies the monopoly to produce and sell patented 
drugs. In effect, this code prohibited even the government and the private sectors in 
the country to import from other nations cheaper medicines that are more or less 
similar to the ones distributed by the MNCs.18 After all, the 2008 law was effective 
only after the patent of a specific drug expired. The drugs that are now supplied in the 
                                                
17 The drugs understudy are commonly used medicines in the Philippines to treat diseases such 
as arthritis, hypertension and heart problems, asthma, diabetes, pneumonia, and body pains. 
Ponstan is for body aches, Lopid is a lipid regulating agent, Buscopan to relax spasms and 
stomach cramps, Bactrim is an antibiotic to cure urinary tract infections and pneumocystis 
carinii pneumonia, Adalat Retard and Plendil are calcium channel blockers, Lasix is drug for 
congestive heart failure and edema, Diamicron is for oral anti-diabetic, Ventolin as a rescue 
inhaler for asthma, Voltaren to relieve the pains of arthritis, Isordil to prevent a suffocating 
chest pain, Imodium to control diarrhoea and lastly Fortum, an antibiotic.  
18 Neal Cruz. “We are not still Independent from Foreign Drug Firms – As I See It.” Philippine 
Daily Inquirer. 13 June 2007. 20 March 2008. 
<http://www.pitc.gov.ph/archives/not_independent.html>.   
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Philippines from India are those products which patents have already expired in the 
archipelago. 
 
8.4. Institutions and Initiatives: Entry of Indian Pharmaceutical Products in the 
Philippines 
The issue of drug importation has been fought tooth and nail by the MNCs in both 
legislative and judiciary battlegrounds. Millions of pesos were poured in to lobby 
bureaucrats, coerce the small players and even file of cases to hinder the importation 
of drugs from India and Pakistan. Despite vehemence and outright resistance coupled 
with money manoeuvring from these companies to sustain the monopoly, the 
Philippine government, through its regulators, has finally decided not to renew the 
drug patents. This provided a clear signal to the regulators, particularly the Philippine 
International Trading Corporation (PITC), to ink memoranda of agreement on 
pharmaceutical collaborations and consequently commence the trading partnership 
with South Asian countries specifically India.  
 
Corollary to this, earlier bilateral agreements related on health between the 
Philippines and India was inked during the state visit of President Fidel Ramos to 
India in 1997. This paved the way for the opening of more doors of opportunities for 
pharmaceutical importation scheme. In 2004, the said pact was followed up with the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between PITC and the 
Pharmaceutical Export Promotion Council (PHARMEXCIL) of India. Both parties 
agreed to facilitate the smooth coordination in distributing Indian pharmaceutical 
products in the country as well as provide training to PITC technical personnel at the 
National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research (NIPER) in India (see 
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Appendix P). This cooperation was further cemented during the state visit of President 
Arroyo in 2007. The Indian and Philippine governments agreed to legitimately 
authorise PITC to conduct business with its Indian counterpart, the State Trading 
Corporation of India, Ltd. (STC). 
 
As earlier mentioned, PITC is responsible in the advent of low cost but good quality 
drugs in the country. It is a government-owned international trading company that 
takes care in the exportation, importation and marketing of a wide range of 
commodities, industrial products and consumer goods. Established in 1973 to pioneer 
and take the lead in the Philippine trade with the Socialist and Other Centrally 
Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), PITC was given a broader mandate in 1977 
to be a prime mover in the expansion of the Philippine trade worldwide. It has since 
embarked on various innovative trading activities and has implemented facilitative 
trade-related services directed in attaining its two-pronged objectives. One is the 
expansion of market for Philippine products and the other is the stabilisation of prices 
and supplies of essential raw materials as well as commodities for local industries and 
consumers. In August 2004, PITC was designated as the key agency in the 
implementation of the President’s 10-point Legacy to include the lowering of prices 
of essential medicines by 50 percent in 2010.19  Since then, the agency continued to 
engage in the parallel importation of off-patent medicine for sale and distribution in 
the Philippines.20  
 
                                                
19 “Corporate Profile.” Philippine International Trading Corporation. n.d. 28 February 2008. 
<http://www.pitc.gov.ph/>. Also contained in the letter of Mr. Jesus Canto, then Vice 
President for Logistics and Supply Chain of PTIC through Ms. Leslie Macatangay. Email 
Interview. 10 March 2008. 
20 Marvin Sy. “RP-India sign 4 MoUs for Generic Drugs.” Philippine Star. 05 October 2007. 
28 February 2008. 
<http://www.pitc.gov.ph/archives/100507%20RP%20India%20sign%20MOUs.html>.  
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To ensure the smooth handling of the increasing volume of parallel imports from 
India, PITC Pharma Inc. (PITCPI) was created in 2006 to manage the pharmaceutical 
business of PITC. The said subsidiary is primarily deputised to handle the business of 
research, development, production, manufacture, packaging, sale as well as 
distribution of pharmaceutical products and/or investment and/or management of 
investments in pharmaceuticals.21 
 
STC is the PITC counterpart in India. It is the premier international trading house by 
the Government of India established in 1956. The said corporation was created to deal 
largely with East European countries during the early years of its formation and 
recently exports a large number of items ranging from agricultural commodities to 
manufactured products from India to all parts of the world.22 
 
These two corporations are responsible for the facilitation of parallel drug importation 
scheme beneficial to the two countries particularly to the Philippines. The said 
arrangement, however, was not really envisioned to be a permanent response to the 
problem of high prices of drugs. In the long term, the solution still lies in 
strengthening the local pharmaceutical industry, encouraging competition and 
interplay of market forces, and eventually, allowing the law of supply and demand to 
prevail.23  
 
                                                
21 PITC Pharma Inc. is a subsidiary of PITC and affiliate of National Development Company 
as mandated by Executive Order No. 442. n.d. 29 February 2008. 
<http://www.pitcpharma.com.ph/aboutus.html>.  
22 “About Us.” State Trading Corporation. n.d. 29 February 2008. <http://stc.gov.in/>. 
23 Jose Cortez. Interview. 11 November 2008. Also, Chanco.  
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The increase in government’s parallel drug importation was also cumulatively 
triggered by the growth of generics’ usage, government’s implementation of ‘Botika 
ng Bayan’24 (Bnb) programme as well as by the timely expiration of patent licensing 
for some commonly used drugs in the country. 
 
In 1986, the Philippines was the first country in Southeast Asia to enact the Generics 
Drug Act that permitted for the production of unbranded drugs which employed the 
same active ingredients and processes used in branded drugs, thus bypassing the 
patent system.25 Although there were twists and turns in the interpretation of the law, 
it still opened more opportunities to parallel importation as an alternative means of 
offering good quality yet affordable drugs from India. Obviously, it became a 
government’s strategic response to the regime of expensive medicines in the 
country.26 
 
Also, the eagerness of the Philippines to ensure its commitment in realizing the 
international campaign of ‘health for all’ also pushed the government to implement 
the Bnb and ‘Botika ng Barangay’27 (Bnby) as ways of delivering low cost yet good 
                                                
24 Botika ng Bayan (Bnb) or Peoples’ Pharmacy is a program of the government owned PITC 
that aims to provide cheaper but equally efficacious medicines and at halving prices of 
commonly bought drugs. Bnb imports primarily from India and Pakistan but also carries local 
branded generic drugs particularly for asthma, hypertension and diabetes. Bnb outlets are 
usually opened in cities and municipalities. “Botika ng Bayan Sells Cheaper Drugs.” 
Philippine International Trading Corporation.19 March 2007. 31 May 2010. 
<http://www.pitc.gov.ph/archives/cheaper_drugs.html>. 
25 Sheryl Anne Quito. “Generics Medicine Law Enforcement Dismal.” The Manila Times. 03 
February 2008. 28 February 2008. 
26 “Pagdanganan calls for the passage of HB 6035.” People’s Tonight. 16 February 2007. 28 
February 2008. <http://www.pitc.gov.ph/archives/HB_6035.html>.  
27 Botika ng Barangay (Bnby) or Pharmacy in the Village is a government health program 
pattered after the Botika ng Bayan (Bnb). It allows the establishment of a drug outlet managed 
by a legitimate community organisation (CO/non-government organisation (NGO) and/or the 
Local Government Unit (LGU), with a trained operator and a supervising pharmacist 
specifically established in accordance with Administrative Order No. 144 s.2004. The Bnb 
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quality medicines to the poorest sector of the Philippine society. The government 
needed a reliable source to acquire these supplies within a minimal budget and found 
India as one of the willing providers to fill the vacuum. 
 
The expiration of a 25 year-patent of certain pharmaceutical goods offered leeway for 
the Philippine government to get rid of MNCs drug monopoly. Those highly 
patronized drugs that were already off-patented can be freely produced by local 
industries or its ingredients can be imported from India without the fear of being 
harassed by the MNCs through court litigations. In fact, the Philippine Congress 
incorporated the principle of international exhaustion of rights into the Philippine 
patent system. This means that the rights of a patent holder on any patented medicine 
sold outside the Philippines is already exhausted and that the patent holder in the 
Philippines can no longer sue those companies that are importing similar drug.28 And 
in 2008, the Philippine Congress finally enacted Republic Act 9502 to level the 
playing field in the local pharmaceutical industry and subsequently encouraged more 
local companies to venture in pharmaceutical sector. It also amended the IPC of the 
Philippines to make patents, trademarks and trade names more responsive to the 
health care needs of the public.29  
 
                                                
outlet is permitted to sell, distribute, offer for sale and/or make available low-priced generic 
home remedies, over-the-counter (OTC) drugs and two selected, publicly-known prescription 
antibiotic drugs (i.e. Amoxicillin and Cotrimoxazole). “Programs.” Department of 
Health.com. n.d. 31 May 2010. <http://www.doh.gov.ph/programs/bnb>.  
28 Elpidio Peria. Philippine Daily Inquirer. 2 July 2006. A12. 
29 The Universal Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008 or RA 9502 allows 
for parallel importation, prohibits re-patenting of old products for ‘new uses’, encourages 
home grown businesses to test, produce and register generic versions of drugs with active 
patents, and empowers the president of the republic and the Department of Health (DOH) to 
regulate the prices of drugs when deemed appropriate. “Republic Acts 9502.” Senate.gov.ph. 
n.d. 19 February 2008. <http://www.senate.gov.ph/republic_acts/ra 9502.pdf>.  
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Such major developments were even complemented by the bilateral and private 
initiatives in India. As mentioned earlier, the 2007 State Visit of President Arroyo in 
India resulted in the signing of four business agreements worth around US $155 
million that were primarily focused on distributorships of pharmaceutical products in 
the country. The Philippines’ Macropharma Corporation and India’s Emcure 
Pharmaceuticals Limited (EPL) signed a five-year distributorship agreement worth 
US $75 million. The bilateral ties from the private sectors were also furthered with the 
forging of the third memorandum of agreement (MoA) between Panacea Biotech 
Limited (PBL) of India as well as Family Vaccine and Specialty Clinics, Inc. (FVSCI) 
of the Philippines for the importation and distribution of medicines and vaccines. The 
transaction value was pegged at US $10 million for a period of two years.  
 
On the government side, the PITC signed an agreement with STC on trade 
cooperation and drug sourcing. Under the MoA, PITC and STC were deputised to 
share organisational strengths and experiences in international trading and handling of 
various commodities. This cooperation was expected to generate at least US $25 
million worth of business for the pharmaceutical industry. STC, on the other hand, 
coordinated with Indian bulk drug manufacturers for the supply of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients to the Philippine manufacturers of generic products. The 
said importation of low-cost raw materials from India will effectively bring down the 
price of generic drugs manufactured in the Philippines. Moreover, by sourcing the 
commonly used medicines from countries such as India where prices are very low, 
local pharmacies are now capable of offering branded medicine at affordable prices.  
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Knowing the potential of Indian pharmaceutical industry and the great demand of the 
Philippine health condition, President Arroyo in 2007 invited Indian pharmaceutical 
companies to set up production facilities in the Philippines. By doing so, these 
companies could keep the Philippine market and even made the archipelago as their 
base for exports to farther markets like Northeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand.30 
Nearly four years after, the Philippine government has secured in 2011 an Indian 
foreign investment in the establishment of a pharmaceutical packaging plant in the 
archipelago.31 
 
In addition, the presence of Indian migrants and of pharmaceutical companies with 
Indian interest in the Philippines also contributed to the success of this new 
endeavour. Either acting as facilitators or distributors of Indian pharmaceutical 
products in the country, the following companies have already contributed in the 
improvement of health condition of the Filipinos. These are AAA Pharma, Ambica 
International Trading; Claris Labs; Eon Pharmatek, Inc.; Genpharm, Inc.; HLN Phil 
Trading, Inc.; Huge Pharma International Corp.; Indian Drug Distributor; IPCA Lab; 
Khriz Pharma Trading, Inc.; National Bio Tec; Raptakos Brett and Co.; SMHP 
Marketing; Synmedic Labs; T. Chotrani; Torrent Pharma;32 and Ajanta Pharma 
Philippines, Inc.33 They served as facilitators and distributors of drugs from India 
especially the generic ones while the Sandhu Pharmaceuticals Limited acted as 
                                                
30 Sy.  
31 Julito Rada. “Govt Asks India to Invest in BPO, Other Business.” Manila Standard Today. 
12 April 2011. 12 April 2011. 
<http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/insideBusiness.htm?f=2011/april/12/business4.isx&d=
2011/april/12>.   
32 “BFAD Database.” Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD). n.d. 19 February 2008.  
<http://www.bfad.gov.ph/default.cfm>.  
33 “Global Presence.” Ajanta Pharma Philippines, Inc. n.d. 10 March 2011. 
<http://www.ajantapharma.com>.  
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distributor of medicines for better child health, gynaecological and chronic ailments in 
the Philippines.34 
 
Another important development in the pharmaceutical industry was the visible 
presence of representative offices of Indian drug companies in the archipelago. Their 
existence means more volume of the much needed medicines at affordable prices. 
Logistically, the direct distributorship along with minimal hauling and transportation 
expenses also contributed in lowering the cost of drugs in the country.  
 
Thus, the commencement of local operations of numerous Indian pharmaceutical 
companies in the Philippines as early as 2003 is a welcome development for the 
Filipinos. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd., for instance, made its presence in the 
country in 2003 through its subsidiary Glenmark Philippines, Inc. It also collaborated 
with the largest Philippine drug distributor, Metro Drug, for the wider distribution of 
its dermatological products.35 Ahmedabad based Torrent Pharmaceutical Limited 
established in 2004 the Torrent Pharma Philippines, Inc.36 Reliance Life Sciences of 
India forged in 2005 an alliance with Ambica Philippines in setting up the Ambica 
Biotechnologies.37 In 2007, several pharmaceutical companies also made known their 
presence in the Philippines. Dr. Reddy, for instance, commenced its operations in the 
                                                
34 “Activities of HL Nathurmal.” HLN Philippines.com. n.d. February 22, 2010. 
<http://www.hlnphil.com>.  
35 “Business Asia.” Glenmark Pharma.com. April 2006. 1 January 2008. 
<http://www.glenmarkpharma.com/business/asia/philip.html>. 
36 “33rd Annual Report 2005-2006.” Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited. n.d. 8 September 2009. 
<http://www.torrentpharma.com/milestones.php>.  
37 “Ambica Philippines.” Ambica Philippines.com. n.d. 22 February 2010. 
<http://www.ambicaphilippines.com>. Although the company provides Deoxyribonucleic 
Acid (DNA)/ Ribonucleic Acid (RNA) based diagnostics services, it also engages in the 
distribution of pharmaceutical goods ranging from human insulin to dermatological cream, 
anti-cancer medications as well as ‘Tenderils’ baby care merchandises. The latter is a product 
of the Indian based company ‘Krauter.’ “About Us.” Krauter Babycare.com. n.d. 5 June 2010. 
<http://www.krauterbabycare.com>.  
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archipelago through a partnership with Britton Marketing Corporation38 (BMC), 
Emcure Pharmaceuticals Limited also sealed an agreement with the Philippines’ 
Macropharma Corporation in 2007 for distribution of medicines in the critical areas of 
nephrology, immunology and biotechnology39 and the Punjab-based PBL partnered 
with FVSCI in providing the Filipinos an access to value added vaccines.40  
 
 
Table 8.2. India-Philippines Pharmaceutical Trade, 1993-2008 







Exports to India Total 
1993 1,050,003 N.S. 1,050,003 
1994 2,613,296 N.S. 2,613,296 
1995 2,573,934 7,233 2,581,167 
1996 3,080,966 19,525 3,100,491 
1997 5,616,109 43,027 5,659,136 
1998 4,501,072 914 4,501,986 
2000 N.S. 120,352 120,352 
2001 10,593,088 10,674 10,603,762 
2002 18,592,584 176,466 18,769,050 
2003 19,365,418 251,697 19,617,115 
2004 13,675,893 507,258 14,183,151 
2005 14,780,696 812,433 15,593,129 
2006 17,599,209 1,116,242 18,715,451 
2007 16,476,307 1,575,322 18,051,629 
2008 24,999,230 1,655,151 26,654,381 
 
Note: N.S. stands for not specified. Trade data from 1990 to 1992, 1999 
are not specified in the annual report. Foreign Trade Statistics of the 





                                                
38 “Dr. Reddy’s commences operations in Philippines.” Times of India. 28 September 2007. 18 
October 2009. <http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.  
39 “Philippines.” Emcure.co.in. October 2007. 28 January 2008. 
<http://www.emcure.co.in/philippines.html>.  
40 “About Us.” Panacea-Biotec.com. 4 October 2007. 28 November 2007. 
<http://www.panacea-biotec.com>.  
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8.5. Indian Pharmaceutical Trades in the Philippines 
The above-mentioned factors legitimately pushed for parallel importation of drugs 
from India. From 1993 to 2008, Indian pharmaceutical supplies in the Philippines had 
irregular trending as demonstrated by the figures in Table 8.2.  
 
The earliest recorded pharmaceutical trade between India and the Philippines 
happened in 1993 with more than US $1 million. It was only in 2001 that the Indian 
pharmaceutical exports to the Philippines valued more than US $10 million.  By 2002 
and 2003, the exports increased further to more than US $8 million and US $9 
million, respectively. The annual import figure, however, plummeted to US $13 
million in 2004 and US $14 million in 2005. It regained some improvement in 2006 
with US $17 million and in 2007 with US $16 million. With the serious intention of 
the Philippine government to expand its health programme using generic drugs from 
India, the annual pharmaceutical exports grew by more than US $20 million for the 
first time in 2008. At the same time, the annual Philippine pharmaceutical exports to 
India gradually increased to more than US $1 million since 2006.  
  
A closer examination of the available data regarding the total pharmaceutical exports 
of India in the Philippines from 2002 to 2007 shows an uphill trend. In Table 8.3, 
drugs such as penicillin, antibiotics, vitamins, hormone, insulin, and medicaments 
comprised the big bulk of Indian pharmaceutical imports in the archipelago. Penicillin 
specifically streptomycin, for instance, ranked second after ‘other medicines’ from 
2002 to 2007 except in the years 2003 and 2004. The large demand for this specific 
pharmaceutical import only demonstrates the greater need of the Philippine 
government to address the increasing cases of deaths due to infections and diabetic 
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related complications in the country. Moreover, the parallel importation of Indian 
medicines per annum in the span of five years grew three times in value by 2007 from 
the recorded import figure in 2002 of US $8.22 millions.  
 
 
Table 8.3. Bulk of the Indian Pharmaceutical Exports to the 
Philippines, 
 2002-2007, (In US Million Dollars) 
 
Products 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Other Medicines 4.03 7.04 6.09 7.21 10.16 15.38 
Penicillin, 
Streptomycin 
2.57 1.14 1.20 2.95 3.32 4.18 
Antibiotics 0.98 1.46 2.94 2.56 2.83 3.23 
Vitamins 0.25 0.60 0.32 1.12 1.43 0.66 
Hormone Etc. 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.06 0.38 
Insulin 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.12 0.16 
Alkald 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.09 
Medicaments  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
TOTAL 8.22 10.56 10.82 14.47 18.09 24.10 
 
Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics 
(DGCI&S), Ministry of Commerce. Courtesy of Mr. Kantha Rao. 
 
 
As forecasted in 2010, the said figures will increase further in the next five years since 
the Philippine government has committed to pump up additional financial support 
through PITC. In 2010 alone, the government planned to import 1 billion pesos worth 
of drugs to lower the prices of medicines by half. This is already a good progress from 
the 2009 pharmaceutical imports from India and Pakistan worth 700 million pesos. 
Needless to say, the 2009 import was also significant since the figure improved twice 
as compared to the 2008 total transaction value of 350 million pesos. PITC is now 
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importing 45 brands and 78 stock-keeping units. It increased the brands to 75 in 2010 
making life-saving medicines affordable to the poor.41 
 
 
Figure 8.1. India Pharmaceutical Exports to the Philippines 2002-2007. Data are 
courtesy of Mr. Kantha Rao, Department of Commerce, India. 
 
Specifically, the government wants to import Indian produced drugs for common 
illnesses, hypertension and diabetes. These drugs are Ceterizine (anti-allergy); 
Sinvastatice (anti-cholesterol); Lozartane (anti-hypertension); Cifrofloxacine; 
Claritromycin; Clindamycin (antibiotics); and Gliclazide (anti-diabetes).42 As a result 
of President Arroyo’s state visit in India in October 2007, a MoA between PBL and 
FVSCI came into effect. Such agreement did not allow only the importation and 
distribution of medicines and vaccines but also the setting up of additional 100 clinics. 
                                                
41 Kristine Alave. “P1B drug importation eyed for 07.” Business World. 15 November 2006. 
28 February 2008. <http://www.pitc.gov.ph/archives/drug_importation.html>.  
42 David Cagahastian. “PTIC, company approve pact on generic drugs.” Manila Bulletin. 05 
December 2006. 28 February 2008. <http://www.pitc.gov.ph/archives/pact.html>.  
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A minimum of half a million Filipinos is expected to benefit from this joint 
collaboration. The estimated transaction value was approximately US $10 million.43 
PBL, on the other hand, built an innovative portfolio in combination vaccines under 
‘Easy’ range of vaccines that were distributed by the FVSCI.44 
 
The joint venture agreement between Emcure Pharmaceuticals and Macropharma 
Corporation provided new, effective and reasonably priced medicines to the 
Philippines.  Emcure Pharmaceuticals chose to award exclusive marketing rights to 
Macropharma Corporation because of their similar adherence to the current goods 
manufacturing practises and to the high ethical standards in drug marketing. Under 
this collaborative scheme, the former was assigned to manufacture and distribute 
pharmaceutical products and formulations in India while the latter was authorised to 
handle the marketing and retailing of Emcure products to cure renal diseases 
including anti-rejection drugs for renal transplant and anti-cancer therapy in the 
Philippines.45 
 
Other than these companies, there are Indian pharmaceutical firms that recently 
established satellite offices and/or found distributing partners in the country such as 
Torrent Pharmaceutical Limited (TPL), Glenmark Pharmaceutical Limited (GPL) and 
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Limited (DRLL). TPL, for instance, produces drugs such as 
Nicorandil, Tisperidone, Lamotrigine, Clopidogrel bisulphate and mixtures of 
hydrochloride drugs in curing cardiovascular, central nervous, gastrointestinal 
                                                
43 “$60-M trade agreements signed between RP, India.” Gov.ph. 04 October 2007. 29 
February 2008. <http://www.gov.ph/news/default.asp?i=18979>.  
44 “Panacea Biotec to supply vaccines in Philippines.” Biospectrumasia.com. 5 October 2007. 
29 February 2008. <http://www.biospectrumasia.com/content/051007PHL4487.asp. 5 October 
2007>. 
45 <http://www.gov.ph/news/default.asp?i=18979>.  
    243 
ailments as well offers anti-infective, anti-diabetic and pain management products. It 
is worthy to emphasise that the Philippines became the first subsidiary of Torrent in 
Asia.46  
 
GPL supplies the country with anti-bacterial, topical anti-fungal and corticosteroid, 
emollient, cough suppressant, H2 receptor antagonist, retinoid for topical use in acne, 
expectorant, anti-dandruff and anti-diabetic goods.47 On the other hand, the full blast 
operation of DRLL in the country since 2007 has provided the Philippine market the 
chance to access the company’s major brands such as Omez (Omiprazole), Stamio M 
(Amiodipine Maleate), Resilo (Losartan) Reclide and Finast (Finasteride).48 
 
8.6. Parallel Importation: Effects to Filipino Health 
The facilitation of parallel importation of Indian pharmaceutical drugs in the 
Philippines really helped the government to keep its commitment of a ‘Health for All’ 
to the Filipinos. It also provided some opportunities to small investors to open 
business specializing on affordable medicines practically in every nook and corner of 
the archipelago. 
 
The Department of Health (DOH) primarily benefits from this economic bilateral 
development. Faithful to the mandate of the Philippine Constitution, the agency was 
able to launch its new generic drugs campaign called Project 100 (Pl00). It aims to 
offer the public with quality drug packages for common diseases for only one hundred 
                                                
46 “Products.” Torrent Pharma.com. n.d. 28 January 2008. 
<http://www.torrentpharma.com/products.php>.   
47 “Product Lists.” Glenmark.com. April 2006.  28 January 2008. <http://glenmark.com>. 
48 Times of India. 28 September 2007. 
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pesos. Treatment drugs for hypertension, diabetes, and some common infectious 
diseases are the priorities of such campaign.  
 
Under Pl00, consumers can get more value for their money since they can purchase a 
complete set of treatment drugs instead of buying them individually. If these drugs 
were bought individually, these would cost a patient approximately 120 pesos to 500 
pesos additional expense.   These P100 packages are available nationwide in the 
pharmacies of 72 DOH-run hospitals such as Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Lung 
Center of the Philippines (LCP), National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI) and 
Philippine Children's Medical Center (PCMC) among others. They are also available 
in 28 selected local government hospitals. The P100 project is a joint collaboration of 
the PITC, Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), WHO and the EU. Specifically, the 
PITC has been working with the DOH in making essential drugs readily accessible 
even to the poorest of the poor. As counterpart, the BFAD is creating a regulatory 
environment that will support the project and provide quality assurance safeguards.49  
 
The parallel importation programme of the government also supported the National 
Drug Policy-Pharmaceutical Management Unit (NDP-PMU) of the Department of 
Health’s Pharma50 project. The primary goal of the project is to ensure that 
affordable, high quality, safe and effective medicines are always available, especially 
to the poor. Table 8.4 will obviously tell of the big savings that this programme can 
provide to the masses. These savings, which ranged from 22 to almost 500 percent, 
are considered a great relief for people who are living below the poverty line who can 
                                                
49 Katrice Jalbuena. “DOH sets Generic Drug Campaign.” The Manila Times. 14 February 
2008. 28 February 2008. 8. 
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now buy cheaper medicines and at the same time saves extra cents to purchase food 
and other basic needs. 
 
 
Table 8.4. Comparative Price of Drugs of NDP-PMU 50 Project 











100 mcg/dose x 200 
doses MDI 




250 mcg inhaler 
831.00 532.50 64.08 
Hypertension 
Atenolol (Tenormin) 
50 mg tablet 
17.75 9.05 50.99 
Hypertension 
Nifedipine (Adalat 
Retard) 20 mg 
capsule 







SMZ + 40 mg TMP/5 
ml susp. 50 mL bot. 




(Daonil) 5 mg tablet  
7.75 3.10 40 
 
Source: http://www.doh.gov.ph/programs/pharma50 
Note: PPDO (Price in Private Drug Outlets), PDOHH (Price in 30 DOH 
Hospitals), PD (Price Difference) 
 
 
Aside from this, the parallel importation is the government’s support for the Bnb 
programme. The latter is a network of small drugstores which sell over-the-counter 
(OTC) and prescriptive medicines at affordable prices that was launched in 2004.50 In 
                                                
50 Alave. 
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2007, there were 1,481 BnB outlets51 (see Figure 8.2) and more than 7,000 Bnby 
stores.52 In 2010, the Philippine government was even pushing that every barangay 




Figure 8.2. Botika ng Bayan Outlets in the Philippines. PITC.com 
                                                
51 “Botika ng Bayan.” Botika ng Bayan. n.d. 19 June 2010. <http://www.pitcpharma.com.ph>. 
52 “Botika ng Bayan Sells Cheaper Drugs.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 19 March 2007. 12 April 
2008. <http://www.pitc.gov.ph/archives/cheaper_drugs.html>.  
53 Cortez.  
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Thus, the parallel importation of drugs, the presence of the BnB/Bnby outlets, and the 
increasing patronage of generic drugs definitely contributed to lowering the prices of 
medicines in the Philippines. It does not imply, however, that the government should 
be complacent in this partial success since there are more things to do to further 
decrease the cost of drugs in the Philippines close to the regulated prices in India. As 
pointed out in Table 8.5, the prices of Philippine drugs despite the presence of parallel 
importation mechanism are still two to 20 times higher than the Indian prices. There is 
a need, therefore, for a continuous effort on the part of the Philippine government to 
monitor and implement price regulations on pharmaceutical drugs among commercial 
outlets. More so, the PITC should lower the prices in its own distribution outlets in 
every municipality and village all over the country to a tolerable profit mark after 
logistical expenses and production inputs are aptly accounted.  
 
 
Table 8.5.  Price Difference in Local Drugstores and Botika ng 
Bayan, 2010 







Plendil 2.5mg 29 14.35 49.48 
Lasix 40 mg 9.90 4.80 48.48 
Bactrim 80 mg 18.00 8.95 49.72 
Gardan 500 mg 19.25 6.00 31.17 
Ponstan 500 mg 25.50 11.25 44.12 
 
Source: Courtesy of Mrs. Ma Fe Santarita and Mrs. Rosemarie Billones. 25 
April 2010.  
 
*Botika ng Bayan outlet is located in selected areas in the cities and 
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8.7. Conclusion 
The above-mentioned state interventions particularly those initiated by the PITC 
indeed helped in lowering exorbitant prices of medicines in the country. The parallel 
importation is a successful instrument in crushing the decade-old drug cartels in 
which the sale of branded medicines was so high that they could hardly be afford by 
impoverished Filipinos. This dire scenario resulted to thousands of deaths and 
inconsiderable miseries to less privileged Filipinos.  
 
It is therefore imperative that the government through its regulators should find means 
to maximise pharmaceutical connections in both public and private avenues. While 
waiting for the right time to completely eliminate drug monopoly in the country and 
for the ripe time to strengthen the local pharmaceutical industry, the government 
should also explore other sources such as Pakistan in getting more supplies of 
medicines distributable both in commercial and government outlets. At the same time, 
the government through PITC should also actively invoke the trade-related 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in applying for the registration of soon-to-expire patents ahead of the 9-month 
window. Just like India, the Philippines should seriously weaken its patent law in 
order to resuscitate and/or rebuild its own pharmaceutical industry. For more than 
three decades, the Philippines already missed lots of business opportunities. 
 
It is now high time for the government to follow the painstaking steps made by India 
in the 1970s in improving the health conditions of its constituencies. This can possibly 
done by a serious reduction of the market entry barriers, legalisation of reverse 
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engineering and creation of a competitive domestic market.54 The latter is now 
gradually happening with an increasing participation of Indian companies in the 
pharmaceutical markets of the Philippines. It is just a matter of time that this initiative 
with India will bring favourable results beneficial to the Filipino people. To fast track 
its realisation, the government should increase PITC’s budget in procuring medicines 
as well as importing sizable volume of vitamins and other drugs. 
 
The importation of drugs must not be considered as an ideal solution. The Philippine 
government, on its part, must try to empower the local pharmaceutical industry to 
produce low cost but good quality drugs enough for domestic consumption. For the 
meantime, the Filipinos should make the best out of whatever benefits that Indian 
pharmaceutical industry can provide until such time when the Philippine local 
industry is already empowered to articulate the meaning of ‘health is wealth’ literally 
and figuratively.  
 
The ongoing and increasing circulation, therefore, of Indian pharmaceutical products 
in the archipelago is a good signal of the recent healthy bilateral ties between India and 
the Philippines. This inference is lucidly underscored in the last chapter.
                                                
54 Kale and Little. 607. 






The preceding chapter on the soaring demand of Indian pharmaceutical products in the 
country revealed the growing diversity of the evolving India-Philippine relations. This 
development along with the presence of Indian-based companies particularly on 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sector in the Philippines is just an example of 
many potential fields of cooperation between India and the Philippines in the near 
future. These advancements are part of the continuing efforts of India through its 
‘Look East’ policy (LEP) to reach out to all countries in Southeast Asia particularly 
the Philippines. The policy has been utilised by India to revive its relations with the 
Philippines after four decades of ‘cordial but distant relations’ since 1949 and 
followed by almost a decade of lukewarm responses to India’s LEP after its 
implementation in 1992.  
 
This chapter, therefore, argues that the re-energised India-Philippine relations 
represent the third phase of India’s LEP. What follows are discussions that addressed 
the main objectives and hypotheses of the research, offered in the early part of this 
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9.2. India-Philippine Recent Relations: The Third Phase of India’s LEP 
The process of documenting the recent India-Philippine relations as well as probing in 
this research that the said relations are now representing the third phase of India’s LEP 
has gone a long way.  
 
In particular, the questions raised by the four main objectives mentioned in the first 
chapter were discussed in Chapters 3 to 8. The first objective, “to explain the existence 
of a ‘cordial but distant behaviour’ between India and the Philippines in the context of 
their Cold War history of relations”, is elaborated in Chapter 4. The second objective, 
on the other hand, “to investigate whether the change in the foreign and economic 
policies of post Cold War Philippines and India resulted to compatible or contradictory 
policies towards regional cooperation”, is succinctly discussed in Chapter 5. The third 
objective, “to define India’s LEP in Southeast Asia and the Philippines in particular as 
a regional strategy”, is addressed in Chapter 3. Finally, the fourth objective, “to 
identify the concrete manifestations of regionalism in the recent India-Philippine 
relations”, is discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
 
Likewise, the presence of various collaborations and up-to-date literature in the early 
decade of the 21st Century has enabled this research to probe its hypotheses. Offered in 
the first chapter, I argued that the LEP has now evolved into a multidimensional 
mechanism fit to either engage bilaterally or multilaterally with all member states of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) including smaller economic 
players in the region such as the Philippines. Upon examination of various works on 
India-Philippine recent ties, I concluded that indeed India’s LEP has become a multi-
pronged instrument of regionalism in the Philippines and is now in its third phase. 
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This conclusion is made on the basis of various manifestations articulated in the 
previous chapters. 
 
Foremost, I observed that in terms of motivations, the LEP as an instrument of 
regionalism has evolved for over 18 years in three phases.  Scholars like GVC Naidu 
believed that the LEP was initially implemented to dispel misunderstandings created 
by Indian navy’s expansion in Southeast Asian waters in late 1980s. By early 1990s, 
however, the LEP was utilised by Narasimha Rao’s administration as a tool of 
economic diplomacy to complement India’s economic reforms. In 2001, the LEP 
became a full-blown multidimensional project when it assumed as a strategic tool to 
practically cover defence/maritime, economic and security dimensions of regionalism. 
This is evidenced by the accent of the LEP which was articulated in the Indian Naval 
Doctrine in March 2004.1 This enabled India to fully participate in several American-
initiated maritime exercises with its allies in South China Sea including the 
Philippines.  
 
The LEP’s role in advancing India’s relations with Southeast and East Asia 
particularly with the Philippines was also influenced by global developments from 
1990 to 2010 in three “tipping” periods. In each period, the flexibility of Indian 
diplomacy especially the LEP has been tested. In every test, India was able to offer 
solutions to ASEAN countries’ concerns and in a way shaped up the parameters of 
LEP.   
 
                                                
1 Sudhir Devare. India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006. 118. 
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The first period began with the conclusion of the Cold War in 1990 towards the 
occurrence of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997. India was able to offer 
financial assistance to the affected countries.  The second period started right after the 
AFC and the conduct of nuclear tests in South Asia in May 1998 until the attack of the 
World Trade Centre in 2001. Although India was highly criticised by Southeast Asian 
countries particularly the Philippines, it was able to prove its sincerity to work 
peacefully with these nation-states and fight against common enemies with allies like 
the United States of America (US).  The third period began from 2002, when George 
W. Bush’ administration declared war on terrorism and against Iraq, to 2010. Aside 
from its participation in various security and disaster related exercises with Southeast 
Asian countries, India also increased its foreign direct investments (FDI) and explored 
more partnerships with these countries including the Philippines. 
 
In terms of geographical focuses, the LEP is indeed in its third phase when it comes to 
the recent India-Philippine relations. I argued that the LEP was never implemented as 
a collective initiative of India in Southeast Asia. The latter’s responses to India also 
did not come as one package. In a closer examination with the information and 
literature available in circulation, it is clearly presented that the LEP has undergone 
three phases. It started with the six countries of ASEAN. Prior to July 1995, there were 
only six members in this regional body namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines. The first four including the Philippines are the 
original members of ASEAN but only the four countries achieved the Highly 
Performing Asian Economies’ (HPAE) status in late 1980s. The Philippines was not 
politically and economically prepared to actively respond to India’s initiative. Brunei, 
on the other hand, although small in size, was significantly valued by India as a 
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petroleum rich country. At this time, I found that the Philippines was still part of the 
LEP’s radar but remained in the periphery. 
 
After 1995, India also engaged with the newest members of the ASEAN like 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam (CMLV). Although they are small economic 
players, all of them are geographically and security important to India due to border, 
migration and transnational concerns as well as a check to China’s expansions. Again, 
the Philippines was still at the side-line. 
 
It was only in the early part of 2000 that regionalism began to actively work in India 
and Philippine relations. Along with the change of motivations and defining global 
developments, India at the beginning of the 21st Century was able to solicit positive 
responses from the Philippines by capitalizing on security dimension as well as 
economic integration of the LEP both in East Asia and the Pacific. Once more, the 
Philippines earned a place in India’s foreign and economic priorities along with China, 
Japan and South Korea as well as Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific island-
states. 
 
By and large, these findings cumulatively and contributory supported an earlier 
argument that the LEP as an instrument of India’s regionalism in the Philippines is 
now in its third phase. The findings also helped in justifying the use of ‘new 
regionalism’ as a vital concept in this research to explain the growing partnerships 
between India and the Philippines since 1992.  Hence, in the context of the post Cold 
War India and Philippine experience, regionalism is now defined as a 
multidimensional policy of integration covering political, economic, cultural, social, 
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security and even environmental aspects; and is promoted actively both by state and 
non-state actors such as private organisations and other social groupings either through 
bilateral or multilateral levels.  
 
Coming up with this definition has been more convenient after consulting the various 
points mentioned in the previous eight chapters.  As discussed in Chapter 1 for 
instance, the developments that occurred between 1980s and 1990s suggest that the 
launching of the LEP by the Indian government as a response to various global 
developments either directly or indirectly effects of Cold War’s conclusion. These 
include economic crisis, formation of trading blocs, interregional cooperation, and the 
weakness of existing regional arrangements.  
 
Looking closely at the nature of the LEP, the said policy was born in congruence with 
the proliferation of new regionalism. Aside from domestic financial woes, the 
existence of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an increasing influence of 
south-south cooperation, the surging presence of China in Southeast Asia, the 
weakness of World Trade Organization (WTO) and the sluggish performance of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) triggered India to join 
the bandwagon of global trend of new regionalism in the 1990s. These factors forced 
the administration of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to implement reforms on 
economy and foreign policy. Thus, the LEP came into existence and has become a 
regionalist strategy of India in Southeast Asia and a mechanism to reach out those 
countries in the region including the Philippines.   
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Nevertheless, the LEP has evolved into a multi-pronged strategy of India in advancing 
its interests not only in Southeast Asia but also the entire Eastern Asia. To some 
extent, the member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum2 (PIF) are now categorically 
included in an expanded coverage of the policy particularly Australia and New 
Zealand.  
 
The success of the LEP for almost two decades was greatly attributed to the dynamic 
interactions of key drivers of regionalism and regionalisation. The government sectors 
as well as private organisations and other members of civil societies worked together 
to implement this new regionalism strategy in enhancing the relations of India and 
countries of Southeast Asia including the Philippines. In reviewing the initiatives 
associated to the LEP since 1992, it was revealed that the governments of India and 
Southeast Asia and their related agencies closely collaborated with each other on 
various fields particularly on the economy. The respective governments also seriously 
involved the private sectors in their numerous partnerships. These were manifested by 
the existence of joint working groups, formation and participation of business councils 
and other media of cooperation.  
 
The participation of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI), Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) 
and Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) greatly facilitated the role of the LEP in 
revitalizing the relations of India and the Southeast Asian countries.  Conversely, the 
                                                
2 Pacific Islands Forum is composed of member countries such as Australia, the Cook Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Soloman Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. It 
was established in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum and later changed to its current name in 
2000. Since 2006, the associate members are New Caledonia and French Polynesia. “About 
Us.” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.org. n.d. 31 May 2010. <http://www.forumsec.org>.  
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LEP also made it possible for India’s private organisations to have active role in the 
building of political, economic and social cooperation with members of the ASEAN. 
CII, for instance, is helping the Indian government in connecting and cooperating with 
the ASEAN countries through governments and through their respective chamber of 
commerce and industries.3 In the case of the Philippines, the role of the Federation of 
Indian Chamber of Commerce Philippines (FICC) and the India-Philippine Business 
Council (IPBC) among others is also important in re-energizing the relations between 
India and the Philippines. This initiative complemented the various efforts of the 
Philippine government ranging from official visits to forging of agreements and 
memoranda of understanding (MoU). The presence of Indian settlements in the 
archipelago also matters to this development. 
 
The LEP since 1992 witnessed the evolution of its approaches from a mere naval 
diplomatic tool to an economic instrument and strategic mechanism beginning 2001. 
In fact, a considerable number of literature documented several success stories of 
India’s regionalism in Southeast and East Asian countries. Based on the literature that 
were consulted and discussed in Chapter 2, India was able to strengthen its relations 
with the ‘developed’ economies in the region through the special attention given by 
the Indian government to these countries in the nascent stage of the LEP.  
 
The discussion on the evolution of the LEP as a project and a policy in Southeast Asia 
continued in Chapter 3. This also led to the examination of the various definitions of 
regionalism and the role of regionalisation.   
 
                                                
3 Olive Tiu. “18 Indian companies eye BP Outsourcing with RP- PIA Press Release.” 
Philippine Information Agency. 27 November 2006. 3 July 2010. <http://www.pia.gov.ph>. 
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To put India’s LEP and India’s role in Southeast Asia in the proper context, the 
concept of the ‘region’ was examined. Based on definitions of various scholars, all 
regions including Southeast Asia are socially constructed and politically contested. 
Thus, any country including India is basically a legitimate part of any given political 
or economic area as long as there is acceptance from the members of the regional body 
that comprised a region. On historical ground, India used to be geographically 
categorised as part of Southeast Asia by the Allied Southern Command during World 
War II (WWII). This classification has been adhered until now by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) by designating India as the base of its Southeast Asia Regional 
Office (SEARO).  
 
It is also in Chapter 3 that the research hypothesis has been probed and substantiated.  
As a result, three variables such as motivations, global developments and geographical 
focuses were employed to examine the current status of the LEP. Among these 
variables, it is still the geographical focuses that emerged as the ideal framework to 
situate the recent relations of India and the Philippines in the context of India’s 
regionalism in Southeast Asia. As articulated in the said chapter, the LEP was used by 
India as a regionalist instrument to reach out to countries in the Southeast Asian region 
on incremental and individual bases. The first target was the ASEAN. India was very 
much attracted to the highly developed economic growth of the ASEAN grouping in 
late 1980s. It wanted to replicate the success stories of these countries.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Southeast Asian regional body before 1995 was composed 
of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. All these 
countries with the exception of the Philippines and Brunei were really high performing 
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Asian economies (HPAEs). Unfortunately, the Philippines, one of the founding 
members of ASEAN, did not respond much to India’s reoriented foreign policy as it 
was basically preoccupied in addressing the social problems and natural calamities at 
that time. The case of Brunei was another story. Due to its religious indifference4 
(Islam) with India, Brunei did not register much in former’s radar during that period. 
However, in the early 1990s, Brunei oil exports substantially attracted India to pay 
again a considerable attention to this small nation state.      
 
Despite this limitation, India still continued its engagement with the ASEAN region 
but usually with the four high performing Southeast Asian economies and Brunei. In 
the later part of 1990s, India managed to strengthen its relations with Brunei and later 
with the newly accepted members of the ASEAN such as CMLV. The status of the 
Philippine relations with India, on one hand, remained cordial but distant even at the 
turn of the 21st Century. No significant political or economic improvement that 
happened in the relations of India and the Philippines within this decade except for the 
first state visit of a Philippine president in India in 1997. The situation only changed 
when the ‘war on terror’ was launched after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the strong 
call for regional integration in East Asia was deemed imperative. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, India widened the spatial scope of its relations to include countries in East 
Asia and the Pacific. Aside from strengthening ties with China, Japan and South 
Korea, India also included in its ‘radar screen’ countries down under like Australia, 
New Zealand and other PIF members.  
 
                                                
4 Tridib Chakraborti. “India and Indochina States in the New Global Firmament: Charting the 
‘Look East’ Domain.” Power, Commerce and Influence: India’s Look East Experience. Eds. 
Rabindra Sen, et. al. New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2009. 233. 
    260 
These above-mentioned developments, however, for Jaswant Singh5, former India’s 
Minister of External Affairs, were all part of the second phase of the LEP.6 The Phase 
One for him, on the other hand, was India’s relations with the ASEAN wherein he 
treated all bilateral responses of the 10 member countries as one collective action. 
India, from New Delhi’s foreign office point of view, was conducting officially its 
relations only to one regional body in Southeast Asia, that is, the ASEAN. The 
expansion on membership that happened from 1990 to 2000 was considered internal. 
Thus, all transactions and cooperative stances either bilaterally or otherwise were 
jointly accounted under the ASEAN.  Hence, no matter how sluggish the economic 
collaboration or lukewarm the relations of the Philippines with India, the former along 
with the nine ASEAN member states were lumped under the first phase of India’s 
LEP.  
 
A closer examination of the diplomatic behaviours as well as economic advances of 
India in the region from 1990s onwards speaks about its compromise positions with 
regards to the individual condition of each ASEAN member country. In most cases, a 
single diplomatic initiative of India was done surprisingly through several channels 
and on different phases in the region in order to materialise the LEP. This was the 
situation that India faced when it started its rapprochement with ASEAN 6. The results 
obviously came in different packages. 
 
India also realised that the political and economic conditions of the Philippines were 
indeed distinctly unique from the experiences of other member countries of ASEAN 6 
                                                
5 Jaswant Singh was the Minister of External Affairs of India from 1998 to 2002. 
6 Shibashis Chatterjee and Sulagna Maitra. “Peace, Prosperity or Community?: 
Conceptualizing India’s Look East Policy.” Power, Commerce and Influence: India’s Look 
East Experience. Eds. Rabindra Sen, et. al. New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2009. 53. 
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in the first decade of the 21st Century. In fact, such special consideration is reflected in 
the conclusion of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement in 2009. India and the 
ASEAN member states agreed to implement a schedule of tariff commitments under 
‘normal track’ by batches except for the Philippines which again is treated as a 
separate entity. India agreed to tariff commitments from January 2010 to December 
2013 with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand and vice versa, as 
well as with CLMV. The last four states, however, are expected to completely 
implement the commitments by 2018. In the case of the Philippines, its government 
and India will reciprocally materialise the commitments from 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2018.7  This special consideration only proved that India was conducting its 
economic and foreign relations simultaneously on a bilateral basis with ASEAN 
member states, as argued in Chapter 2, contrary to the multilateral category mentioned 
earlier by some scholars and diplomats. 
 
The positive response and active politico-economic interactions of the Philippines with 
India transpired only in early 2000 onwards. This event happened during the time 
when India also expanded its influence further to Eastern Asia and some parts of 
Oceania.  
 
But why the response came a bit late from the Philippines? Why only in 2000? Having 
five decades behind to the said relations of India and the Philippines, why did the latter 
remain lukewarm to India’s initiative when most of its neighbours in the region were 
                                                
7 The document categorizes the tariff lines subject for reduction or elimination into normal and 
sensitive tracks, special products and highly sensitive lists. For more information, see 
Appendix S.  
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engrossed to the ‘India fever’8 in early 1990s?  The answer is simple. Aside from the 
social problems and natural disasters that the Philippines confronted in late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the Philippines and India remained as ‘prisoners of history.’ 
  
As expounded in Chapter 4, the relations between these countries were ‘cordial but 
distant’ and were heavily influenced by Cold War politics. For decades, India and the 
Philippines treated themselves with ‘unenthusiastic cordiality.’ While the other 
members of the ASEAN were embracing India’s initiative with receptiveness after the 
Cold War, the Philippines remained subdued. Such behaviour began at a time when 
the Philippines and India found themselves at the opposite ends of the politico-
ideological spectrum. India was identified with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) while the Philippines with the US. This lukewarm treatment as a 
result of the ideological bipolarisation lasted for more than four decades and some of 
its vestiges were unfortunately overstretched after the 1990s. This is best exemplified 
after India held the Pokhran II nuclear test in 1998. The Philippines along with the 
ASEAN member countries reacted strongly against it. However, not satisfied with the 
reaction at the ASEAN level, the Philippines even expressed its strong objections at 
significant international gatherings such as Group of Eight (G8) meeting in London 
and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Summit in Manila where the Philippines 
concurrently served as chairman of both ASEAN and ARF groupings.  
 
The period from 1991 to 2000 was the phase of reorientation while the decade from 
year 2001 to 2010 was considered the era of growing diversity in the relation. 
                                                
8 India fever is a term coined in 1993 by then Singapore’s Prime Minister and currently Senior 
Minister Goh Chok Tong to describe the swift transformation of the Indian economy and of 
India as a nation. 
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Although the trading interaction continued since the beginning of the official 
diplomatic relations in 1949, the total bilateral trade figures of India and the 
Philippines did not register more than US $100 million before 1994. Basically, the 
first decade of India’s LEP did not bring much excitement to the economic and 
political relations of the Philippines and India. However, this decade as aptly branded 
as the period of reorientation was good enough to start the ball rolling. In fact, former 
President Venkataraman mentioned that his state visit in Manila in 1991 had gained 
India a friend.9 The first state visit of Philippine President Fidel Ramos in India in 
1997 also contributed to these efforts. It should be noted, however, that no matter how 
little the impact of the state visit of former President Ramos in New Delhi, Indian 
scholars still considered the visit as a watershed of the relations. As cited in Chapter 5, 
the said official trip truly ‘broke the ice’ of distant ties between these countries. Series 
of agreements and memoranda of understanding were forged as a result of this visit. 
 
India’s LEP gained more prominence in the Philippines beginning in 2000 onwards, 
the period of growing diversity. Coincidentally, it was also the era where India’s LEP 
evolved to its third phase. It was also the decade where the existence of economic 
partnerships served as core of the revitalised India-Philippine relations. This 
development was further reinforced by high profile visits of Indian President Kalam in 
Manila in February 2006 and of Philippine President Arroyo in New Delhi in October 
2007. Such diplomatic exercises showed the seriousness of both governments to 
augment the ‘quiescent’ bilateral relations. The latter’s visit was considered a fillip to 
                                                
9 Ramasamy Venkataraman. My Presidential Years. New Delhi: Indus, 1994. 524. 
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India’s LEP on the premise that a strong bilateral relations of India with every 
ASEAN-member state is a prerequisite for India’s integration with the region.10 
 
Also, within this period, the merchandise bilateral trade, flows of investment, tourism, 
and even manpower steadily improved and consequently fuelled the renewed relations. 
In Chapter 6, for instance, the most notable result was the big leap on the merchandise 
trade between India and the Philippines in 2002. In this year, the two countries reached 
for the first time the US $500 million annual bilateral trade compared to the 2001 trade 
figure of US $300 million. This trade performance progressively improved in the 
succeeding years until it surpassed the US $1 billion mark in 2010. The growth of 
trade was indeed remarkable if not in greater proportion in the Philippine-Indian 
experience. However, it was still considered ‘underdeveloped’11 when compared to the 
performance of several countries in Southeast Asia such as Singapore and Malaysia 
which served as benchmarks. Nevertheless, this improvement is something to 
celebrate since it implies that the Philippines, as mentioned in President Arroyo’s 
speech, has returned back in the Indian radar. 
 
A closer examination of the trading data from 1997 to 2008 showed that the industrial 
manufactures emerged as the Philippine highest exported commodity to India while 
India’s highest exported goods to the Philippines was on food and food preparations 
along with industrial manufactures. The carabeef (water buffalo’s meat) imports also 
got a considerable chunk of Indian trade in the country.12 These goods should be given 
                                                
10 Anushree Bhattacharyya. “Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Visit to India.”  17 October 2007. 28 
November 2009. <http://www.ipcs.org/article/india-the-world/gloria-macapagal-arroyos-visit-
to-india-2394.html>. Quiescent means sluggish or stagnant. 
11 Ramon Kabigting. Interview. 23 September 2009. 
12 Navrekha Sharma. Interview. 28 January 2009. 
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more attention by the government and private sectors through the use of appropriate 
technology to enhance steady productions and sustain the demands of the local and 
global markets. 
 
The flow of Indian investments in the Philippines underwent a comparatively positive 
improvement since 2005, quite far from the figures registered in the 1970s. The 
expansion of Indian based/owned BPO companies in the Philippines along with the 
infusion of new investment into existing Indian businesses specializing on textiles, 
steel and other types of industry suggests strong economic linkages. 
 
The number of Indian tourists also increased through the years, although the figure is 
comparatively small with the influx of Indian tourists in other Southeast Asian cities. 
But it is only interesting to note that the number of tourists soared at times of financial 
and health related crises such as the occurrence of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) epidemic from 2002 to 2004 where the Philippines was spared 
from the deadly epidemic. Though phenomenal and short-lived, it was a plus to the 
Philippine tourism industry. In 2008, despite the global financial crisis, India remained 
as one of the fastest growing sources of foreign tourists in the country.  
 
In terms of manpower flows, the number of Indian skilled workers and professionals, 
although small in numbers, has cumulatively grew since 2004 to about 9,000. It should 
be noted that majority of them are working in various BPO companies as well as 
multinational enterprises in the country aside from those employed in the international 
organisations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), WHO, UN and others. 
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Another vivid manifestation of LEP’s influence in India-Philippine relations is the 
swift transformation of the BPO industry in the archipelago. As presented in Chapter 
7, the presence of 24 Indian based/owned BPO companies with facilities are scattered 
in the new wave cities (NWC) all over the country is an undeniable product of India’s 
LEP. The confidence of the Indian investors in pouring their wealth into the 
Philippines is not just an outright result of globalisation. It is also a product of close 
coordination and active facilitation of both private and public sectors. This 
government-private sector collaboration is a clear example of the healthy interface of 
regionalism and regionalisation as key drivers of India’s LEP in the Philippines. The 
presence of these Indian based/owned BPO companies provided jobs to sizable 
number of Filipinos and improved the standard of living of those directly involved in 
the business such as the contact centre agents. With the increasing demand of this 
industry, physical infrastructures and technological facilities in the areas outside of 
Manila are also enhanced. The prospects of favourable returns of this ‘sunshine’ 
industry also triggered major improvements in tertiary education’s curriculum. In its 
current state, the curriculum is now giving special emphasis on English language 
proficiency as well as on science and technology.  
 
The BPO industry has moved the Philippines closer to India economically through 
inter-firm linkages such as joint ventures. Other business deals, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, also raised the potentials of Indian transnational communities as 
gatekeepers of opportunities. This special connection reinforced the influence of 
India’s LEP in facilitating the smooth presence not only of Indian BPO companies in 
the Philippines but also of other Indian owned enterprises. This development favoured 
the Indian companies in the Philippines to be benevolent rather than as threat to the 
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Filipinos. For the Filipino people and the Philippine government, the presence of these 
enterprises in the country meant more employment opportunities. For Indians, on the 
other hand, they simply implied business as well as security by making the Philippines 
as their back office recovery facilities in case a political turmoil rocks or a calamity 
strikes in India or in other areas of operation. 
 
The increase of parallel imports of Indian pharmaceutical products in the Philippines is 
another important aspect of India-Philippine relations where the LEP’s influence is at 
work. Through the generic drugs and related goods produced by the Indian 
pharmaceutical companies, the prices of commonly used drugs by the Filipinos are 
brought down to half the cost. These partnerships, as argued in Chapter 8, also 
provided a ‘lifeline’ to the legacy project of then President Arroyo such as Botika ng 
Bayan and Botika sa Barangay. Enshrined in the context of ‘health is wealth’, this 
pharmaceutical collaboration means two things to different people. It implies a literal 
appreciation of the real value of health for the Filipino consumers through cheaper 
medicines and a figurative meaning of profit to both Indian and Filipino businessmen. 
 
Given these tangible manifestations, it is now undeniable that India-Philippine 
relations have reached the third phase of India’s LEP. The interviews and the data 
gathered in the field especially those economic related matters corroborated my 
argument that indeed the India-Philippine relations are already re-energised by the 
presence of India’s LEP especially during the periods from 2000 onwards. It should be 
taken into consideration, however, that the recent relations of the Philippines with 
India do not enjoy an exclusivity in the latest phase of India’s LEP. The Philippines 
also shares this attention together with Australia, New Zealand and some Pacific 
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Island states. Along with this development, India also intensified its relations with 
Northeast Asian countries while strengthened and maintained existing favourable ties 
with the ASEAN. In general, the LEP is now effectively employed by India as a 
regionalist tool not only to reach out but also to actively engage to all countries in 
Eastern Asia and the Pacific, regardless of size and economic status, through various 
actors including civil society. 
 
9.3. The Role of Civil Societies in India-Philippine Relations 
Aside from the actors of state and private sectors, it is also interesting to note that the 
India’s LEP and the subsequent resuscitation of India and Philippine relations are also 
facilitated by the presence of civil society players. In fact, this does not happen only in 
the Philippines but to all member countries of the ASEAN. In particular, various actors 
and voluntary associations, such as the chambers of business, non-governmental 
organisations, community-based organisations, interest groups, academic institutions, 
clan and kinship circles, lobbies, and others13, are working to improve the relations 
between India and the Philippines. Similar to Soderbaum’s observations in South 
Africa, the regional cooperation and networking among civil society actors between 
India and the Philippines, particularly in promoting the LEP, prominently arise in the 
aspects of social and economic justice, trade and globalisation, human rights and law, 
health, food security, as well as regional research and education networks.   
 
Foremost of these civil societies are the chambers of business in both India and the 
Philippines. In India, the Federation of Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (FICCI), Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Associated Chambers of 
                                                
13 Fredrik Soderbaum. “Regionalisation and Civil Society: The Case of Southern Africa” New 
Political Economy (September 2007): 326. 
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Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) worked on national scale while India 
Chemical Council, Chemicals and Allied Products Export Promotion Council 
(CAPEXCIL) for chemical businesses and National Association of Software Services 
Companies (NASSCOM) for information technology and business process outsourcing 
(BPO) enterprises on sectoral aspects. They initiated various trade fairs and sellers-
buyers meetings both in India and the Philippines.  
 
In the Philippines, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), Filipino 
Indian Chamber of Commerce in the national scale while the Business Process 
Outsourcing Association of the Philippines (BPAP) and BPO Association Services 
Unlimited (BSAU) for BPO businesses are actively collaborating with their Indian 
counterparts as well as with Indian and Philippine bureaucrats. In fact, they 
participated in various joint business councils in providing an institutional framework 
for trade and investments for both countries. 
 
The existence of kinship circles and faith-based organizations also facilitated the 
advancement of the India-Philippine relations.  People of Indian origin and the 
communities and associations they established through the years provided an avenue to 
collaborate and interact with their relatives and business contacts in India. By and 
large, they served as conduits of exchange and collaboration between their kin in India 
and kiths in the Philippines. Various Sikh and Sindhi business associations all over the 
Philippines, social groups such as Indian Ladies Club and Merry Maidens Club, as 
well as Khalsa Diwan contributed in facilitating, mediating and channeling the 
interests of people in a wider regional context. 
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It is also interesting to note that other non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as 
the Ramos Peace and Development Foundation (RPDF) of the Philippines, and 
academic institutions such as Asian Institute of Management also helped in promoting 
the relations of two countries. RPDF, for instance, coordinated and participated in a 
CII organised partnership summit in India while the Philippine-based Asian Institute of 
Management collaborated with Thapar Institute of Technology in Pune to collaborate 
in the promotion of management education in India. 
 
Another important observation in the regionalisation between India and the Philippines 
is the multiplicity of interactions among civil societies between national, regional and 
other transnational levels. It is a common misnomer that regional transactions 
happened usually between government to government and in national scale. 
Institutions at local level are only assumed to be riding on the national bandwagon. In 
reality, however, some important developments are happening and facilitated by 
people in the local level.  Locally based- information and communication technology 
(ICT) councils in the Philippines such as the Bacolod-Negros Occidental Federation 
for Information and Communications Technology (BNEFIT), for example, can interact 
directly with its business process outsourcing (BPO) counterparts in India without 
necessarily involving certain Philippine government agency or even its national 
confederation especially at the initial stage of transaction. The same is true for India.   
 
In terms of health cooperation, HealthCORE, a private corporation specializing in 
healthcare research and communications, and the National Accreditation Board for 
Hospitals and Healthcare Providers (NABH) of India coordinated in holding the 1st 
Philippine Global Healthcare Forum in Quezon City, Philippines. It reaffirmed the 
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cooperation of two countries in improving the state of healthcare in both countries. 
Such activity was designed to discuss and exchange information on how the 
Philippines, with the help of India, can develop into an international healthcare hub.14 
 
It is also interesting to note that aside from civil society, the role of popular culture has 
been highlighted in the continuous discourse on regionalisation. Popular culture is 
considered as a powerful regionalising engine as manifested by the growing patronage 
of India’s Bollywood movies and music in Southeast Asia. In fact, the Philippines has 
been gradually influenced by Bollywood fever and some collaborative projects 
between India and Philippine movie outfits were produced either in India or in the 
Philippines. The latest Philippine produced film that was made in India involving 
Filipino and Indian actors happened in 2010. Knowing the potentials of this industry, 
former Philippine president Arroyo in 2007 invited Indian film producers to consider 
some scenic sites of the Philippines as their possible shooting locations for Bollywood 
film productions. Such developments are indeed exciting to witness in the years to 
come for both enthusiasts and players alike. 
 
9.4. Future Directions 
To follow again an argument that the interest of doing research and publication 
follows where development is happening, then the most recent advancements 
particularly in 2011 between India and the Philippines are expected to generate 
interests among scholars and enthusiasts. The opening of the Philippine Airlines’ 
(PAL) direct flight service between New Delhi and Manila since March 2011 has 
                                                
14 “Philippines, India Re-affirm Partnership in Health Services, Medicine, Global Healthcare 
Travel.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 11 November 2011. 
<http://lifestyle.inquirer.net/22739/philippines-india-re-affirm-partnership-in-health-services-
medicine-global-healthcare-travel>. 
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already attracted considerable attention from various sectors. Even the Philippine 
media started to look at India seriously. Some journalists, in their columns in major 
Philippine broadsheets, even lamented the missed opportunities of the Philippines by 
not taking advantage of the ‘rising India’. Thus, this development is something to 
watch closely as it opens more avenues of interaction and collaboration among Indians 
and Filipinos in the years to come. 
 
This research is just the beginning. It hopes to contribute to the limited number of 
literature that focused on India’s relations with the ‘economically weak, politically 
susceptible and lately incorporated countries within the ASEAN orbit’.15 It looks 
forward that other interested scholars will also start to focus their attention to India’s 
relations with small economies in Eastern Asia as their contribution in the creation of a 
comprehensive narrative useful towards the real integration of India in the East Asian 
Community (EAC) and to the realisation of former President Kalam’s vision of Pan 
Asian Community of Peace and Progress in the future. Furthermore, this research is 
expected to serve as a baseline or model to future undertakings interested in examining 
the ties of the Philippines with the other countries in South Asia such as Pakistan and 
Bangladesh among others. 
 
Being just a tip of an iceberg, there are number of things that should be done 
especially on the recent development when both state and non-state actors of India and 
the Philippines explored other forms of cooperation. These works in progress will 
surely create interests in various academic quarters and it only depends now to 
literature on how fast it can keep tract such development.  
                                                
15 Chakraborti. 233. 
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Among the interesting topics to consider in the near future are the influx of Filipino 
tourists in India and vice versa, the rise of Filipino skilled workers in India, the growth 
of Indian human capital in the archipelago, as well as the expansion of Indian 
businesses in the Philippines and of Filipino businesses in India as well.  
 
I am also interested to look at the advancement of bio-technology collaborations 
between the two countries and its related industries such as dairy production.  I 
observed that various partnerships were already conducted in the past but these did not 
prosper as envisioned. There is a convincing reason, therefore, of the need to 
investigate various barriers that impede full implementation and the possible 
advantages it will bring to the Philippines once successful. 
 
It is also imperative to continuously keep track the expansion of Indian BPO 
companies in the Philippines especially with the ongoing mergers, acquisitions and 
collaborations of India and Philippine companies. It is likewise interesting to study the 
impact of their expansion in the infrastructural, lifestyle and health conditions of the 
involved provinces in the archipelago. 
 
Another exciting development to observe is on energy cooperation between India and 
the Philippines. The year 2011 witnessed the signing of memorandum of agreement to 
establish three liquefied natural gas power plants in Tawi-Tawi in southern Philippines 
and in Cagayan province located in the northern part of the archipelago. This is 
something to watch along with the progress of India-Philippine jatropha consortium 
projects to solve the rising power crisis of the Philippines.  
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India and the Philippines are also pursuing areas of cooperation in agriculture basically 
in dairy cooperatives, agro-forestry and herbal medicines. The latter is categorised 
under the proposed science and technology cooperation.16  
 
Since India’s LEP is an evolving concept, some aspects of its influence to India-
Philippines relations are still in the pipeline or in their early stages. The economic 
component has already been harnessed and the two countries are now working hard to 
take advantage of various fields of cooperation including strategic partnership. In fact, 
the strategic aspect began to show some improvements with the forging of defence 
cooperation agreement in February 2006.17 I am also interested to know the potential 
role of India in the Philippines’ concerns on Spratly and to China’s growing maritime 
supremacy in the area. Certainly, this is a ‘hot’ issue to keep tract especially among 
security and strategic observers. 
 
Similarly, it is also essential to follow up those unfinished projects of early Filipino 
Indologists on early links of the Philippines and India through the presence of 
Sanskrit, Ramayana and other ancient cultural artefacts. While looking for materials in 
the national archives of India and the Philippines particularly on Indian communities 
in the archipelago, I realised the lack of literature that will explain the arrival and 
settlement of Indians in the country since 16th Century. I was even surprised that the 
well-publicised British occupation of Manila from 1762 to 1764 did not properly 
document the presence of Indian sepoys from Madras, India. I am hoping that doing 
                                                
16 Laura Del Rosario. “Waiting for Visits from India since 1998.” Interview. Harun Riaz. 
Philippines in Focus. June 2005. 8. Print. 
17 Despite the document’s availability, the source of information requested not to include it as 
part of the dissertation’s appendices for confidential reason.  
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this historical literature will contribute towards the completion of the narrative on 
India and Philippine relations since pre-colonial era.  
 
Another important development to watch out is the effect of Indian-ASEAN FTA 
particularly the realisation of India and Philippine tariff commitments by 2018. For 
sure, this will create a lot of buzz in various sectors and the subsequent progressive 
interactions among players in the coming future. Since these collaborations are works 
in progress, the results are obviously too early to assess. Nevertheless, these will 




As a concluding chapter, it primarily encapsulates the effort of this research in 
addressing the main hypothesis and objectives offered in the first chapter. The data 
and information gathered from the archival research and interviews substantiated the 
questions raised by the research objectives.  
 
Both the literature and the informants identified the Cold War politics as the culprit in 
the existence of ‘cordial but distant relations’ between India and the Philippines for 
almost 40 years. Fortunately, India was able to seize the opportunity of implementing 
the LEP in 1992 to resuscitate its relations with eastern neighbours including the 
Philippines. In 2000, the Philippines finally responded to India’s initiative which 
resulted to various forms of cooperation and partnerships especially in the field of 
information technology and pharmaceuticals sectors. With such response coming from 
a small economic player like the Philippines, this research has enabled to prove its 
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hypothesis that the LEP has indeed evolved into a multidimensional tool of 
regionalism fit to engage bilaterally and multilaterally to all (both big and small) 
players in Eastern Asia.  Furthermore, the developments contemporary to the LEP’s 
existence in terms of motivations, global developments and geographical focuses 
suggest that the recent India-Philippine relations represent the third phase of India’s 
LEP.  
 
Given the seriousness and arduous efforts of India in advancing further the LEP as a 
regionalism tool and its recent increasing interaction with the Philippines, it is 
expected that it will not take long to witness a number of collaborative projects and 
partnerships between the two countries. These developments are more than enough to 
create excitements among bureaucrats, businessmen and other key players as well as 
motivate scholars to develop their future research projects. 
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